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INTRODUCTION

1

UDICIAL supremacy posits that (i) the Supreme Court has
ultimate authority to interpret the Constitution's meaning; 1
) the Court's constitutional decisions should be taken as binding on, and by, all other governmental actors 2-including Congress3 and the President; 4 and (iii) only by amending
constitutional text can the electorate supersede the Court's declarations of constitutional law. 5 Judicial supremacy has motivated
political and scholafly concern about the "countermajoritarian"
nature of judicial review. It has inflated the stakes in selecting

I. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969) ("[I]t is the responsibility of this Court to act as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution."); Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) ("[T]his Court [is the] ultimate interpreter of
the Constitution.").
2. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. l, 18 (1958) ("[T]he federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution . . . . It follows that the
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the
Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes
it of binding effect on the States. . . . Every state legislator and executive and
judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath . . . 'to support this
Constitution.' ").
3. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966) (Congress
lacks power "to enact statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protection and due
process decisions of this Court.").
4. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) ("[l]t is the province
and the duty of this Court to 'say what the law is' with respect to the claim of
[executive] privilege presented in this case.") (citing Marbuy v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(l Cranch) 137 (1803)).
5. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 518 (1989)
(plurality opinion of Rehquist, CJ.) ("Stare decisis is a cornerstone of our legal
system, but it has less power in constitutional cases, where, save for constitutional amendments, this Court is the only body able to make needed changes.").
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Supreme Court Justices. And it is nowhere to be found in the
Constitution's text.
This article evaluates judicial supremacy from the perspective
of ordinary voters-individual members of the contemporary
electorate otherwise empowered to enact legislation through its
presidential and congressional representatives. I take this perspective because the individual voter is the ultimate and authoritative decisionmaker for two foundational events of constitutional
policymaking. First, when the President, the Congress, and state
legislatures join to create constitutional texts-the formal subjects of judicial review-they are accountable to voters throughout the national electorate. 6 Second, when the President and the
Senate select Supreme Court Justices-the individuals who exercise the powers of judicial review-they are accountable to voters
throughout the national electorate. 7 Thus, the individual voter's
perspective should be a critical focus for anyone concerned about
the proper relationship between judicial review and
majoritarianism. s
I begin with an issue of basic political self-interest. Judicial
supremacy does not deny the right of American voters to supersede Supreme Court decisions by amending the Constitution's
text. But why should the electorate have to change constitutional
text, and satisfy the tortuous processes of article V, to override a
6. While not formally involved in article V amendment processes, the President is a major participant in the politics of constitutional amendment. See infra
notes 306-09 and accompanying text (discussing President Bush's political initiative for "constitutional amendment to protect the Hag"). Bruce Ackerman has
proposed new procedures for formal constitutional amendment in which the
President would play a crucial role. See Ackerman, Transformative Appointments,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1164, 1182 (1988).
7. Cf M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 4
( 1982) [hereinafter PERRY I] (judicial review is in tension with axiom of
"electorally accountable policymaking"). But see M. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS,
AND LAw 164 (1988) [hereinafter PERRY II] (suggesting earlier view of axiomatic
electorally accountable policymaking was mistaken). I do not take an external
perspective that evaluates majoritarianism and accountability as a moral principle. Instead, I take an internal perspective that evaluates accountability as a
practical good for political competitors in a largely given majoritarian structure.
For further examination of this starting point, see infra notes 44-58 and accompanying text.
8. Those traditionally concerned with the countermajoritarian difficulties of
judicial review focus on the majoritarian roots of the policies that courts deem
"unconstitutional." See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23
(l 962). In this article, I begin with the foundations of constitutionalism that are
themselves majoritarian. Cf Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE LJ. 1013, 1045-49 (1984).

1991]

A

CRITIQUE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY

285

constitutional decision of the Court with which they disagree? 9
Why not, for example, a system in which Congress and the President together may "correct" the Supreme Court's interpretations
of constitutional meaning by statute-a regime of congressional

supremacy? 10
From the voters' perspective, the relative merits of judicial
supremacy and congressional supremacy for interpreting constitutional texts depend on evaluating differences in results and
political processes under each regime. Judicial supremacy, congressional supremacy, or some alternative regime, makes sense
only as a mechanism for maximizing the likelihood that whatever
function voters might want judicial review to serve will, in fact, be
served. Because judicial supremacy applies only to the Court's
interpretation of constitutional texts, goals for judicial reviewand, therefore, reasons for judicial supremacy-should depend
on justifications for constitutional supremacy . 11
9. U.S. CONST. art. V (prescribing arduous process for amending
Constitution).
10. This is the essential question even when courts invalidate state policies.
When the Supreme Court decides that states may not prohibit abortion or adopt
affirmative action plans, for example, it establishes national standards that restrict
congressional discretion as well as state discretion. Given prevailing practices
and premises about judicial review, Congress may not repeal or dilute limits on
state discretion as defined by the Supreme Court in the name of the Constitution. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 318 (1851) ("If
the Constitution excluded the states from making any law regulating commerce,
certainly Congress cannot re-grant, or in any manner reconvey to the states that
power."); see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966)
("[C]ongress' power under § 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the
guarantees of the [Fourteenth] Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to
restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees.");]. CHOPER,jUDICIAL REVIEW AND
THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 199 (1980) ("When the Supreme Court invalidates state (or private) action under the initial sections of the thirteenth, fourteenth, or fifteenth amendments, ... these decisions may not be overturned by
ordinary federal legislation."); Chang, Conflict, Coherence, and Constitutional Intent,
72 IowA L. REV. 753, 778 n.81 (1987). Thus, given my starting point-a focus
on the national electorate's authority to create constitutional provisions, enact
federal legislation, and select Supreme Court Justices-as well as uncontested
notions of federal supremacy, I accept that state legislatures should not have
interpretive supremacy over federal courts. Indeed, as Dean Brest has noted,
given federal supremacy, "[w]hatever the scope of Congress' constitutional decisionmaking authority, ... it is implausible that a state legislature could properly
contradict a federal decision." Brest, Congress as a Constitutional Decisionmaker and
Its Power to Counter judicial Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REV. 57, 68 n.28 (1986). Furthermore, I do not question the need for a single body with supreme authority to
interpret constitutional provisions and, therefore, whether the President may
properly refuse to execute a law because he believes it unconstitutional. Cf Lee,
The Provinces of Constitutional Interpretation, 61 TuL. L. REV. 1009, 1015 (1987)
(presidential refusal to execute law based on perception of unconstitutionality is
inconsistent with separated powers and represents prescription for anarchy).
11. One might, however, posit that justifications for constitutional
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The principles of constitutional supremacy posit that
(i) constitutional text may not be enacted, repealed, or amended
by Congress; 12 and (ii) constitutional provisions supersede conflicting national legislation. 18 The second element of constitutional supremacy requires some process for determining whether
national legislation does conflict with the requirements of constitutional text. Either judicial supremacy or congressional
supremacy could provide such a process. Thus, the second element of constitutional supremacy restates the question: Why judicial supremacy?
The first element of constitutional supremacy imposes limits
on the discretion of the national electorate's representatives beyond those imposed by judicial supremacy: The national electorate may not change or create constitutional text by ordinary
article I legislative processes, but may do so only by extraordinary
article V amendment processes. 14 Thus, again from the voters'
perspective, a more fundamental question: Rather than a regime
of constitutional supremacy, why not statutory supremacy-a regime
in which "constitutional" text has the same status as statutory text
enacted by Congress? Why not a regime in which Congress and
the President together may enact whatever legal texts they want,
including, for example, amendments to the text of the first
amendment, or even amendments to the legislative processes and
structures prescribed in article 1? 15 In short, toward determining
supremacy should depend on justifications for judicial supremacy. See infra note
366. Yet, such an argument would run against American history, as principles of
constitutional supremacy were employed (through the distinctions between article I and article V) before notions of judicial review, let alone judicial
supremacy, were developed and accepted.
12. See U.S. CONST. art. V; infra notes 14, 15 & 43.
13. See U.S. CONST. art. VI; infra note 44. These two principles of constitutional supremacy distinguish constitutional provisions from congressional legislation, because Congress does have discretion to enact, repeal and amend
statutes.
14. The national electorate both creates constitutional provisions that limit
congressional and local discretion, U.S. CoNST. art. V., and selects the Supreme
Court Justices who will "interpret" and enforce those provisions that limit legislative discretion, U.S. CONST. art. I. I am not now interested in distinctions between article V policymaking and article I policymaking beyond the greater
difficulty of acting under the former than the latter. For a discussion of other
significant differences between article I and article V policymaking, see infra note
202; note 248 and accompanying text.
15. Under congressional supremacy, Congress would have authority, for
example, to enact a statute "correcting" the Supreme Court's "interpretation"
of the due process clause in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). But because of
constitutional supremacy, Congress would not be able to repeal the due process
clause itself. Furthermore, congressional supremacy as I consider it would not
have Congress reversing the results of a particular case, but changing legal prin-
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the merits of judicial supremacy in interpreting constitutional
texts, voters might ask: Other than to overturn Supreme Court
decisions, why make public policy with "constitutional" texts, immune from legislative revision, rather than with ordinary legislative texts?
Although the national electorate might choose to circumscribe ordinary legislation by creating new constitutional provisions, the political system today uses the principles of
constitutional supremacy primarily by applying them to aging
constitutional texts created by people generations ago. Toward
understanding how this "intertemporal difficulty" 16 affects the
relative merits of constitutional supremacy and statutory
supremacy from the perspective of voters today, one must begin
with otherwise analogous circumstances in which the passage of
time is irrelevant.
Thus, Part II of this article will bypass the complexities of
intergenerational decisionmaking by considering the merits of
constitutional supremacy from the perspective of those who actually create constitutional texts. Why might political competitors
wish to make national policy by creating constitutional provisions
rather than by enacting ordinary congressional legislation? By
answering this question, I can consider how people who have created new constitutional provisions would define ideal goals for
judicial review 17-their preferred brand of constitutional "interpretation." By identifying ideal definitions of "interpretation," I
can then consider whether judicial supremacy or congressional
supremacy is a better mechanism for inducing government officials to fulfill each ideal.
In Part III, the article will return to contemporary political
practice. I reintroduce intertemporal issues by asking whether
and why it makes sense for members of the national electorate
ciples applicable to future cases. Abraham Lincoln made this distinction when
discussing his opposition to Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). Lincoln said, "in so far as it is decided in favor of Dred Scott's master and against
Dred Scott and his family, I do not propose to disturb or resist the decision." 2
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 516 (R. Basler ed. 1953) (speech
of July 17, 1858). Yet Lincoln also said, "we nevertheless do oppose that decision as a political rule . . . . We propose so resisting it if we can, and a new
judicial rule established upon this subject." Id. at 494 (speech of July 10, 1858).
16. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1046.
17. I introduce the idea of constitutional representation-that Justices, in "interpreting" constitutional provisions, should endeavor to make the same decisions the electorate would make if it were engaged in extraordinary constitutional
politics toward creating constitutional texts. See infra text accompanying notes
63-66, 90-94 & 106-08.
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today to apply the principles of constitutional supremacy to aging
texts, rather than either (i) to create new supreme texts or (ii) to
establish a regime of statutory supremacy. By answering this
question, I can consider ideal definitions of constitutional "interpretation" for the national electorate today. 18 I can then consider
whether an "interpretive" regime of judicial supremacy or congressional supremacy can better achieve these ideal definitions of
"interpretation" and, therefore, better serve the electorate's reasons for applying principles of constitutional supremacy to the
Constitution's aging texts.19
This article reaches a conclusion to which many might react
with discomfort: While voters have good reason to exploit the
principles of constitutional supremacy to define a category of
supreme legal text that cannot be modified by ordinary political
processes, an ethic of judicial supremacy in interpreting those
supreme texts is surprisingly problematic. 20 I suggest that from
18. I suggest the same "interpretive" ideal for the electorate today as for
those who actually create their own constitutional provisions-constitutional
representation: identifying the choices voters would make if engaged in extraordinary constitutional politics. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 144-48, 175-82, 193-94 & 207-18. This approach
provides a method for understanding and resolving the "intertemporal difficulty" involved in applying aging constitutional provisions to contemporary social conflict. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1045-49; Chang, supra note 10,
at 784-94; Kahn, Reason and Will in the Origins of American Constitutionalism, 98 YALE
LJ. 449, 451, 517 (1989) (originalism is phase in constitutional development
that ultimately denies real (present) popular sovereignty). Thus, the "interpretive" goals generated by this analysis might supplant (or, more likely, exacerbate) the "interpretivism" versus "noninterpretivism" dilemma. See generally,
e.g., PERRY I, supra note 7, at 11. For a comparison of constitutional representation with other theories of interpretation, see infra notes 149-74 and accompanying text.
19. Cf Gavison, The Implications of jurisprudential Theories for Judicial Election,
Selection, and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1617, 1622 (1988) ("[B]oth selection and accountability presuppose that we know what judging entails, and what
constitutes performing well as a judge."); Shapiro.Judicial Selection and the Design
of Clumsy Institutions, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1555, 1557-58 (1988) (theories for selecting adjudicators must be linked to theories of adjudication).
20. Cf P. DIMOND, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL CHOICE: THE ROLE
OF PROVISIONAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY 11-20 ( 1989) (advocating judicial finality for issues of political process and representation reinforcement; congressional override for other issues); Conkle, Nonoriginalist Constitutional Rights and the
Problem ofjudicial Finality, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q 9, 9-23 (1985) (advocating
judicial finality for "originalist" decisions and power of Congress to override
"nonoriginalist" decisions for "human rights" issues); Dimond, Provisional Review: An Exploratory Essay on an Alternative Form of judicial Review, 12 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q 201, 201-02, 229-38 (1985) (same as P. DIMOND, supra); Sandalow,
judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1188 (1977) (advocating
judicial deference to congressional choices that reflect a deliberate and broadly
based political judgment). I question judicial supremacy for all issues of constitutional interpretation and, indeed, suggest that it is equally problematic, if not
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the perspective of the national electorate, judicial review supplemented by congressional supremacy-an ethic that Congress has authority to supersede the Court's constitutional interpretations by
statute 21 -might well better secure the benefits that constitutional
supremacy can provide.22
more so, with respect to originalist decisions. For further evaluation of the relationship between originalism and judicial supremacy, see infra text accompanying notes 149-53 & 234-35.
21. At the same time, however, I argue that an ethic of congressional
supremacy should not necessarily induce congressional eagerness to exercise
that authority. Indeed, that so many probably will be.so uncomfortable with the
idea of congressional supremacy suggests that the power, even if recognized,
would be cautiously employed. Nevertheless, I suggest that the electorate might
well benefit from a reallocation of institutional responsibility for making constitutional law. See infra text accompanying notes 219-20; notes 240 & 244; cf. R.
NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES 3 (1989) (courts should do less, thereby invigorating political resolution of constitutional issues). Professor Nagel's argument suffers the flaws of all arguments for judicial deference-the benefits of
judicial decisionmaking are silenced. See infra text accompanying notes 266-68,
277-92 (losses from judicial deference); notes 250 & 348 (same); note 362
(losses from Michael Perry's option of withdrawing federal jurisdiction). Congressional supremacy, in contrast, retains judicial review as a good, while serving
Professor Nagel's goal of public responsibility for constitutional law through interaction between the Court and Congress.
22. I will consider judicial "life-tenure" in passing, but the subject will not
be of central concern. A recent symposium has addressed this issue at length.
See Bell, Principles and Methods ofjudicial Selection in France, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1757
( 1988) (process of judicial selection should be tailored to needs of varying judicial functions); Gavison, supra note 19; Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A judge's Perspective of judicial Retention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969
( 1988) (discussing the dangers of eliminating judicial elections); Schauer.judging
in a Corner of the Law, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 171 7 (1988) (society may want some
political decisions made by people with life-tenure position and other political
decisions made by representatives elected every few years); Shapiro, supra note
19; Solum, The Virtues and Vices of a Judge: An Aristotelian Guide to judicial Selection,
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1735 (1988) (concluding that merit selection of appellate
judges should be based on judicial intelligence, integrity, and wisdom); Thompson, Judicial Retention Elections and Judicial Method: A Retrospective on the California
Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2007 (1988) (advocating retention of California's judicial election process if campaigning can be controlled); Tushnet, Constitutional lnterpretation and judicial Selection: A View from The Federalist Papers, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1669 ( 1988) (problems associated with elected legislative branch
serving extended terms not present in judicial branch since judges must offer
rational justification for decisions); see also Ross, The Hazards of Proposals to Limit
the Tenure of Federal Judges and to Permit Judicial Removal Without lmpeachment, 35
VILL. L. REV. 1063 (1990) (comprehensive history of efforts to abrogate lifetenure and analysis of Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980). I ultimately suggest, however, that life-tenure is not as problematic as judicial supremacy and, indeed, in conjunction with congressional
supremacy, can promote the benefits that voters might want constitutional
supremacy to provide. See infra note 359; see also Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1571, 1575 (1988) (legislative power to correct
judicial decisions does not necessarily imply propriety of electing judges).
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JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR PEOPLE WHO CREATE
CONSTITUTIONAL TEXTS

A.

1.

Why Constitutional Supremacy?

To Perpetuate an Extraordinary Political Advantage

During Reconstruction, while the defeated Southern states
remained unrepresented in Congress, 23 the Northern electorate's
"Congress" passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 toward ensuring
that its own notions of racial justice governed the entire nation. 24
With Southern participation, the legislation probably could not
have been passed. 25 In enacting the bill without the participation
of the Southern states, a majority among the Northern electorate
determined that their values of racial justice were more important
than was their white Southern neighbors' right to shape public
policy.
But the North's Republican majority faced a problem. With
the prospect of Southern readmission to Congress, many
Northerners feared that they would lose their status as an unchallenged congressional majority governing issues ofracial morality.
Racial justice would again become a matter for open conflict and
accommodation with the South, as it had been before the Civil
War. 26 The Civil Rights Act of 1866 might be eroded.2 7 Addi23. The 11 rebel states regained representation in Congress only after ratification of the fourteenth amendment in 1868. See W. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 93-94 (1988).
Even then, representation was shaped by the North's military reconstruction of
the Southern electorate. It was not until the mid-1870s that the Southern electorate reverted to its antebellum nature. See infra text accompanying notes 7987.
24. The Act protected blacks from discrimination in making contracts, owning and transferring property, and enjoying the protection of a state's criminal
laws. President Andrew Johnson vetoed the bill, in part on the ground that such
policies could not be made by a "Congress" in which 11 states were not represented. See]. BURGESS, RECONSTRUCTION AND THE CONSTITUTION 70 (1902).
25. See id. at 63 (discussing Northern Republican perception that Southern
state governments reconstructed by President Johnson "were consciously developing freedmen's codes which would not differ greatly from their old slave
codes").
26. Charles Fairman has suggested that President Andrew Johnson's plan
for reconstruction would have left the Southern states "subject to no additional
restraints beyond the abolition of slavery," and, indeed, able to join with Northern Democrats to press Southern concerns in Congress. "For a people defeated
in their rebellion, what more could be asked?" 7 C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: FIVE JUSTICES AND THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION 3 (Supp. 1988); see also]. BURGESS, supra note 24, at 31-41 (describing
Johnson's reconstruction plan).
27. Some apparent supporters of racial equality were less fearful that Congress might repeal civil rights legislation, even after the antebellum Southern
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tional legislation toward enforcing its provisions against inevitable Southern recalc;itrance might be blocked.
The fourteenth amendment is widely viewed as an effort by
the North's Republican majority to frame as constitutional mandates the policies underlying the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 28
Strengthened by the principles of constitutional supremacy, these
policies theoretically would be immune from erosion by Congress. Thus, even after the wrong-headed Southern electorate
regained representation in Congress, Northern policies of racial
justice would persist and supersede any conflicting legislation
that the Congress endeavored to enact. 29
electorate regained its political strength. Oregon Senator George H. Williams,
for example, later nominated by President Grant to succeed ChiefJustice Chase,
offered a substitute for the fifteenth amendment that simply would have given
Congress discretion to create voting rights by statute. See H.R. 402, 40th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1869). In favor of such a measure, in his view, was greater flexibility in
meeting unforeseen intrusions on the right to vote. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th
Cong., 3d Sess. 900 (1869).
28. As one historian has noted,
It is certainly not strange that the Republicans should have feared that
the Democrats of the North ... would soon be found fraternizing with
the Senators and Representatives from the reconstructed "States," and
that it was their duty to secure "perpetual ascendancy of the party of the
Union," before admitting the Senators and Representatives from these
"States" to participate in public power.
J. BURGESS, supra note 24, at 54 (emphasis added); see also c. BLACK, THE PEOPLE
AND THE COURT 131-32 (1960) ("The debates on the Fourteenth Amendment ...
express the thought that the Amendment was being adopted, in part, because of
a desire to put its guarantees out of the reach of future Congresses.");]. BURGESS, supra, at 74 ("[T]here was but one thing to do, and that was to enact, and
secure the adoption of, another amendment to the Constitution covering these
points, while the power to do so still existed."); P. DIMOND, supra note 20, at 41
(Republicans wished to insulate policies of 1866 Act from erosion by future
Congresses); W. NELSON, supra note 23, at 3 (differing views about fourteenth
amendment converge on Northern electorate's desire to secure certain policies
against future erosion); id. at 47 (fourteenth amendment a means to undermine
"political power of disloyal groups that had brought the war about"); id. at 55
(framers wished rights protected by Constitution rather than Congress to ensure
judicial enforcement "even if Congress fell under Democratic control"); id. at 61
("The Fourteenth Amendment must be understood as the Republican party's
plan for securing the fruits both of the war and of the three decades of antislavery agitation preceding it."); id. at 95 (quoting Arkansas newspaper charging
Republicans with attempt to perpetuate power "of the temporary majority of a
section of the Union").
29. Another means toward perpetuating the Republicans' notions of racial
justice was the loyalty oath. One early such measure, prescribed by President
Lincoln, required oaths to
faithfully support, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United
States ... and faithfully support all acts of Congress passed during the
existing rebellion with reference to slaves, so long and so far as not
repealed, modified, or held void, by Congress or by decision of the
Supreme Court ....
J. BURGESS, supra note 24, at IO. The two provisos concerning repeal by Con-
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Under article V of the Constitution, however, amendment required ratification by three-fourths of the states.so As Southern
values were the very reason that the Northern Republicans
needed a constitutional amendment, so Southern participation in
the amendment process could have blocked its ratification.s 1 The
North's Republican majority was able to secure ratification, however, by placing the Southern governments under military rule
and making ratification the price for readmission to Congress. s2
This analysis of the fourteenth amendment suggests that one
portion of the electorate might seek to exploit the principles of
constitutional supremacy by creating constitutional provisions to
perpetuate an extraordinary political advantage over another portion of the
electorate. Implicit in this motive for creating supreme constitutional provisions are three necessary components. First, those
seeking to create such a constitutional provision must care more
about achieving certain policy results than about their weakened
opponents' "right" to shape public policy.ss Second, that portion
gress and invalidation by the Supreme Court revealed the Northern electorate's
problems: How to ensure that a Congress in which the South was readmitted
did not repeal or otherwise undermine protection for the newly freed slaves, and
how to ensure that the Supreme Court did not invalidate such measures as
unconstitutional.
30. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
31. Other than Tennessee, all the Southern state governments reconstructed under President Johnson's plan rejected the fourteenth amendment
shortly after the elections of 1866. See J. BURGESS, supra note 24, at 106.
32. After 10 of the 11 rebel states had rejected the amendment by early
1867, Congress replaced President Johnson's reconstructed governments with
its own regime of military rule. See J. BURGESS, supra note 24, at 112. Congress
then passed measures that made ratification of the fourteenth amendment by
each Southern state, and by three-fourths of the United States, a condition for
readmission to Congress. Id. at 121-22; see also M. MANTELL, JOHNSON, GRANT,
AND THE POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION 101 (1973).
33. Professor Nelson reports one Republican's claim of willingness "to sacrifice almost anything to keep the democratic party out of power" and unwillingness "to see it in power again while I live." W. NELSON, supra note 23, at 46. If
members of the Northern electorate were willing to deny their Southern opponents a right to shape public policy, how did they feel about each other? Some,
like Thaddeus Stevens, were far more committed to racial equality than others,
like Representative James Wilson of Iowa, who did not believe that the amendment should proscribe racial segregation. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY 118-19 (1977). But both Stevens and Wilson lacked the political clout
to deny each other's right to shape public policy. Thus, with respect to the precise content of the Civil War amendments, Stevens and Wilson were opponents;
with respect to the question of whether some version of Northern values regarding racial justice should be framed in the Constitution to exploit an extraordinary political advantage over the South, Stevens and Wilson were valued allies
without conflict. It is possible, but not necessarily true, that Stevens would have
chosen to deny even his Northern allies the right to shape public policy, toward
more precisely achieving his own notions of racial justice, if he had enjoyed the
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of the electorate must be sufficiently powerful to enact its preferences as a constitutional mandate by preventing its opponents'
participation. A desire to perpetuate an extraordinary political
advantage is mere fantasy without a political advantage to exploit.
Third, the political advantage must be temporary. If a group will
enjoy tomorrow the same political advantage in ordinary legislative politics that it enjoys today in both legislative and constitutional politics, it need not resort to constitutional supremacy to
serve its interests. It need not endure the trouble and risks of
constitutional politics, 34 because its political power in the legislature serves just fine.35

2.

To Secure the Benefits of Political Self-Constraint

Toward generating a second reason for creating supreme
constitutional texts, put aside the foregoing motive by assuming
that a majority of voters either (i) believe that all voters have an
equal right to shape public policy; or (ii) acknowledge each
other's undeniable power to shape public policy-whether by enacting statutes or creating constitutional texts. Now consider two
additional assumptions.
First, political competitors believe that during times of extraordinarily thoughtful dedsionmaking, they would be better
able to identify moral ideals or practical concerns that are critipower to do so. Yet any increment toward his own racial ideals that he could
have achieved by denying Wilson's right to shape public policy might not have
been worth compromising a concern-if he had one-that people should have
an equal right to shape policy. Cf R. DAHL, MODERN POLITICAL ANALYSIS 18-19
(1963) (discussing relationships between conflict and consensus in government).
Stevens never faced this problem, however, because he never enjoyed such
power-he had to compromise. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
34. See Chang, supra note IO, at 775-82 (analyzing risks of creating constitutional provisions and of judicial review for those provisions when electoral majority's concerns can be achieved with ordinary legislation).
35. Theories of interest group politics view constitutional provisions "as
designed to protect groups sufficiently powerful to obtain constitutional protection for their interests." Landes & Posner, The Independent judiciary in an lnterestGroup Perspective, 18 J.L. & EcoN. 875, 893 (l 975). In arguing that courts should
interpret statutes according to their original meaning, Landes and Posner view
as mere "detail" whether the interest group is a majority of the voting population. Id. For my purposes, however, this variable is fundamental. It seems unlikely that a minority, however interested and active, could prevail against
majoritarian sentiments in the high stakes, high visibility politics of constitutional ratification, see infra note 48--except under extraordinary circumstances
such as those following the Civil War. See supra notes 23-32 and accompanying
text. Furthermore, whether the "interest group" is a minority or majority is critical for determining whether, and why, it is sensible to make policy by creating a
constitutional provision or statute. See infra text accompanying notes 183-91.
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cally important in general and over time. 36 Such values might involve allowing someone to speak his mind, even though his
message is offensive; 37 or treating convicted felons as human beings, even though their crimes are disgusting; 38 or requiring the
federal government to balance the budget, even though each
voter would like more spent on his own preferences. 39
Second, most members of the electorate are unwilling and
unable to commit themselves to such political thoughtfulness on
an everyday basis. In Bruce Ackerman's terms, they are private
citizens: private to the extent that they wish to be apart from society, to go to work, to raise a family, to watch "The Honeymooners," and citizens to the extent that they wish to be a part of
society, to influence the lives of others, or to convince others not
to influence their own. 40 Thus, values identified during times of
extraordinarily thoughtful decisionmaking might seem less pressing on an everyday basis and are, therefore, vulnerable. 41
Given these assumptions, voters might choose to create
supreme constitutional texts to constrain their own careless ex36. See R. DAHL, supra note 33, at 66 (discussing Hobbesian view of dichotomous human nature encompassing both passion and reason); THE FEDERALIST
No. 55, at 346 U· Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (human nature comprised of
both depravity and virtue).
37. Cf Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (state may not punish flag
burning because of disagreement with ideas expressed). The flag burning issue
has been the subject of a proposed response by both constitutional amendment
and congressional legislation. See infra text accompanying notes 306-21.
38. Cf Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (death penalty may be imposed if administered in nonarbitrary way); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972) (arbitrary administration of death penalty cruel and unusual).
39. See generally Barker, A Status Report on the "Balanced Budget" Constitutional
Convention, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 29 (1986).
40. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at I 033-34; see also R. DAHL, supra note 33, at
57 (people have different degrees of dedication to politics).
41. One can draw analogies from everyday life. For example, a person
might have conflicting desires to eat rich foods and to lose weight. He might
decide to favor the goal of losing weight, but generally can do so only after
extraordinary reflection and ritual-whether in the form of a New Year's resolution, purchasing a diet book, or joining (and paying for) a weight loss program.
Without such efforts, the more pressing desire to eat overwhelms the vulnerable
(yet preferred) desire to lose weight. See Chang, supra note 10, at 771-74. Certain reasons for attending church provide another example a bit closer to the
text's analysis of reasons for creating constitutional provisions. Even a person
who embraces her religion's precepts about how to live, how to think, and how
to treat others, might fail to live up to them because of competing preferences
and impulses. Toward reinforcing her higher concerns, she goes to church and
listens to a sermon that reminds her of ideal behavioral norms and goads her to
conform. It is through this extraordinary effort that one's higher ideals are identified. Because competing concerns are expressed and felt more impulsively and
reflexively, the higher ideals are vulnerable to the pressures of everyday living.
Id.
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cesses, errors, or omissions in everyday legislative politics. If so,
the electorate would want to make "constitutional" policy immune from legislative erosion to enforce a greater commitment to certain values, identified during episodes of extraordinarily thoughtful politics,
than they can trust themselves, and their legislative representatives, to respect
in the relative carelessness of everyday political competition. 42 I have elsewhere characterized this motive for creating supreme constitutional provisions as the desire for political self-constraint. 43

3.

To Ensure optimal Legislative Accountability

The most fundamental issue for evaluating the relative merits
of constitutional supremacy and statutory supremacy is whether
42. Speaking of the revolutionary period, Gordon Wood suggested that
"fear of themselves actually underlay all of the Americans' foolish contrivances-their perpetual constitutions, their special conventions, and their use of
instructions-and was involving them in all sorts of tangled contradictions." G.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1786, at 378 (1969).
Indeed, constitutionalism as extraordinarily thoughtful politics is an element of
the general rise of republicanism in constitutional scholarship. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 8; Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside
Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988); Michelman, Foreward: Traces of SelfGovernment, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986) [hereinafter Michelman I]; Michelman,
Law's Republic, 97 YALE LJ. 1493 (1988); [hereinafter Michelman II]; Sunstein,
Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 ( 1988). This type of constitutionalism comports with another word in vogu~hronesis, or practical wisdom. See,
e.g., PERRY II, supra note 7, at 181; Solum, supra note 22, at 1752 ("Practical
wisdom is the virtue that enables one to make good choices in particular circumstances."). Both republicanism and phronesis can be viewed from an elitist perspective, as does Michelman, or a populist perspective, as do Ackerman and
Amar. As my focus is on ordinary voters-the electorate ultimately responsible
for creating constitutional provisions, enacting legislation, and selecting
Supreme Court justices-I am now r~sting with the populist camp. See infra text
accompanying notes 169-73, 34 7-50 (relating liberal republicanism and judicial
review toward political self-constraint).
43. See Chang, supra note 10, at 767-74. A notion of political self-constraint
is implicit in Alexander Hamilton's justification for the supremacy of constitutional choices over legislative choices:
Though I trust the friends of the proposed Constitution will never concur with its enemies in questioning that fundamental principle of republican government which admits the right of the people to alter or
abolish the established Constitution whenever they find it inconsistent
with their happiness; yet it is not to be inferred from this principle that
the representatives of the people, whenever a momentary inclination happens
to lay hold of a majority of their constituents incompatible with the provisions in
the existing Constitution would, on that account, be justifiable in a violation of those provisions ....
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (footnote
omitted and emphasis added); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 71, at 432 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("When ... the interests of the people are at variance
with their inclinations, . . . the persons whom they have appointed to be the
guardians of those interests [should] withstand the temporary delusion in order
to give them more time and opportunity for more cool and sedate reflection.").
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an established legislative process should be free to restructure itself.44 Thus, in fully analyzing why a majority of the national electorate might choose to make policy in supreme constitutional
texts rather than in ordinary legislation, one must consider factors that voters might weigh in structuring their mechanisms for
making public policy. 45
Although voters might decide to compete in a direct democracy, most would reject such an intensely participatory process for
at least two reasons. First, such political combat would occupy a
44. Statutory supremacy eliminates a distinction between "constitutional"
text, immune from revision by ordinary legislative processes, and ordinary legislative texts. It supposes that the established legislative process may enact,
amend, or repeal any legal text, including one that changes the legislative process itself. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
45. Just as voters disagree about good policy, they will disagree about the
best structures for legislative and constitutional politics. Thus, political competitors must somehow establish a rule by which they determine the rules under
which they create their Congress and any supreme constitutional provisions purporting to limit congressional discretion. Both historically and theoretically,
identifying an ultimate rule of recognition is a matter of improvisation in response to prevailing social and political forces. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at
1057-65 (historical approach); Greenawalt, The Ru/,e of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 621 (1987) (theoretical approach); see also H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAw 98-99 (1961) (rules of recognition often not stated but
shown in the way in which other rules are identified); H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 338-43 (1983) (Kelsen's doctrine presupposed
norm underlying legal system's perceived validity); H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF
LAw 193-204 (M. Knight trans. 1967) (legal norms are valid because they are
created in manner determined by presupposed "basic norm").
I make the following assumptions about the prior, improvised, informal rule
of recognition. First, a prior and informal rule of recognition will reflect both
the respective power that political competitors possess to vindicate their concerns and their views about the rights of others to shape public policy. Second,
people believing that each has an equal right to shape public policy will view
each other as comprising an authoritative electorate. A primary, informal rule of
recognition within such a group will likely reflect a one-person, one-vote mechanism coupled with a principle of majority rule. Under such a rule, the majority
might choose anything from a majoritarian legislative mechanism to a monarchy.
Third, even people who deny each other's equal moral right to shape public policy, yet who possess approximately equal power, and whose differences are not
so great as to undermine the cohesiveness of community, will view each other as
an authoritative electorate. A primary, informal rule of recognition within such
a group also will likely reflect a one-person, one-vote mechanism coupled with a
principle of majority rule. Fourth, and critically important, the choice for statutory supremacy or constitutional supremacy will be made under the same primary, informal rule of recognition. In other words, even if not all people are
equally influential in shaping public policy, the same power relationships govern
when creating the legislative mechanism and when creating the legislature"s relationship, if any, to principles of constitutional supremacy. Indeed, this was the
case with the founding of 1787, as article I (congressional discretion) and article
V (procedures for amendment) and article VI (requirement that statutes be made
"in pursuance of" the Constitution) all were created by the prior, improvised
rule of recognition reflected in article VII (ratification procedures).
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great amount of their time. Some people might view a publiclyoriented life as ideal, but most-the private citizens-seem more
concerned with insular and personal pursuits. 46
Representative government can provide an efficient substitute for direct democracy. By relying on accountable representatives to make public policy, voters need not devote so much
attention to achieving their public objectives. To ensure accountability, however, voters must be concerned about competitive
political power: not only each other's influence over the government,47 but also the extraordinary power given to their representatives.48 Thus, the electorate might endeavor to define voting
rights, specify limited terms of office and procedures for elections, 49 and create rights to information about governmental per46. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1033-34 (discussing private citizenship);
see also R. DAHL, supra note 33, at 60 ("An individual is unlikely to get involved in
politics if he places a low valuation on the rewards to be gained from political
involvement relative to the rewards to be expected from other kinds of human
activity.").
4 7. One can return to the political dynamics underlying formation of the
original, pre-formal rule of recognition. See supra note 45. If a voter believes
that each individual has an equal right to shape public policy, he will want no
more influence over representatives than his opponents have. If, however, a
voter is less concerned about his opponents' right to shape public policy than
about achieving his own notions of justice, he might hope to have extra control
over representatives-perhaps by denying opponents a right to vote. This desire is meaningful only to the extent that one has the power to succeed. If all
voters press equally for as much influence as possible over the creation of public
policy, they will create a legislative machine that acts as if each believed in democracy as a matter of morality. These bases for both a moral commitment to
majoritarianism and a resigned acceptance of majoritarianism in the legislative
structure parallel later analysis of one's ideal "interpretive" behavior for judges
in giving meaning to legal provisions. See infra note 143 (distinguishing between
individual's community-oriented "interpretive" goal and selfishly-oriented "interpretive" goal).
48. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 U· Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)
("It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the
oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice
of the other part."); cf. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Mo~l. 86 CoLUM. L. REV. 223, 242-43 (1986)
(constitutions designed to inhibit active minorities from transforming preferences into law at expense of passive majorities). During constitutional creation,
more people who otherwise would be politically passive might vigilantly address
themselves to public policy, thus preventing more politically obsessed people
from disproportionately shaping law. Id. at 246-47 (high stakes of constitutional
creation provide incentives for free riders to become active participants); cf. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 CoLUM. L. REv. 1689, 1690 (1984)
(original constitutional concern to prevent capture of government by factions).
Ronald Dworkin refers to competitive relationships among members of the electorate as "horizontal" issues of power and to the relationship between the electorate and officials as "vertical" issues of power. See Dworkin, What is Equality~
Part 4: Political Equality, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. l, 9 (1987).
49. See, e.g., G. Wooo, supra note 42, at 273 (expressing profound distrust
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formance 50 and rights of access to governmental decisionmakers.
Although no legislative structure can ensure equal accountability to each voter, 51 many could approximate this goal. For example, both a unicameral legislature subject to annual elections,
and a bicameral legislature subject to elections every decade, can
reflect a one vote per person principle. Thus, the sort of legislative structure that political competitors choose must be a function
of concerns other than their competitive relationship to each
other. In other words, in determining their preferred legislative
structure, voters must decide not simply that the legislature
should be equally accountable to each citizen's values and preferences, but also what kind of accountability each wants the legislature to have. 5 2
Recognizing different types of accountability suggests a second reason for rejecting direct democracy. Even if voters otherwise had the energy and inclination to participate so intimately in
shaping public policy, they might choose a representative legislature if they distrust their own anticipated behavior in everyday
politics. 53 Voters might be concerned that they will not make
in the legislature, James Iredell suggested in 1776 that "there can be no check
on the Representatives of the people in a democracy, but the people themselves
... by having their elections very frequent, at /,east, once in a year") (emphasis
added).
50. See, e.g., A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GovERNMENT 93-95 (1988); Bork, Neutral Principks and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. LJ. 1, 20 (1971) ("Constitutional protection should be accorded only to
speech that is explicitly political.").
51. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 48, at 8-17 (discussing unattainable factors
necessary for all citizens to have equal influence in making public policy). Public
choice theory rests on the inevitability that different people will have unequal
influence on governmental policy. See, e.g., Farber & Frickey, The jurisprudence of
Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987) (discussing disproportionate impact of
special interests upon legislative process); Kalt & Zupan, Capture and Ideology in
the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 AM. EcoN. REV. 279 (1984); Landes & Posner,
supra note 35, at 876 (economic analyses used to reconcile "a conception of the
political-governmental process that emphasizes the importance of interest
groups in the formulation of public policy" with notion of independent judiciary); see also infra note 243 (further discussion of public choice theory).
52. Cf Gavison, supra note 19, at 1620 ("Two senses of accountability may
be distinguished: accountability to, identifying those to whom the judge is answerable, and accountability for, identifying the norms governing the judge's
conduct.").
53. James Madison made this point. He recognized that "the people are
the only legitimate fountain of power." THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 313 (J.
Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Yet he also suggested that in a government too
closely connected with the people, "[t]he passions, ... not the reason, of the public
would sit in judgment. But it is the reason, alone, of the public, that ought to
control and regulate the government. The passions ought to be controlled and
regulated by the government." Id. at 317 (emphasis in original).
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well-considered judgments about public policy on an everyday
basis-that they will give excessive attention to short-term personal interests and inadequate attention to long-term and general
interests. 54 Voters might be concerned that their reflexive judgments about public policy made as private citizens will not reflect
the careful judgment by which important questions should be resolved. Thus, a majority among the national electorate would
wish to provide its congress with a structure that itself serves
political self-constraint. 5 5
54. Cf Amar, supra note 42, at 1085 (republican representation can improve
quality of public deliberation); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38
STAN. L. REV. 29, 34 (1985) ("The structural mechanisms would insulate representatives, to a greater or lesser degree, from constituent pressures, in the hope
that they will deliberate more effectively on the public good."). Sunstein suggests that this view rejects pluralist premises-for example, that there is no
meaningful concept of public good. Corporate decisions for political self-constraint are not necessarily any less consistent with an agnostic view about the
public good than is any other public decision. Pluralists do not deny that any
given individual can have a personal view of the public good. Thus, rather than
some externally conceived and defined notion of public good, choices for political self-constraint might reflect compromise among each individual's view that
the public good will be better served by making policy in a supreme constitutional provision rather than a statute. Cf supra notes 42-43 (self-constraint as
imperfect linking of republicanism and pluralism).
55. Madison expressed a concern for political self-constraint in suggesting
that people might respond to the problem of majority faction through choices
they make in structuring their representative government. In The Federalist No.
10, Madison defined "faction" as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a
majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or
to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." THE FEDERALIST
No. 10, at 78 U· Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Madison suggested that far
better than direct democracy, a principle of republican representation can provide a safeguard against majority faction while preserving majority rule. He
noted that the effect of representative government would be to "enlarge the
public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens,
whose wisdom may best discern the true interests of their country and whose
patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or
partial considerations." Id. at 82. Thus, Madison would have the voter, each
otherwise empowered in a direct democracy, choose a system of representative
government to improve the chances of achieving public policy that each, in the
long run, will view as good. This is political self-constraint through the legislative
structure. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 350-51 U· Madison) (C. Rossiter ed.
196 l) ("The aim of every political institution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for
rulers men who posses most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the
common good of the society . . . . The elective mode of obtaining rulers is the
characteristic policy of republican government."); THE FEDERALIST No. 71, at
432 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (when "interests of the people are at
variance with their inclinations," the executive should "withstand the temporary
delusion in order to give them time and opportunity for more cool and sedate
reflection"); Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1025 (structure of government can hinder ill-considered and temporary efforts to "endanger the principles of the
American Revolution"). Madison then noted that even these potentially wise
legislators might stray from their mission of carefully making public policy con-
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The foregoing suggests that voters might choose to structure
their legislature toward achieving a goal of optimal legislative accountability. The concern for accountability suggests a fear that the
representatives a voter has fought to elect might not do what he
wants them to do. The representatives might fail the voter by giving more weight to his opponents' concerns than to his own, or
by not caring about the voter's concerns at all. The concern for
optimal accountability suggests a concern for political self-constraint: legislators should not respond too closely to the electorate's latest whims.
Both concerns support a decision to define legislative structures and processes in supreme constitutional texts. Doing so
promotes accountability by undermining the legislature's discretion
to change its structure in a way that removes itself from popular
control. Similarly, to the extent that protecting a right to criticize
governmental performance can prevent representatives from entrenching themselves in power, voters would do well to frame this
right in supreme constitutional texts, immune from legislative
rev1s1on.
To the extent that the legislative structure is designed to secure the benefits of political self-constraint-to ensure optimal accountability-voters also would do well to define the legislative
mechanism in supreme constitutional texts. Doing so could deter
changes in the legislative structure that do respond to present (but
ill-considered) electoral preferences. Voters might fear, for example, that they someday could impulsively decide to transform
their bicameral legislature into a unicameral one, or to shorten
their representatives' terms from six years to one, or to limit the
number of terms their representatives can serve. Thus, the elecsistent with the electorate's values and interests. He suggested, therefore, that
voters must have mechanisms for keeping their representatives accountable to
electoral concerns. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82 CT· Madison) (C. Rossiter ed.
1961). Thus, the desire for political self-constraint through the legislative structure
does not eliminate a voter's desire to keep the legislature accountable. It merely
establishes the kind of accountability she views as ideal. See also G. Wooo, supra
note 42, at 209 (nearly all states adopted bicameral legislature; upper houses
"were to be the repositories of classical republican honor and wisdom, whose
superior talent and devotion to the common good would be recognized and rewarded by the people"); id. at 409-10 (sense that problems of 1780s existed
because legislatures were too representative); id. at 556 (senate justified as body
of "weight and wisdom" to "check the inconsiderate and hasty proceedings of
the first branch"); Dougan & Munger, The Rationality of Ideology, 32 J.L. & EcoN.
119, 124 (1989) (length of term in office inversely proportional to legislator's
ability to stray from constituent preferences).
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torate might choose to prevent their future legislatures from vindicating these anticipated whims by strengthening present,
(presumably) more reflective, and (presumably) better public
judgments with the principles of constitutional supremacy, by
framing their deliberate choices in supreme constitutional texts. 56
Indeed, the notion of optimal legislative accountability provides further insight about constitutional supremacy (versus statutory supremacy) as a route to political self-constraint. A voter
who supports framing the legislative structure as a constitutional
mandate because he doubts not only his representatives' integrity, but also his own judgment, supposes that the legislative
structure might provide an inadequate measure of political selfconstraint toward its own preservation. Similarly, a choice to protect other policies in supreme constitutional texts-whether
about religion, or racial discrimination, or criminal justice-supposes a desire to achieve more political self-constraint than the
legislative structure itself can provide. 57 Choices for political selfconstraint, therefore, can be made along a continuum between
the competing concerns of self-distrust and self-determination. 58
4.

To Overturn Supreme Court Decisions

Voters also might seek to create supreme constitutional texts
to overturn Supreme Court "interpretations" with which they disagree.59 This motive for creating constitutional provisions, however, presumes judicial supremacy-that the electorate can
overturn the Court's views about constitutional mandates only by
constitutional amendment, and not by legislative action. This
56. Cass Sunstein's characterization of the federalists' view of representation suggests that the motive of political self-constraint can shape the form of
legislative accountability that the electorate chooses. "For the federalists, politics was to be deliberative in a special sense .... The result was a hybrid conception of representation, in which legislators were neither to respond blindly to
constituent pressures nor to undertake their deliberations in a vacuum." Sunstein, supra note 54, at 46-4 7.
57. Cf Tushnet, supra note 22, at 1680 ("If Congress could not act unjustly
because it was paralyzed, there would be no need for judicial review."). Yet
there would be need for some affirmative policymaker.
58. This continuum of political self-constraint is represented by the relationship between The Federalist No. 10 (discussed supra note 55) and The Federalist
No. 78 (discussed supra note 43).
59. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (overturning Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112 (1970), where Court invalidated congressional statute granting
right to vote to citizens eighteen years and older); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397 (1989) (state may not punish flag burning because of disagreement
with ideas expressed). A movement for a constitutional amendment developed
in response to this decision. See infra text accompanying notes 308-l l.
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motive for making policy by creating supreme constitutional texts
rather than ordinary statutes should be put aside as question-begging, because the task at hand is to derive justifications for judicial supremacy from reasons for constitutional supremacy.
B.

Why judicial Supremacy?

Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any
written or spoken laws, it is he who is truly the lawgiver,
to all intents and purposes, and not the person who first
wrote or spoke them.60
This section will derive ideal conceptions of constitutional
"interpretation" from the perspective of political competitors
who have just created constitutional texts and who must choose
judges to enforce them. It will show that each of the three motives for creating constitutional provisions-(i) perpetuating an
extraordinary political advantage; (ii) securing the benefits of
political self-constraint; and (iii) ensuring optimal legislative accountability-implies a distinctive definition of ideal "interpretation." Finally, it will consider whether judicial supremacy or
congressional supremacy might better ensure that judges achieve
each "interpretive" ideal. 61
1.

Selecting justices to "Interpret" Constitutional Texts Intended to
Perpetuate an Extraordinary Political Advantage

a.

The "Interpretive" Ideal: Constitutional Representation

In creating the fourteenth amendment, the Northern electorate sought to perpetuate an extraordinary political advantage
over the South. 62 By framing their values as supreme constitutional texts without meaningful Southern participation, representatives of Northern voters hoped to prevent white Southern
60. This remark was made by Bishop Hoadly in 1717 in a sermon for the
King. See Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,
7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 152 (1893). Charles Evans Hughes made a similar point
when he said, "We are under the Constitution, but the Constitution is what the
judges say it is." L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES 5 (1988). So did Franklin Roosevelt, when he said, "[An] amendment like the rest of the Constitution is
what the Justices say it is rather than what its framers or you might hope it is."
G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 130 (l lth ed. 1985) (quoting radio address
by President Roosevelt, Mar. 9, 1937).
61. Cf Gavison, supra note 19, at 1619 ("Our criteria for [judicial] choice
and accountability will reflect our answers to some normative questions (e.g.,
what are 'good' judicial decisions) .... ").
62. See supra notes 23-35 and accompanying text.
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voters from affecting national policies of racial justice once the
Southern electorate regained formal representation in Congress.
This motive suggests, at least from the perspective of the
Northern majority, an ideal definition of "interpretation": In giving meaning to the amendment, the Supreme Court should have
acted as if it were the Congress in which the Northern electorate
reigned supreme. This "interpretive" ideal takes the underlying
motive for creating supreme constitutional text to its logical conclusion, for it asks judges to make the same decisions that the
once extraordinarily powerful electorate would make if it still had
the power to deny its opponents the right to shape public policy. 63 So viewed, the "interpretive" task is no less creative-and
no less subservient to a self-proclaimed authoritative electoratethan is the legislative. 64 Indeed, so viewed, the judicial task of
63. Public response to President Grant's nomination of Caleb Cushing to
replace Chief Justice Chase in 1874 is illuminating. Cushing was known to have
had sympathies for the Confederacy. According to the New York Times, he had
supported the Dred Scott decision and had advocated slavery. It concluded:
"When we get a Chief Justice of secessionist proclivities ... the entire proceedings of Congress since the war may be called in question .... We can only
regard the present game of blindman's bluff ... with surprise and mortification." 7 c. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88, PART Two 63-64 (1987) (citing New
York Times, Jan. 10, 1874). Fairman reports similar editorials from other Republican newspapers: for example, from the Boston Transcript, "does the Government feel quite sure ... that Mr. Cushing is entirely sound on the question of
civil rights, which will be carried to the Supreme Court?"; from the New York
Evening Post, "for the past ten years he has not been at all in sympathy with the
pronounced policy of the republic"; from the Cl.eveland Herald, "not a safe man."
Id. at 65. In a letter to his brother-in-law, Justice Miller suggested a political
consciousness within the Court that should have pleased those with the sentiments that these newspapers expressed: Cushing's "appointment was considered an insult to the Bench by every man on it except [Nathan] Clifford, who is
himself ... a life-long bitter Democrat." Id. at 72. Clifford had been appointed
by President Buchanan in 1858.
64. Abraham Lincoln expressed such a view: "we wish for a Chief Justice
who will sustain what has been done in regard to emancipation and the legal
tenders .... [W]e must take a man whose opinions are known." See Friedman,
Tribal Myths: Ideology and the Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees (Review Essay),
95 YALE LJ. 1283, 1297 (1986). Though never explicitly articulated, this creative notion of constitutional representation fairly describes Senator Charles
Sumner's approach to issues arising under the Civil War amendments. In debate over the Civil Rights Act of 1875 with the more legalistic Senator Carpenter
of Wisconsin, Sumner suggested that the Declaration of Independence was
"'loftier, more majestic, and more sublime' than the Constitution," and "of
greater dignity and force than the Constitution." C. FAIRMAN, supra note 63, at
162, 163. Sumner's measure to prohibit racial discrimination in churches was
"simply setting up the Declaration of Independence in its primal truths, and
applying them to churches as to other institutions." Id. at 163; see CoNG. GLOBE,
42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 821-28 (1871); CONG. GLOBE, 4lst Cong., 2d Sess. 242230, 2746-53 ( 1870). Congressional efforts to curtail the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of Reconstruction measures also sug-
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"interpretation" is much the same task that each voter would like
his legislators to perform in creating statutes: to represent his
preferences.
This ideal of judicial behavior may be referred to as constitutional representation. 65 Here, constitutional representation would
have differed from congressional representation to the extent that
the Court endeavored to represent only the Northern electorate's
preferences, after Congress once again represented the national
electorate, including white Southern voters. 66
gest this "interpretive" ideal. See, e.g.. U.S. v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128
(1872) (invalidating congressional effort to withdraw jurisdiction when Court of
Claims determines that property claimant had accepted presidential pardon); Ex
parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) (upholding congressional repeal of
statute authorizing Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over circuit court denials of habeas corpus petitions).
65. Professor Nelson's characterization of the framers' views underlying the
fourteenth amendment is consistent with the idea of a fluid, constitutional representation. The framers, he suggests, "continued to make ... use of the old
antebellum ideas, in part, perhaps, because the old imprecision . . . enabled
them to retain the support of political coalitions whose individual members
shared an agreement only about vague ideas, not about specific programs." W.
NELSON, supra note 23, at 38-39; see also id. at 47 (Republican desire not so much
to perpetuate personal rule as to perpetuate progressive policies); id. at 55
(framers wished rights protected by Constitution rather than Congress to ensure
judicial enforcement "even if Congress fell under Democratic control"). Thus,
this ideal of constitutional representation can explain the vague language of section one. The vague language gave a judge with the Northern electorate's orientation sufficient latitude to declare Northern preferences as constitutional law.
Cf id. at 61-62 (explaining amendment's vague language as reflecting an exhortive rather than regulatory purpose).
66. Thus, from the perspective of those who voted for the fourteenth
amendment, a Justice ideally would have acted as if he were representing their
preferences-not as of 1868, but at the moment of judicial decision. In Bruce
Ackerman's terms, this "interpretive" ideal would have the Supreme Court act
as if it were a continuous "rump 'Congress.' " See Ackerman, supra note 8, at
1066; Chang, supra note 10, at 832 n.266 (viewing fourteenth amendment as
serving desire to disable Southern electorate rather than promote political selfconstraint establishes ideal judicial behavior as acting like "continuing rump
Congress."). As those who created the fourteenth amendment died and were
replaced by their progeny, however, justifying some definition for ideal judicial
behavior must have become problematic indeed. See infra text at notes 172-89
("interpretive" options for aging constitutional provisions originally intended to
perpetuate a temporary political advantage); cf Chang, supra note 10, at 843
n.306 (who are "the people" of 1872?); id. at 846 n.318 ("the people" of 1896?);
id. at 850 n.325 ("the people" of 1954?); id. at 863 n.370 ("the people" of
1987?); id. at 865 n.376 (same).
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b. Judicial Supremacy as a Mechanism for Ensuring
Accountability to the Ideal of Constitutional
Representation
1.

The Case for Judicial Supremacy: Toward Limiting the
Authority of Reinvigorated Opponents

Even if the Supreme Court had acted as if it were representing those who comprised the Northern electorate in 1868, the
Radical Republicans truly could have perpetuated their extraordinary political advantage over the South only to the extent that the
Court's interpretation of supreme constitutional meaning could
not have been violated by Congress. Under congressional
supremacy, judicial "interpretations" of the Civil War amendments would have been subject to congressional correction, and
Southern voters would have gained a measure of control over national racial policy. 67 Thus, a majority of Northern voters would
have had some reason to prefer judicial supremacy. Indeed, without judicial supremacy in this context, Northern voters could have
expected to gain little beyond what they had achieved by enacting
the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 68
n.

The Case Against Judicial Supremacy: Reinvigorated
Opponents, Fallible Judges, and Undeniable Power

Judicial supremacy could have served a Northern voter's goal
of perpetuating his extraordinary political advantage only to the
extent thatJustices in fact identified the choices that the Northern
electorate would have made if it still governed without Southern
participation. Yet like any other unaccountabl.e. governmental
servant, aJustice wielding the·powers of judicial supremacy might
commit two transgressions. 69 First, a Justice might make a good
faith error even while endeavoring to serve the Northern electo67. Indeed, the Radical Republicans tried to forestall the reinvigoration of
white Southern power as long as possible by placing conditions on the franchise.
Despite these best efforts, however, the antebellum Southern power structure
could not have been forever forestalled. The Southern electorate degenerated
through the 1870s from its reconstructed state to one far more resembling that
of 1860. See J. BURGESS, supra note 24, at 198-99.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 23-32. While Professor Nelson suggests that the framers thought that Congress, not the courts, would be the main
enforcer of the fourteenth amendment, he acknowledges that § 1 of the amendment was aimed at judicial enforcement in anticipation of congressional failure.
See W. NELSON, supra note 23, at 122 •. 145.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 47-50; note 49.
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rate's preferences. 70 Second, a Justice might reject the role of
serving altogether. A Justice might have rejected the "interpretive" goal of identifying the Northern electorate's preferences
and instead have chosen to exploit the extraordinary ability to
shape public policy that the judge's public office offers.
It could not have been an easy task to make the decisions that
a majority of Northern voters would have made if they still enjoyed
an extraordinary political advantage over the South. 71 Such speculative decisionmaking essentially would have asked Justices to
act like common law courts with respect to the Northern electorate. But
unlike the ordinary relationship between community and common law court, the Northern electorate lacked a formal mechanism to express itself toward legislatively correcting undesirable
"common law" judgments.72
Furthermore, even in the short term, when the Northern
electorate's extraordinary political advantage enabled it to stack
the Court with hand-picked Justices, 711 Northern voters hardly
could have ensured that their Justices would choose the "inter70. Cf supra note 55 (discussing Madison's concern for optimal governmental accountability).
71. At best, Justices who wanted to act like common law courts with respect
to the Northern electorate, to the exclusion of the Southern electorate, might
have referred to congressional debate and votes, to determine how the representatives from the Northern states voted. This would have provided at least
some evidence of the Northern electorate's preferences.
72. Because judges are, in general, less effective gauges ofmajoritarian sentiment than legislatures, the common law is subordinate to statutes. Cf G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAw FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) (arguing that
contemporary statutory law should supersede contemporary common law, but
that courts should supersede aging, "out of phase" statutes with contemporary
common law). Yet even legislators can make mistakes while trying to serve the
electorate's preferences. See, e.g., Dougan & Munger, supra note 55, at 128-32.
73. Indeed, because the white Southern electorate was, actually or in effect,
absent from Congress between 1861 and 1875, the Northern electorate had the
opportunity to install their preferred Justices, without having to bow to obnox-.
ious Southern notions ofracialjustice. To a Supreme Court that then consisted
of 10 members, President Lincoln made five appointments: Noah H. Swayne,
Samuel F. Miller, and David Davis in 1862, StephenJ. Field in 1863, and Salmon
P. Chase in 1864. President Johnson made no appointments to the Court,
largely because Congress passed legislation reducing the number of Justices in
order to prevent him from making any appointments. See 4 THE SUPREME COURT
IN AMERICAN LIFE: THE RECONSTRUCTION COURT 1864-1888, at xi, 12 (R.
Fridlington ed. 1987) [hereinafter THE RECONSTRUCTION COURT]. This action
itself can be viewed as reflecting Congress's ideal of constitutional representation. Toward the end of Reconstruction, President Grant made four appointments to the Court: William Strong and Joseph P. Bradley in 1870, Ward Hunt
in 1872, and Morrison Waite in 1874 (replacing Chase as Chief Justice). Thus,
during the South's exclusion from Congress, the Northern electorate had the
opportunity to install eight of the 10 sitting Supreme Court Justices without
meaningful participation by the antebellum Southern electorate.
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pretive" ideal of constitutional representation. 74 Protected by
life-tenure and the powers of judicial supremacy, a Supreme
Court Justice has extraordinary access to public power-more
than even Thaddeus Stevens had. Thus, for aJustice to have chosen the "interpretive" goal of constitutional representation on
behalf of the Northern electorate, two conditions must have been
satisfied. First, the Justice must have accepted that Southern
weakness was properly exploited in order to vindicate some vision
ofracialjustice shaped in the image of the Northern electorate-atlarge. At the same time, the Justice must have believed that the
Northern electorate's weakness with respect to the Justice's own
extraordinary power was not properly exploited. 75
Some people might think this way. Yet to acknowledge that
democracy can be subordinated to other personal values and
preferences when one has the power to do so-as did the Radical
Republicans by creating the fourteenth amendment-is to beg the
question: Why ever respect a choice of some electorate that claims
to be authoritative, when that choice differs from the concerns of
74. See, e.g., United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875). In Reese the Court
invalidated crucial portions of the Enforcement Act of 1870, which would have
punished people for obstructing any citizen from voting, or acting to qualify to
vote, on the ground that Congress purported to reach all wrongful obstructions
of voting rights-rather than simply obstructions "on account of race," to which
Congress's discretion under the fifteenth amendment apparently was limited.
Id. at 217-21. In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Waite rather clearly
rejected any notion of helping the bygone Republican electorate vindicate its
preferences. Waite said, "we must take these sections of the statute as they are
.... To limit this statute in the manner now asked for would be to make a new
law, not to enforce an old one. This is no part of our duty." Id. at 221 (emphasis
added). Thus, Waite's reasoning not only led him to fail to reach "wrongful
denials" other than those motivated by race; by invalidating the relevant provisions, the Court-the supposed mechanism by which the Republicans might
have perpetuated their extraordinary political advantage-thwarted the Republican desire to prohibit racial discrimination in voting. Indeed, in dissent, Justice
Hunt suggested that the invalidated provisions were intended to address only
racial denials, and that any ambiguity was the result of bad drafting. Id. at 24145 (Hunt,]., dissenting); see also C. FAIRMAN, supra note 63, at 278 (agreeing with
Justice Hunt).
75. CJ Solum, supra note 22, at 1751-52 ("One of the virtues of judging is
suppressing one's political or moral preferences and deciding on the basis of the
law .... [A]ppellatejudges should have a special fidelity to the law."). This begs
the question of what "the law" is. Especially for constitutional provisions created by one portion of the electorate to perpetuate an extraordinary political
advantage over another portion, any notion of judicial fidelity requires a judge's
choice to serve a minority of the electorate who could not have enacted their
"law" in question without the benefits of military victory .. Indeed, to recognize
any "law" requires a judge to apply her own rule of recognition reflecting her
own notion of an authoritative master. CJ Dworkin, The Forum of Principk, 56
N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 474-75 (1981) (any theory of interpretation implies an underlying rule of recognition).
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an individual who has the power to vindicate his own concerns?
The Northern electorate played a dangerous game by acknowledging that it is sometimes justifiable to subordinate democracy
to particular policy ends, while giving judges the power, if not the
"right," to subordinate Northern values to the judges' own policy
ends. 76
Beyond this, whether hand-picked by Northern voters or not,
the Reconstruction Justices could not have lived forever. Once
the South regained its place in Congress, it was inevitable that the
Court would be reformed withjustices chosen by a national electorate in which the South, with all of its obnoxious views, would
have been as much a participant as it was to be in enacting national legislation. 1 7 Thus, however well judicial supremacy might
(or might not) have served the Northern electorate's interests
76. See, e.g., Freund, Appointment of justices: Some Historical Perspectives, IOI
HARV. L. REV. 1146, 1156 (1988) (hazards in judicial selection as means to make
public policy include unforeseen issues, changes in nominee's views); Friedman,
supra note 64, at 1291-302 (judicial performance over time difficult to predict).
But see L. TRIBE, Goo SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 76 (1985) (judicial performance generally predictable). Professor Friedman cites the legal tender issue as
an example of unpredictability. Two of five Lincoln appointees voted to invalidate the Legal Tender Act, even though Lincoln had selected Justices with the
legal tender issue specifically in mind. See Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 603 (1869).
77. After ChiefJustice Chase died in 1873, for example, many advised President Grant to elevate an Associate Justice, and fill that vacancy with a Southerner. See C. FAIRMAN, supra note 63, at 10-23. Although there were indications
of a Democratic resurgence, as the New York elections of 1873 suggested, the
Republicans still dominated the Senate. See N. ORNSTEIN, T. MANN & M. MAL·
BIN, ViTAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS 1889-1910 table 1-18 (1990) (43d Congress,
1873-1875, comprised of 19 Democrats and 54 Republicans; 42nd Congress,
1870-1873, corµprised of 17 Democrats and 57 Republicans). Thus, Grant was
able to nominate, and the Senate to confirm, Morrison Waite of Ohio. Waite
had been "a thoroughgoing Radical" as early as 1862. C. FAIRMAN, supra note
63, at 78. By 1877, however, Reconstruction had ended. The Hayes-Tilden
election of 1876 signalled the resurgence of the antebellum Southern power
structure. See, e.g., R. DAHL, supra note 33, at 84. Thus, when President Hayes
faced a vacancy created by the resignation of David Davis (a Lincoln appointee),
and three years later, another vacancy by William Strong (a Grant appointee), he
turned to the Souih. Two primary candidates were Benjamin Bristow and John
Harlan-both Republicans, to be sure, but both also of Kentucky. See C. FAIR·
MAN, supra note 63, at 504. Harlan was chosen. Of the two, he was far more the
reluctant Republican, having opposed both the Emancipation Proclamation, as
"a direct interference, by a portion of the States with the local concerns of other
States," and the thirteenth amendment, as based on a "dangerous" principle
that "may eventuate in the destruction of our present form of government," and
because it would "destroy the peace and security of the white man in Kentucky."
Id. at 499, 567. He also supported McClellan for President against Lincoln in
1864. Id. at 499. It was only after a schism in his church over slavery in the early
1870s that Harlan, following his Reverend, joined the Republican cause. Id.
Bristow, in contrast, fought for both Lincoln's re-election and ratification of the
thirteenth amendment. Id. at 20. When Hayes faced his next Supreme Court
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when their ownjustices were on the Court, the North's ability to
ensure that the "interpretive" ideal of constitutional representation was fulfilled had to degenerate once justices became, at least
in part, the South's Justices as well. 7 S
m.

A Case Against Creating Supreme Constitutional Texts
Toward Perpetuating a Temporary Political Advantage

Just as the remnants of Reconstruction were about to dissolve, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 79 which provided broad protection against racial discrimination.so A
Northern voter who supported the bill, however, might have
feared that it would not long survive a potential alliance between
Northern and Southern Democrats.s 1 Anticipating this sort ofravacancy, with the resignation of William Strong, he also turned to the Souththis time, Georgia. Id. at 522.
78. Justice Harlan's nomination continues to be instructive. Justice Miller
revealed that Senator Edmunds of Vermont and Senator Conkling of New York
were deeply troubled about John Marshall Harlan:
The Senate Judiciary Committee are making great trouble about
Harlan's nomination. Edmunds ... [has] called on me about it. As far
as I can learn Edmunds, Conkling· and Howe are disposed to make protracted inquiry into his fuklity to the constitutional amendments and the reconstruction acts of Congress . ... I think this both unwise and unjust. Harlan
is as true a man I have no doubt to the constitutional amendments as
any man from a Southern State, who may have doubted the wisdom of
some of them when they passed.
c. FAIRMAN, supra note 63, at 518 (citing c. FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND
THE SUPREME COURT 1862-1890, at 369-70 (1939)) (emphasis added and footnotes omitted). Republicans anticipated that Southern-oriented judges might
well thwart national racial policies, as the Civil Rights Act of 1866 provided for
criminal penalties against state judges who rendered judgments undermining a
federally protected right. See W. NELSON, supra note 23, at 105-06.
79. See M. KoNVITZ & T. LESKES, A CENTURY OF CIVIL RIGHTS 90-91 (1961)
(describing five-year congressional battle to enact the legislation); infra note 80.
80. Section one of the Act provided:
[A]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or
water, theatres, and other places of public amusement; subject only to
the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike
to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition
of servitude.
Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. l 14, § l, 18 Stat. 335, 336 (1875). In the view of its
principal sponsor, Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, the bill would do
all that had to be done in order to ensure his vision of "equal rights in this
Republic." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3180-90 (1872).
81. The Act was among the last gasps of the Northern electorate's efforts to
exploit their temporary political advantage over the white Southern electorate.
In both the South and the North, the Democrats had made significant gains in
the elections of 1874. Some of the Northern electorate had tired of fighting with
the South over race and other issues emerged. See, e.g., W. NELSON, supra note
23, at 149; see also C. FAIRMAN, supra note 63, at 156, 180. But see infra note 82.
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cist retrogression, a majority of Northern voters created the fourteenth amendment toward perpetuating their extraordinary
political advantage.
These voters' concerns would have been well served if the
Supreme Court had declared the Civil Rights Act's policies to be
constitutionally mandated. This would have been a plausible exercise of constitutional representation, as the legislation was, in
fact, a choice that the Northern electorate made while still enjoying an extraordinary political advantage. 8 2 Protected by judicial supremacy, this policy would have been immune from
congressional erosion.
Interesting speculation, perhaps, but far from what actually
occurred. The Supreme Court never declared that the provisions
of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 were constitutionally mandated;
instead, in the Civil Rights Cases, it determined that the Act was
constitutionally prohibited. 83 Thus, Northern Republicans lost
their law not by action of their reinvigorated political opponents,
but by a decision of the very Justices who were supposed to entrench their law. This was constitutional representation turned
upside down. 84

•••

The Civil Rights Cases raise doubts about the extent to which
people can effectively perpetuate an extraordinary political ad82. However much the elections of 1874 might cast doubt on the Northern
electorate's continuing commitment to racial equality, the pattern of response to
the Civil Rights Cases by the Northern states is striking. After the Supreme
Court's decision, 16 Northern states passed virtually identical legislation: Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey and Ohio in 1884; Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska and Rhode Island in 1885;
Pennsylvania in 1887; Washington in 1890; Wisconsin in 1895; and California in
1897. See G. STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS IN AMERICAN LAw 121 (1910).
But for the Supreme Court's decision, and absent congressional action repealing
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, such state-by-state legislation would have been unnecessary-and other states that did not pass such legislation for themselves
would have been governed by the apparent preferences of the Northern electorate's majority.
83. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
84. The Court's decision might be viewed as serving the values of the
Northern electorate only if (i) they had desires for political self-constraint related to federalism and (ii) those concerns outweighed their desire to perpetuate
their political advantage for concerns of racial justice. This is unlikely, however,
for the motive of perpetuating an extraordinary political advantage necessarily
implies a rejection of respect for local decisionmaking. Cf W. NELSON, supra
note 23, at 104-09 (opponents of fourteenth amendment and Civil Rights Act of
1866 raised federalism objections); id. at 114-16 (proponents argued amendment would intrude on discretion only of Southern states that denied basic racial
equality); id. at 197 (Northerners had conflicting desires to restrain South from
racial discrimination while retaining nation's federal structure).
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vantage by creating supreme constitutional texts. Two competing
forces undermine any possibility of keeping Justices accountable
to this "interpretive" goal of constitutional representation. On
the one hand, a voter's Justices must be insulated from the power
of his reinvigorated political opponents. On the other hand, the
voter's Justices must be induced not to stray from the task of
identifying the choices he and his allies would make if they still
enjoyed their extraordinary political advantage. While judicial
supremacy might address the first problem, it intensifies the second. 85 Furthermore, because the motive of perpetuating an extraordinary political advantage antmpates the loss of
extraordinary political power, there can be no effective way to address the second problem of ensuring perpetual judicial accountability. 86 Thus, one might question whether even those with the
present power to deny their opponents the right to shape public
policy should bother seeking to perpetuate that extraordinary
political advantage by creating supreme constitutional provisions
at all. 87
85. In giving themselves near "absolute authority to interpret" the Civil
War Amendments, with life-tenure and the enforcement authority of judicial
supremacy, those justices truly became the lawgiver, as Bishop Hoadly warned,
and not the Northern electorate "who first wrote" those constitutional provisions. See supra note 60. It was ultimately for those Justices, not for Northern
voters, to decide whose values would be served.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71.
87. The Civil Rights Cases of 1883 were just part of a series of Supreme
Court decisions that more than likely violated the ideal of constitutional representation from the perspective of a Northern electorate that wanted to perpetuate its temporary political advantage over its white Southern neighbors. Indeed,
"of the six acts of Congress held unconstitutional by the Waite Court, three
were acts guaranteeing rights to black Americans." THE RECONSTRUCTION
COURT, supra note 73, at xii. Furthermore, the Court invalidated an 1869 (i.e.,
Reconstruction) Louisiana statute that prohibited racial segregation in public
conveyances. See Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877). The Court viewed the
legislation as a violation of the dormant commerce clause-an inordinate local
intrusion on the free flow of interstate commerce. Id. at 488-90. Once again,
then, rather than protect the Republicans' efforts to perpetuate an extraordinary
political advantage against enemies reinvigorated in Congress--or, indeed, a reinvigorated antebellum electorate within Louisiana-the Supreme Court was the
instrument of the Republicans' defeat. This irony is intensified by a case in
which the Court upheld against a dormant commerce clause claim an 1888 Mississippi post-reconstruction statute that required racial segregation in public conveyances. See Louisville Ry. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587 (1890). As Justice Harlan
intimated in dissent, the DeCuir and Louisville decisions were embarrassingly inconsistent. Id. at 593-95 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Again, the Court was the instrument not of perpetuating the Republicans' ideology of racial justice, but of
thwarting it. See also supra note 74 (discussing Reese).
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2. Selecting justices to "Interpret" Constitutional Texts Intended to
Secure the Benefits of Political Self-Constraint
a. The "Interpretive" Ideal: Constitutional Representation
By creating constitutional provisions for political self-constraint, voters agree that public policy should respect certain
ideals to a greater extent than they can trust themselves to pursue
in ordinary politics.BB The predicate for creating such constitutional provisions is debate and resolution that the electorate
views as unusually thoughtful. Framed in supreme constitutional
texts, the fruits of these extraordinary political labors are protected from being changed by congressional representatives.
Thus, voters wish the benefits of the best politics they have ever
pursued to persist once politics returns to the mundane.B9
This analysis suggests an ideal definition of "interpretation."
Each voter might conclude that in giving meaning to constitutional mandates created with the motive of political self-constraint, judges ideally should replicate the electorate's
extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics. 90 Ideally, judicial "interpretation" would yield the same decisions voters would
reach if they were engaged in the same sort of extraordinarily reflective constitutional politics through which they made actual
choices for political self-constraint. 91
88. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 36-43. Indeed, in a better world, voters would not need to make special choices during the extraordinary politics of
constitutional decisionmaking. In a better world, their politics would always be
as good as they are during the debate that leads to constitutional choices for
political self-constraint. Cf infra note 92.
90. This assumes that each voter acknowledges the others' equal right to
shape public policy or inevitable power to shape public policy-whether in creating constitutional provisions, national legislation, or selecting Supreme Court
Justices-and, therefore, foreswears any desire to deny his opponents' rights to
shape public policy. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36, 45-47.
91. This is a variation on the classical notions of interpretation developed
by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 78 and by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (l Cranch) 137 (1803). In the view of Hamilton and Marshall, who were part of a generation that created a constitution, the
goal of constitutional "interpretation" should be to identify the choices that
"the people" have made in constitutional politics. In the view presented here, the
ideal goal in constitutional "interpretation" should be to identify the choices
that voters would make if still engaged in extraordinary constitutional politics.
Thus, for the generation that both creates constitutional text and installs judges
to "interpret" that text, there is little distinction between my view and standard
originalism. Cf Brest, The Misconceived Qy,est for the Origi,nal Understanding, 60
B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980) (problems in resolving issues that framers did not consider); Dworkin, supra note 75, at 482-97 (same). However, significant differences do develop as new generations live under aging constitutional provisions.
See infra text accompanying notes 137-48. For a comparison of constitutional
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Thus, after creating supreme constitutional provisions for
political self-constraint, a voter would want judges to represent
her preferences-not her ordinarily conceived, everyday preferences, but those preferences that can be identified only after extraordinary reflection. 92 This ideal of judicial behavior is another
version of constitutional representation. 93 Under this version, constitutional representation would differ from congressional representation to the extent that the Court represents the electorate's
extraordinarily thoughtful decisionmaking intended to constrain
everyday politics, while Congress represents the electorate's eve·
ryday politics intended to be constrained.94
representation with other theories of interpretation, see infra text accompanying
notes 149-74.
92. Indeed, in a more ideal world, politics would always be better than it is
during actual constitutional politics. In a more ideal world, each voter would be
smarter, more moral, more in touch with God, or better according to any
number of criteria that people might deem relevant to politics. Accepting this
ideal notion of politics, one might devise an ideal definition of "interpretation"
that would have judges identify choices the electorate would make if voters were
smarter, more moral, more in touch with God, than they can ever hope to be.
This proposition could provide a populist justification for advocates of judicial
activism who otherwise are unconcerned with electorate preferences that compromise constitutional "rights." See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 413 (1986)
("[Law] is an interpretive, self-reflective attitude addressed to politics in the
broadest sense. . . . [It] makes each citizen responsible for imagining what his
society's public commitments to principle are, and what these commitments require in new circumstances."); R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 24-3 l (l 985) (advocating more active judicial protection of private property based on "internal intellectual integrity" of fifth
amendment takings clause); Michelman, Forward: Traces of Self-Government, 100
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986) (traces of democracy found in reflective deliberation and
voting among Justices). This conception of a political ideal and concomitant
"interpretive" ideal might seem beguiling. Yet it is ultimately unrealistic, for it
would have voters choosing to delegate broad decisionmaking authority without
a clear, convincing set of criteria by which they could identify judges who are
themselves smarter, more moral, or more in touch with God, than the voters can
ever hope to be. That political opposites such as Dworkin and Epstein might
employ the better-than-reality-ever-could-be ideal of politics and "interpretation" vividly illustrates this point. Indeed, even putting aside the improbability
of agreement about who should serve as Guardians, there remains an improbability that a voter would choose to give her own preferred Guardians powers of
judicial supremacy. Even one who goes to Church and who trusts her minister
sufficiently to consider his exhortations would be rare indeed to trust that minister
enough to give him authority to make decisions governing her life. CJ infra text
accompanying notes 322-37 (discussing Brown).
93. As with provisions intended to perpetuate an extraordinary political advantage, see supra text accompanying notes 62-66, this suggests a political foundation for "interpretation" and, therefore, for the selection of Justices. Cf
Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, IOI HARV. L. REV. 1202,
1203, 1207 (1988) (appointment of Justices should be viewed as political).
94. One could characterize the motive of securing the benefits of political
self-constraint as a desire to perpetuate a temporary political advantage. Here,
however, the temporary political advantage is not one of power against political
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b. Judicial Supremacy as a Mechanism for Ensuring
Accountability to the Ideal of Constitutional
Representation
1.

The Case for Judicial Supremacy: Toward Limiting the
Authority of Careless Politics

In satisfying this "interpretive" ideal of constitutional representation-by identifying the choices the electorate would make if
extraordinarily thoughtful---courts would be making decisions with
which most voters might reflexively disagree. Because Congress
is the forum in which these more reflexive political impulses are
vindicated, congressional supremacy might seem problematic. In
contrast, judicial supremacy would preclude Congress from
trumping judicial decisions that otherwise would serve the electorate's concerns for political self-constraint. 95
11.

The Case Against Judicial Supremacy: The Power,
Prerogatives, and Fallibility of Judges

Insulating judicial decisions from the popular impulses expressed in everyday legislative politics, however, does nothing to
keep judges accountable to the "interpretive" goal of identifying
choices the electorate would make if engaged in extraordinarily
reflective constitutional politics. Indeed, voters must account for
two potential problems. First, the "interpretive" ideal of constitutional representation asks judges to pursue a difficult exercise
enemies, but of one's better self against one's ordinary self. While the electorate
that creates constitutional provisions for perpetuating an extraordinary political
advantage is displaced by an electorate that includes newly invigorated opponents, the electorate that creates constitutional provisions for political self-constraint is displaced by an inferior version of itself. Both seek to perpetuate the
otherwise ephemeral authoritative electorate by charging judges with the task of
identifying the choices that the constitutional electorate would make if it still existed. Thus, the ideal of constitutional representation asks judges to act as if
they were an electorate that once existed, and once made decisions, but that
could not sustain itself indefinitely.
95. Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)
(judicial independence protects enduring principle from erosion by momentary
political impulse). Hamilton earlier suggested that without the "complete independence of the courts ... all the reservations of particular rights or privileges
would amount to nothing." Id. at 466. Indeed, appointment of judges for limited terms, subject to reappointment, would make them beholden to voters in
the forums of ordinary, everyday politics. This section suggests that such reasoning is flawed as applied to judicial supremacy, if not life-tenure. See also
Chang, supra note IO, at 880-81 (suggesting similar argument in Marbury
flawed). Indeed, it is unclear whether Hamilton intended his notion of judicial
independence to encompass judicial supremacy as well as life-tenure. See infra
note 103.
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in speculation. 96 Second, judges must choose this "interpretive"
goal. As people with extraordinary access to public power, judges
might be more concerned with their own values than with those
of the voters. 97 Ifjudges make mistakes while trying to serve constitutional representation, or make constitutional decisions according to some other "interpretive" ideal, the electorate's
concerns of political self-constraint are not served; intrusions on
96. This assumes a text with open-ended and indeterminate meaning-a
reasonable premise to the extent that one cannot make decisions that anticipate
every possible future issue. Cf Schauer, supra note 22, at 1721-22 (discussing
Bentham's ideal of determinate legal code and Hart's proposition of textual indeterminacy). Using past constitutional choices from which to infer the choices
that the electorate would make today if engaged in constitutional politics assumes
that voters have not changed their minds about what is important. It also assumes a workable evidentiary connection between those past choices and present preferences. I have elsewhere called this the premise of constitutional
continuity. See Chang, supra note IO, at 790-94. The premise of constitutional
continuity becomes more vulnerable when applied beyond those who have actually created their own constitutional provisions, toward those who live under
aging constitutional provisions created by past generations. Id. at 843 n.306,
847 n.318, 850 n.325, 863 n.370, 864 n.374, 865 n.376; see infra note 197 and
accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS I 05
(1978) (judges tempted to use powers for personal notions of justice). Some
feared, for example, that Robert Bork had undergone a convenient "confirmation conversion"-changing his expressed views to placate opponents while reserving his real preferences for resurrection once his seat on the Court was
secured. See, e.g., Nomination of Robert H. Bork To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the judiciary, IOOth
Cong., lst Sess. 423 ("I do not want this ... being a confirmation conversion.
That is going to be a question in the minds of a number and that is why I am
going into such detail.") (remarks of Sen. Leahy); id. at 437 ("What troubles me
as I hear your testimony after having studied your writings and your opinions, is
the very significant and pronounced shifts .... The concern I have is, where's
the predictability in judge Bork?") (remarks of Sen. Specter). After all, to a significant extent, it is within the power of each judge to choose the "interpretive"
goal he will pursue. Cf Maltz, Foreword: The Appeal of Originalism, 1987 UTAH L.
REV. 773. Professor Maltz, much like Owen Fiss, posits that judges almost always at least believe that they are acting within the constraints of their role-that
they are serving some master, that they are acting in a neutral and impartial way.
Id. at 782; see also id. at 784 (for judges to pursue their personal values would be
"inconsistent with [their] self-images"). While it is undoubtedly true that judges
are strongly influenced by clear conventions, it is not necessarily true that they
have internalized those conventions as part of self-image. A judge might do
what is expected to maintain his credibility (power) in anticipation of those issues for which those conventions have unclear implications and, therefore, impose relatively weak constraints on judicial discretion. Furthermore, there are
so many "conventions" available to judges-so many ways of characterizing decisions that have some degree of intellectual respectability-that a judge might
well maintain his "neutral" self-image simply by picking the interpretive "convention" that yields his preferred result. Indeed, Professor Maltz acknowledges
that "nonoriginalist constitutional analysis allows judges and commentators at
least to appear" to be "neutral" while seeing "their own views of justice embodied
in the law." Id. at 788 (emphasis added).
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legislative discretion would be unwarranted from the voters'
perspective. 98 ·
Thus the dilemma of judicial accountability: To subject judicial decisions to congressional correction seems to make constitutional law vulnerable to those relatively careless political forces
that the notion of political self-constraint seeks to supersede. Yet
to give judges the power of judicial supremacy is to manifest trust
in fallible individuals to an extent that would be unthinkable if
they were called "legislators" rather than "judges." 99 Can one
somehow resolve the tension between a concern for political selfconstraint (because voters feel good reason to distrust themselves) and a concern for ensuring judicial accountability (because
voters have good reason to distrust judges)?
m.

The Case for Congressional Supremacy: Re-evaluating the
Dichotomy Between the Electorate's Better
Constitutional Selves and Worse Congressional
Selves
·

This analysis has assumed a stark dichotomy between the
thoughts and behavior of voters during everyday congressional
politics and during the constitutional politics underlying choices
for political self-constraint. This assumption is, perhaps, unrealistic for at least two reasons. First, voters are likely to be neither
98. Michael Perry argues that the Court, rather than Congress, can better
serve goals of "interpretivism"-identifying choices made by the framers. See
PERRY I, supra note 7, at 16-17. While Perry recognizes that the President and
Congress have "incentives ... to ignore constitutional limits on federal power,"
he says nothing about what, if any, incentives judges have to enforce the constitution in an "interpretivist" way--or, indeed, in any way that subordinates the
judges' preferences for those of some authoritative electorate. See id. It seems
more reasonable to suppose not that judges will act in a "disinterested" way, but
that they have their own agendas and perceptions that might not correspond
with those of a majority among the voters.
99. Hamilton denied that the Constitution would make "the legislative
body ... themselves the constitutional judges of their own powers and that the
construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the other departments." See
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Rather,
"[i]t is far more rational to suppose that the courts were designed to be an intermediary body between the people and the legislature . . . to keep the latter
within the limits assigned to their authority." Id.; see also Amar, supra note 42, at
1056-57 (discussing framers' distrust of legislators). But see Monaghan, supra
note 93, at 1212 (judicial unaccountability from life-tenure a "dubious policy");
Tushnet, supra note 22, at 1684 ("[l]n removing judges from the pressures exerted by Congress, (which is acting as a majority faction), life-tenure creates the
possibility that the judges would themselves become an oppressive minority faction."). I suggest, however, that while these latter concerns are applicable to
judicial supremacy, life-tenure can serve ideals of political self-constraint under
a regime of congressional supremacy. See infra note 359.

1991]

A

CRITIQ.UE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY

317

angels while engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional
politics, nor devils while engaged in everyday politics. Rather,
though she might deploy them differently, a voter carries the
same values and impulses in both forums. She is the same person
whether making choices for political self-constraint or for enacting ordinary legislation. Second, although a voter's concerns for
general principle and political ideals might lose a measure of
prominence once constitutional politics ends, they need not be
irretrievably lost. These concerns were the bases of her extraordinary choices for political self-constraint and, like any memory, remain latent within her, a potential to be drawn out and
reinforced. 100
Thus, a voter's deficiency in everyday politics is not in being
so removed from her own values of political self-constraint that
she would wantonly choose to violate them. Rather, the voter's
deficiency is in being insufficiently attuned to these ideals during
the pressures and momentary passions of everyday legislative
decisionmaking. Able to recall her own choices for political selfconstraint once reminded of them, the voter can choose to respect them. 101
100. Bruce Ackerman sees a greater independence between contemporaneous constitutional politics and ordinary politics. He suggests that "in fixing its
sights upon a higher lawmaking victory, [a political movement] diverts its energy
from the lower lawmaking track, passing upon the chance for cheaper victories
that may further the more immediate interests of its followers." Ackerman, supra
note 8, at 1041. Yet one diverts energy from tax policy, for example, whether
one pursues gender discrimination policies in the forum of constitutional politics or that of ordinary legislation. Thus, displacement of tax victories with gender discrimination victories is largely irrelevant to the central question
considered in this section: Why make policy by creating constitutional provisions rather than by enacting ordinary· legislation? Indeed, once the choice is
made to pursue issues of gender discrimination, doing so through the higher
"lawmaking" track could well facilitate victories on the same issues in the everyday
legislature. Convincing a state legislature to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment, for example, could have facilitated adoption of a similar state measurestatutory or constitutional. See supra notes 80 & 82 (discussing enactment of
state legislation prohibiting racial discrimination based on Civil Rights Act of
1875). Furthermore, political leaders concerned with political self-constraint
wish to transform, in Ackerman's terms, private citizens into private citizens. See
Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1033-34. To the extent that they are successful, the
electorate's memory of its private citizenship can be a lasting benefit in the forum
of everyday politics, as suggested in the text. See infra text accompanying notes
100-04.
101. Cf McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). In McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall implied that deference to a congressional judgment
might be appropriate because "[t]he power now contested was exercised by the
first Congress elected under the present constitution." Id. at 401. Thus, many
of those who framed the Constitution also chose to create the national bank
challenged as unconstitutional. See also Brest, supra note IO, at 83-84 (early Con-
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This analysis suggests a solution to the dilemma of judicial
accountability. If voters can trust themselves to give adequate
weight to their constitutional ideals of political self-constraint once
reminded, a correct judicial determination of unconstitutionality
would be safe under congressional supremacy. 102 There would
be no need to give judges the power to make unremediable degresses extensively debated constitutional questions). Yet if those who participated in creating constitutional provisions were peifectly trustworthy to stay
within bounds, it would not have made sense to accord judges any special enforcement authority at all. Indeed, if this were true, Chief justice Marshall in
Marbury should have determined that the Supreme Court lacked authority to
question the constitutionality of § 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. After all,
Marbury was decided within a generation from the time that "the people" of the
United States engaged in constitutional politics and made their constitutional
choices. Cf. supra note 91. Thus, Marshall's approach in Marbury and McCulloch
to congressional decisionmaking was inconsistent. Essential to evaluating the
two prongs of inconsistency is the subject addressed in the text-specifically, the
extent to which a legislature does represent the electorate's current preferences,
and the extent to which those preferences, after having made constitutional
choices, can reflect their own concerns for political self-constraint. Judicial review tempered by congressional supremacy, however, assumes that Congress
might fail to reflect constitutional concerns in ordinary legislation, but more
likely can do so in response to judicial suggestions of unconstitutionality.
102. Paul Brest ar~es that Congress has shown itself unlikely to engage in
effective constitutional mterpretation. See generally, Brest, supra note IO. Yet this
view begs a definition for effective constitutional interpretation. For more on
Brest's views about congressional supremacy for aging constitutional provisions,
see irifra note 244. Some have gone even further, suggesting that Congress
makes policy not by seeking the public good, but by "selling" legislation to the
highest bidder. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533,
548 (1983); Landes & Posner, supra note 35, at 877 (recognizing legislative
"deals" made by effective interest groups). But see Farber & Frickey, supra note
51, at 883 (criticizing extreme conclusions of some public choice theorists); Sunstein, supra note 54, at 48-49 (legislators can engage in thoughtful deliberation
without being unduly influenced by interest groups). This criticism oflegislative
decisionmaking posits two basic flaws: first, that the legislature is inadequately
representative to the extent that interest groups are minority factions and, second, that the legislature is inadequately thoughtful to the extent that interest
groups single-mindedly pursue narrow and short-term objectives. See Sunstein,
supra note 54, at 32-34.
judicial review supplemented by congressional supremacy can address each
of these difficulties. First, by striking down a governmental policy and inviting
congressional response, the Court will have raised an issue to greater public
scrutiny. The electorate-at-large, theretofore perhaps politically passive, will
have a visible opportunity to evaluate an issue that otherwise was resolved by
normal governmental processes (assumedly) captured by narrow interest
groups. Second, if judicial invalidation of governmental policy is subject to congressional revision, interest groups themselves will have been given an opportunity to reconsider an issue in terms framed by the Court's judgment. Of course,
Congress probably would remain imperfectly representative and thoughtfulnot a replication of true, formal constitutional politics. Yet questioning Congress's representativeness is hardly a basis for supporting even less representative judicial supremacy. For elaboration of how congressional supremacy can
serve goals of political self-constraint, see infra text accompanying notes 192-99
& 220-305.
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partures from the "interpretive" ideal of constitutional representation; judicial supremacy lacks justification. 103
Indeed, judicial review tempered by congressional
supremacy could serve as a warning that the electorate's own constitutional ideals might have been compromised. It would provide Congress with the occasion to reconsider issues, framed in
constitutional terms by the Supreme Court, giving each voter the
opportunity to think about the decisions she would make if again
engaged in formal constitutional politics. Thus, the electorate
would be encouraged to recreate the constitutional politics through
which it created the constitutional text now being interpreted,
and thereby to perpetuate the benefits of its extraordinarily
thoughtful constitutional politics. 104 And this, after all, is the
103. As the framers' position on the existence of judicial review is unclear,
their views on judicial supremacy are even more so. James Madison once
seemed to reject vesting any branch with "interpretive" supremacy. See Fisher,
Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C.L. REV. 707, 710 (1985)
(quoting l ANNALS OF CoNG. 493 U· Gales ed. 1789) (remarks of Madison)).
Hamilton's The Federalist No. 78 might be read as suggesting otherwise, see supra
note 43, but even it is ambiguous about judicial supremacy. Hamilton noted
that while "independence of the judges" is necessary to guard against baneful
influences among the people, such influences "speedily give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (A. Hamilton)
(C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (emphasis added). If it is true that the electorate's bad
judgement is temporary, and that it is able to correct itself simply with more
deliberate reflection, a regime of judicial· review tempered with congressional
supremacy would seem to be appropriate-at least so far as choices for political
self-constraint are concerned. Furthermore, one must confront a deeper question that accounts for the "intertemporal difficulty": What is the relevance of
their views about judicial supremacy for any given voter today? See infra text
accompanying notes 136- 48.
104. One who embraces an interest group theory of Congress's
(non)deliberative processes might object to congressional supremacy as a route
to a hopelessly incoherent constitutional law. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note
102, at 547-48. The value of coherence, however, is itself debatable. While
some see law as a quest for moral coherence or "integrity," it is also undeniable
that constitutional provisions themselves are created by politics, and often reflect intricate compromise. Compare R. DWORKIN, supra note 92, at 225-75 with
Chang, supra note 10, at 833-45; see also infra note 366 (discussing priority of
constitutional politics versus judicial review).
Apart from the value of coherence, it is hardly clear that congressional
supremacy would yield a body of constitutional law that is significantly less coherent (perhaps more accurately, more incoherent) than the constitutional law
generated over the past two centuries. Indeed, some suggest that interest
groups affect congressional deliberation in a far more limited way than that perceived by radical public choice theorists. For example, "group influence is likely
to be strongest when the group is attempting to block ... legislation; when the
group's goals are narrow and involve low-visibility issues; when the group has
substantial support from other groups and public officials." Farber & Frickey,
supra note 51, at 887 (footnotes omitted). This characterization of interest
group influence should allay some fears of those who trust courts more than
Congress to make constitutional law. To the extent that interest groups block
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ideal of community decisionmaking that the notion of political
self-constraint seeks to achieve. 105

3. Se/,ecting justices to "Interpret" Constitutional Texts Intended to
Ensure Optimal Legislative Accountability
a.

The "Interpretive" Ideal: Constitutional Representation

Voters, we have seen, might build their legislative structure
with two goals in mind: accountability and political self-constraint. The first seeks to keep representatives tied to electoral
preferences so voters need not be as jealously vigilant about public policy as in a direct democracy. The second seeks to keep representatives sufficiently removed from the latest electoral whims
that they · can exercise independent, publicly-oriented judgment.106 Both goals are served by framing the legislative structure in supreme constitutional texts. Constrained by the
principles of constitutional supremacy, representatives may not
change the legislative structure toward either insulating themselves from electoral retribution or serving the majority's own illconsidered judgments about how public policy should be
made. 107
legislation more easily than prompt it, judicial choices would remain intact. Furthermore, if interest group influence is greatest for narrow, low-visibility issues,
it is likely to be relatively weak for proposed legislation reversing the Supreme
Court under congressional supremacy-to the extent that overturning the Court
is viewed as a sober, extraordinary occasion. This is especially likely to be true
for issues that underlie the most controversial Supreme Court opinions. Finally,
when interest groups need and gain the support of other forces and institutions,
public decisionmaking is more inclusive and, therefore, more likely representative of the electorate-at-large. As Professors Farber and Frickey have observed:
Faith in deliberative congressional resolution of sensitive issues is not
entirely misplaced, particularly when courts assist the deliberative process through structural and procedural review ... that shifts the burden
of inertia to those seeking to reimpose the invalidated decision . . ..
Considering the ease of killing legislation and the difficulty of passing
it, these consequences of a suspensive veto are significant.
Id. at 923.
105. This resolution is far from perfect. Compounding the significance of
the electorate's fading memories, new people will enter the political community
who never focused on the virtues of political self-constraint by engaging in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics. Inevitably, the entire political
community will consist of people who never debated and struggled with the notion of political self-constraint. I confront their plight in the next major section,
where I consider whether, and why, voters should allow their constitution to
grow as old as has the Constitution. Analysis of this truly long-term context will
have much to say about the moderately long-term situation in which one portion
of the electorate has fading memories of choices for political self-constraint, and
another has no memories at all.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 44-55.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 53-58.
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Each motive for exploiting constitutional supremacy carries
its own interpretive ideal. To the extent that the electorate has
created constitutional provisions seeking to maximize legislative
accountability, voters would want Justices to make the decisions
the electorate would make if engaged in extraordinarily vigilant politics toward ensuring that power-hungry governmental functionaries do not separate themselves from voter preferences. To the
extent that constitutional provisions reflect concerns for political
self-constraint, voters would want Justices to make the decisions
the electorate would make if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful
debate about the processes of public policymaking. 108 Each "interpretive" ideal is a version of constitutional representation.
b. Judicial Supremacy as a Mechanism for Ensuring
Accountability to the Ideal of Constitutional
Representation
1.

The Case for Judicial Supremacy: Toward Limiting the
Authority of Power-Hungry Officials

Congressional supremacy might be problematic in this context because it would empower Congress to overturn judicial interpretations of constitutional provisions designed to ensure
Congress s accountability. Congressional authority· to reverse
Supreme Court "interpretations" of constitutional mandates intended to protect those who criticize government, or seek access
to government information, for example, could facilitate legislative entrenchment. 109 Judicial supremacy would make it more difficult for renegade legislators to implement policies that detach
themselves from electoral scrutiny and retribution.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 88-94 ("interpretive" ideal for provisions concerned with political self-constraint). If, for example, a wave of popular euphoria prompts the electorate to make some person Emperor-for-Life, a
majority of voters would be served if justices interpreted provisions intended to
ensure optimal legislative accountability in a way that reflects the choices the
electorate would make if engaged in formal constitutional politics today, toward
protecting their better selves from their worse selves. Cf U.S. CONST. amend. XXII (decision to limit Presidents to two elected terms after Franklin Roosevelt elected
four times).
109. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed.
1961) (legislature should not be judge of own powers).
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The Case Against Judicial Supremacy: When Are
Constitutional Provisions Intended to Police the
Voters' Legislature, and When Are They Intended
to Police the Voters Themselves?

Constitutional provisions designed to ensure optimal legislative accountability are intended both to curb legislative corruption and to promote political self-constraint. 110 Previous analysis
has questioned the merits of judicial supremacy for "interpreting" constitutional provisions intended to secure the benefits of
political self-constraint. 111 Thus, voters might deem it best to establish congressional supremacy with respect to constitutional issues implicating concerns of optimal legislative accountability, but
to accord judges the powers of judicial supremacy with respect to
issues implicating concerns of optimal legislative accountability.
This allocation of interpretive authority would be problematic, because it begs the question of whether Congress or the
Court has supreme authority to draw the "interpretive" line between those provisions and circumstances for which Congress enjoys the powers of congressional supremacy and those for which
the Court enjoys the powers of judicial supremacy. Congress and
the Court might develop three behavioral patterns for answering
this question. First, they could engage in a perpetual competition
yielding ad hoc determinations of final "interpretive" authority
issue by issue. Second, the competition might settle into a prevailing ethic of judicial supremacy across the board-as now exists in the American constitutional scheme. Third, it might settle
into a prevailing ethic of congressional supremacy across the
board.
An ad hoc pattern of perpetual competition not only could
drain institutional energies, but also could yield haphazard results
without established principles under which debate about final "interpretive" authority would be conducted.1 12 Furthermore, if
voters accept that there are significant problems with judicial
110. See supra text accompanying notes 45-58.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 96-105.
112. Yet its desirability depends on the kind of interbranch struggle Congress and the Court would create. Careful and open consideration of motives
for exploiting the principles of constitutional supremacy-whether perpetuating
a temporary political advantage toward denying one's opponents the right to
shape public policy, securing the benefits of political self-constraint, or ensuring
legislative accountability-can enhance public decisionmaking, as will reconsideration of the particular challenged governmental action. See infra text accompanying note 131. On the other hand, stalemate, tension, and gamesmanship
undermine the chances that this careful and open public debate will occur.
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supremacy for "interpreting" constitutional provisions intended
to secure the benefits of political self-constraint, they hardly
would want to establish a universal ethic of judicial supremacy.
Perhaps we can refine the earlier analysis suggesting the desirability of judicial supremacy for enforcing constitutional provisions
intended to ensure legislative accountability. 113 If judicial
supremacy is unnecessary or undesirable for this purpose, the
electorate could safely establish congressional supremacy for
resolving all questions arising under their newly created constitutional texts designed to ensure optimal legislative accountability.
[1]

Bright Lines and Predictable "Interpretations": Judicial
Supremacy as Unnecessary

Many constitutional provisions by which voters might try to
ensure legislative accountability would likely be framed in specific
terms. Consider, for example, terms of office for representatives.
Suppose that voters have created a unicameral legislature and
specified a term of six years for its members. Suppose further
that the legislature passed a statute increasing terms of office to
eight years. Surely, this would be unconstitutional, for "six
years" means six years, doesn't it?
Of course it does, at least in this sense: If one asked any person on the street, she would agree that "six years" means six years.
Furthermore, based on pervasive and traditional notions of "plain
meaning," 114 one can hardly imagine that any judge would find it
to mean anything else--even if she were deeply committed to the
"interpretive" ideal of constitutional representation and open to
the possibility that the choices made in constitutional politics last
year are not necessarily the choices voters would make if engaged
in constitutional politics today . 115
113. See supra text accompanying note 109.
114. See, e.g., Johnstone, An Evaluation of the Ru/.es of Statutory Interpretation, 3
U. KAN. L. REV. l, 12-13 (1954) (although one can posit that all words are inherently ambiguous, "the degree of ambiguity is likely to be substantial only in limited ... sets of situations."); Jones, The Plain Meaning Ru/.e and Extrinsic Aids in the
Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. U.L.Q 2 (1939) (discussing traditional
application of plain meaning rule and cases which have disregarded it.); cf Nutting, The Ambiguity of Unambiguous Statutes, 24 MINN. L. REV. 509, 521 (1940)
(meaning of statutory words "will generally accord with the 'meaning' which
would be attached to the words by ordinary persons, but in some cases a different result may be reached because of considerations of equity or policy which, in
the minds of the courts, are controlling"); Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE LJ. 509,
528-3 l ( 1988) (rules stated in language with clear meaning to legal and lay communities can generate determinate legal outcomes).
115. Pursuing goals of constitutional representation, however, one can
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Indeed, one can hardly imagine that legislators would even
attempt to extend their terms of office from six to eight years,
precisely because the Constitution specifies terms of "six years."
It would be still more incredible that a legislature given the powers of congressional supremacy would pass legislation overturning a judicial determination that the "eight years" statute violates
the bright-line "six years" constitutional text. Thus, such brightline texts would appear to be as self-enforcing as any legal texts
could be. To the extent that bright-line texts are self-enforcing,
judicial supremacy is unnecessary . 116
[2]

Fuzzy I.ines, Core Values, and Predictable
"Interpretations": Judicial Supremacy as Unnecessary

Other provisions that voters might create toward ensuring
legislative accountability must be drawn with far less precision. 117
For example, provisions guaranteeing rights to criticize and to receive information about governmental performance cannot be as
precisely framed as those establishing terms of office for legislators and executives. Thus, the "interpretive" ideal of constitutional representation, rather than the obvious meaning of words
to any person on the street, can be the benchmark for determining the proper meaning of these provisions.
Yet at least for some issues, the value of ensuring legislative
accountability can provide clear guidance not only for judges who
speculate that voters today, if they engaged in true constitutional politics, might
choose a different, but equally specific, term of office for legislative representatives. See, e.g., Oreskes, Bush Backs Move For limiting Tenns of U.S. Lawmakers, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 12, 1990, at Al, col. 6 ("President Bush has decided to push for a
constitutional amendment to limit the number of terms for members of Congress .... "). But given the apparent clarity of the constitutional language, it is
difficult to imagine a judge daring to find that a "six years" provision actually
allows eight years, or, indeed, that a unicameral legislature provision actually
allows transfer of all legislative authority to an Emperor-for-Life-even though
the decisions voters made yesterday are not necessarily the decisions they would
make today if engaged in formal constitutional politics.
116. As Professor Schauer has observed, the.fact that Ronald Reagan was
seldom mentioned as a possible presidential candidate in 1988 is a "legal event"
reflecting the clear and broadly understood meaning of the twenty-second
amendment. See Schauer, supra note 22, at 1719; see also Carter, Constitutional
Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A Preliminary Defense of an Imperfect Muddl.e,
94 YALE LJ. 821, 853-59 (1985) (arguing that some provisions have uncontroversial meaning that lends legitimacy to provisions with indeterminate meaning); Grodin, supra note 22, at 1974 (results sometimes compelled by clear
language, not logic, because "any judge would feel like a damned fool trying to
justify a different result"); Schauer, supra note 22, at 1723-34 (clarity of applicable law deters disputes); Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985).
117. See supra note 96 (impossibility of determinate legal codes).
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endeavor to identify choices the electorate would make today if
engaged in constitutional politics, but also for legislators who
might wish to entrench themselves in power.1 18 For example, assume that the political community consists of three identifiable
groups with approximately equal political power: die-hard and
closed-minded Roosevelt Democrats, die-hard and closedminded Reagan Republicans, and open-minded, wavering Independents. A majority of voters almost certainly would determine, in the name of accountability, that a government staffed by
Republicans should not pass a law prohibiting people from articulating Democratic viewpoints. Not only would die-hard Democrats make this determination; so would Independents who
recently voted Republican but who can imag~ne voting Democratic in the future. The Independents would want to preserve
the opportunity to change their minds. Thus, it is a matter of
simple self-interest for a majority at any given time to assert that
people have the right to criticize government and to have information about their governmental functionaries. At least within a
range of orthodoxy, for groups with significant political power, 119
the idea is deeply rooted, widely accepted, viscerally felt, and not
at all subtle. Rather than a value of political self-constraint that
emerges only after extraordinarily careful deliberation, this is a
value of political self-preservation sprung by a hair trigger. 12°
118. Cf Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593, 608-12 ( 1958) (legal terms have core of settled meaning and penumbras of
indeterminate meaning).
119. A similar analysis will suggest that for a majority of the national electorate at any given time, it does not make sense to exploit the principles of constitutional supremacy toward denying one's opponents the right to shape public
policy in Congress. See infra text accompanying notes 175-91; see also Chang,
supra note 10, at 775-82 (given stable national electorate, political self-constraint, rather than desire to thwart preferences of one's political competitors, is
more plausible motive for successfully creating constitutional provisions). This
is to be contrasted with the plausibility that, for a minority of the national electorate that happens to enjoy an extreme but temporary political advantage over
political rivals, it might make sense to seek constitutional mandates toward
thwarting congressional discretion in anticipation of their opponents' reclaimed
political power. Even for them, however, the difficulty of perpetuating a temporary
political advantage in practice counsels against trying to do so. See supra text
accompanying notes 69-87.
120. Professor Amar has made the point: "Because each American sees
herself in the minority on some issues, each is likely to embrace some general
idea of 'minority rights' out of self-interest, if nothing else." Amar, supra note
42, at 1096. While Amar quite correctly notes that this self-interest justifies only
some limited idea of minority rights, others have suggested that fear of being in a
minority should lead people to protect "minority rights" well beyond the mainstream. See, e.g.,]. RAWLS, A T_HEORX OF JUSTICE (1971). Significantly, Rawls's
view is generated only by denying individuals knowledge of their actual circum-
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Because a majority of voters can clearly voice their interests,
a majority of legislators would not likely attempt to suppress ideas
within a range of orthodox political disagreement. 121 For similar
reasons, even if the legislature enacted such a statute, it would be
still more difficult for a majority of legislators to overturn a
court's determination that the value of accountability had been
violated. Again, judicial supremacy is unnecessary to vindicate
the choices for legislative accountability that the electorate would
make if engaged in constitutional politics today.1 22
[3]

Fuzzy Lines, Ambiguous Values, and Unpredictable
"Interpretations": judicial Supremacy as Undesirable

Consider, however, laws suppressing the expression of viewpoints farther removed from the center of political ideology. It is
less clear whether a majority of voters would want to prohibit the
stances. Yet as suggested by Professor Bollinger's analysis of extremist speech,
the motive of self-protection is relevant only to the extent that one is vulnerable
and needs protection. For a discussion of Professor Bollinger's analysis, see infra notes 123-29 and accompanying text. If unlikely ever to press interests well
beyond the mainstream, one is unlikely to be motivated by self-interest to protect such unorthodoxies. But there might be other reasons, such as a concern
for the welfare of individuals who hold an unorthodox minority interest, that a
majority might wish to protect such unorthodoxies through provisions intended
to secure the benefits of political self-constraint. See id.; cf L. LEVY, LEGACY OF
SUPPRESSION (1960).
121. The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 provide a singular example of an
effort to suppress an opposing faction within the range of political orthodoxy.
See l C. WARREN, THE SUPREME CouRT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 215 (1936).
That this effort failed in the face of outraged political opposition-even in the
absence of judicial review-supports the proposition that one facet of political
orthodoxy cannot suppress another. That the effort was unique in American
history supports the proposition that one facet of political orthodoxy likely will
not even attempt to suppress another.
122. Legislators might gerrymander electoral districts or manipulate census
figures, hoping to perpetuate their political power. Such methods for perpetuating the present power structure are both more subtle and perhaps more effective
than prohibiting the major opposition party's right to criticize. Thus, legislators
might seek to violate the majority's preference for a fluid electoral processwhere here the majority includes members of the opposition parties and temporarily convinced members of the current governing party-if they think they can
get away with it. This is not to say, however, that judicial supremacy will serve
better than congressional supremacy or, indeed, that judicial supremacy is desirable at all. Courts have been deferential to states on matters of districting. Indeed, it is likely that the high stakes of judicial invalidation that necessarily
accompany the powers of judicial supremacy explain the prevalence of judicial
deference. See infra text accompanying notes 250-53. Thus, the theoretical
check of judicial supremacy is meaningless because it is not used. Under congressional supremacy, courts might well be more willing to scrutinize these sorts
of state and federal legislative maneuvers toward determining whether concerns
for optimal legislative accountability have been violated. See infra text accompanying notes 268-72 & 283-85.
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government from suppressing the viewpoints of Communists, the
Ku Klux Klan, child pornographers, or, indeed, flag burners, than
that they would want to prohibit the government from suppressing the viewpoints of mainstream Democrats or Republicans-at least in the name of legislative accountability.1 28 Extremist
values offend; they cause harm. More importantly, a majority of
voters could not imagine adopting those values in the future.
Thus, allowing expression of these offensive views does nothing
to maximize the extent to which electoral preferences are reflected in legislative policy. Indeed, laws suppressing extremist
viewpoints are more likely to reflect the present majority's impulses than to reflect any legislators' efforts to perpetuate themselves in office against their constituents' will.1 24
Thus, a better explanation for a majority's choices, if any, to
protect extremist speech, is a desire for political self-constraint.125 Though a voter is offended by their ideas, though he
cannot imagine ever being persuaded by their ideas, he might
wish to protect the Communists' or Klansmen's speech because
he values their interests in individual fulfillment through
speech, 126 or because he views tolerance per seas an extraordinarily important political value.1 27 As previously suggested, however, if political self-constraint is a voter's reason for
constitutionally prohibiting laws that forbid expression of obnoxious views, 128 then judicial supremacy is counterproductive.129
123. This is the paradox of extremist speech. See, e.g., L. BOLLINGER, THE
TOLERANT SoCIE1Y 12-42 (1986) (constitutional protection of extremist speech
difficult to justify).
124. For example, after the Civil War's end, but before congressional Reconstruction, "Southern intransigence ... took the form of denying freedom of
speech to those who attacked Southern ways." W. NELSON, supra note 23, at 42.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 36-43.
126. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (right of
"intimate association" protected because individuals draw "emotional enrichment" and define self-identity from close ties with others); T. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 ( 1970) (freedom of expression essential
means of assuring individual self-fulfillment).
127. See generally L. BOLLINGER, supra note 123.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 125-27; see also L. BOLLINGER, supra
note 123, at 12-42 (protection of extremist speech difficult to justify); Schauer,
Must Speech Be Speciaa, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1284, 1289-92, 1305-06 (1983) (because self-fulfillment value can justify protecting much more than speech, it is
weak justification for protecting speech).
129. Hamilton's skeptical view of a constitutionally protected free press
does not support judicial supremacy. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 514 (A.
Hamilton) (C. Rossiter, ed. 1961) (free press depends on public opinion); see also
supra note 103 (suggesting The Federalist No. 78 does not necessarily support
judicial supremacy). Similar considerations apply to more subtle structural con-
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The Case for Congressional Supremacy

The foregoing suggests that congressional supremacy is unlikely to undermine electoral concerns for legislative accountability,
which most likely are served by bright-line constitutional texts
and the broadly uncontested core of fuzzy-line provisions. 130
Furthermore, where the implications of the accountability value
are unclear-where electoral ~oncerns are more likely for political
self-constraint with respect to the processes of making public policy-congressional supremacy would better promote the "interpretive" ideal of identifying the choices voters would make if
engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful politics.
By explicitly adopting congressional supremacy for all constitutional issues, voters could avoid the risk not only that Congress
and the Court would gradually develop an ethic of judicial
supremacy, but also that Congress and the Court would have
messy and unproductive confrontations over which institution has
final "interpretive" authority with respect to any given constitutional clause or issue. This is not to say Congress and the Court
would avoid confrontation altogether. On the contrary, the point
of judicial review supplemented by congressional supremacy is
precisely to encourage constructive interaction between Congress
and the Court. 131 Yet rather than evoking a sense of constitutional crisis, the interbranch struggle arising under congressional
supremacy should focus attention on the merits of challenged
policy, the merits of the Supreme Court's rationale for finding the
policy constitutionally invalid, and the merits of subsequent congressional reconsideration. By focusing debate on the merits of
policy, judicial review supplemented by congression;il supremacy
can enrich the "ordinary" political process and make it more like
the extraordinary politics ideally underlying the creation of
supreme constitutional text.

***
cerns such as the delegation of legislative power to procedures and institutions
other than those prescribed in supreme constitutional texts. If such constitutional issues implicate concerns for political self-constraint, judicial supremacy is
inappropriate. If they implicate concerns for preventing legislative entrenchment and corruption, judicial supremacy might be desirable. See infra text accompanying notes 200-13 (same issue for people relying on aging provisions). In
this event, however, the desirability ofjudicial supremacy must be discounted by
the improbability that the Court will find the legislature to have acted unconstitutionally. See infra text accompanying notes 250-53 (judicial supremacy encourages judicial deference).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 114-22.
131. See infra text accompanying notes 241-49, 268-72, 283-92 & 298-305.
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This evaluation of judicial supremacy from the perspective of
voters who have created their own constitutional texts yields
three significant conclusions. First, while judicial supremacy
seems necessary to perpetuate an extraordinary political advantage, it is not sufficient. Indeed, it is doubtful whether people can
perpetuate an extraordinary political advantage by creating constitutional provisions. In the short term, they will lack control
over their hand-pickedjustices; 132 in the longer term, as they lose
their competitive edge, their opponents will regain influence not
only in enacting legislation but also in selecting Justices. 133 Second, congressional supremacy is a better route than judicial
supremacy toward constitutional representation for people who
have created constitutional provisions designed to secure the
benefits of political self-constraint. 134 Third, for constitutional
provisions designed to ensure optimal legislative accountability,
"bright-line" texts and core values generate uncontroversial "interpretive" answers and can be effectively enforced through congressional supremacy. Controversial "interpretive" questions
more likely reflect concerns for political self-constraint and,
therefore, should be resolved through congressional
supremacy.1 35 Thus, congressional supremacy seems a better
method than judicial supremacy for achieving the "interpretive"
goals of people who seek political benefits from the principles of
constitutional supremacy by creating their own constitutional
texts.

•••

III.

jUDICIAL REVIEW FOR PEOPLE WHO RELY ON AGING
CONSTITUTIONAL TEXTS

This section will consider why voters today limit congressional discretion with aging constitutional texts rather than (i) create
new constitutional provisions, or (ii) abandon constitutional supremacy altogether in favor of statutory supremacy . 136 By explaining why the electorate today exploits the principles of constitutional supremacy in
this way, one might define ideal versions of constitutional "interpretation," and determine whether judicial supremacy or con132. See supra text accompanying notes 69-76 & 79-87.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 100-05.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 123-29.
136. For a definition of"statutory supremacy," see supra text accompanying
notes 14-15 & note 44.
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gressional supremacy is a better mechanism for ensuring that
Justices fulfill those "interpretive" ideals.
A.

Why Constitutional Supremacy with Agi,ng Constitutional Texts?

1. Ancestor Worship: A Self-Contradictory justification
Reverence for ancestral heroes might be a reason for limiting
congressional discretion with aging constitutional texts. 137 If a
voter wishes society to be governed by the choices made in past
constitutional politics, rather than those that would be. made in
congressional or constitutional politics today, her "interpretive"
ideal might look like Raoul Berger's strict originalism: 138 to identify the specific compromises wrought by the framers and ratifiers
of each constitutional provision. 139 Alternatively, it might resemble ChiefJustice Rehnquist's and Henry Monaghan's more speculative version of originalism: to identify the choices that the
framers and ratifiers would make if they were able to make decisions about the world today. 140
137. Cf Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1046; Shapiro, supra note 19, at 1566
(originalism is one version of viewing law as coming "from above"; majoritarianism is another). Ackerman seems to define ancestor worship as judicial invalidation of a later legislative decision simply because it is inconsistent with an earlier
one. While this scenario might suggest ancestor worship by the judiciary, it does
not necessarily reflect ancestor worship by the electorate-at-large. For present
purposes, ancestor worship is more properly viewed as a desire by the present
electorate to remain governed by the past.
138. See generally R. BERGER, supra note 33.
139. People might create constitutional provisions to control future generations. See PERRY II, supra note 7, at 142 (constitutional amendment is dramatic
way for present to speak with future); Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1039 (during
constitutional politics, "the democrat has a means of amplifying the voice of the
People in a way that will arrest attention for a long time to come"); Levinson,
Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 376 (1982) (purpose of constitutional
control to preserve particular vision held by constitutional founders and prevent
its overthrow by future generations). The question now asked concerns whether
those subsequent generations want to be bound by past choices and, if so, why.
A desire by the past to control the future can be satisfied only by cooperation
from the future. See Chang, supra note 10, at 787.
140. Justice Jackson articulated-and criticized-both versions of the
originalist's "interpretive" ideal: 'Just what our forefathers did envision, or
would have envisioned had they foreseen modem conditions, must be divined
from material almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for the Pharaoh." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 634 (1952) Uackson,J. concurring). Focusing on what the framers and ratifiers wanted (or would want) begs the question of whether they wished their
decisions and their interpretive ideal to govern later generations. Cf Bobbitt,
Constitutional Fate, 58 TEX. L. REV. 695, 700 (1980) (noting John Adams' view
that founders sought to create written constitution to provide expression of fundamental values to which later generations could refer); Brest, The Misconceived
QJiestfor the Origi,nal Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 209-21 (1980) (originalism must account for framers' "interpretive intent"); Maltz, supra note 97, at 796

1991]

A

CRmQ.UE OF

JumcIAL

SUPREMACY

331

Yet for several reasons, ancestor worship is a self-contradictory reason for voters to rely on aging texts, rather than (i) to
create new constitutional provisions of their own, or (ii) to abandon constitutional supremacy altogether in favor of statutory
supremacy. First, if a voter identifies James Madison or Thaddeus
Stevens as his ancestral hero, and wishes to be governed by the
constitutional provisions they created, the voter makes his own
choice. This choice must rest on the voter's own evaluations of
the quality of each potential hero's thought. Thus, those who
idolize the framers pursue their own values; they simply label
their own values with some personified precedent. 141 One does
not avoid responsibility for making public policy by choosing to
be an ancestor worshipper.
Second, if voters today wish to be governed by the values of
those viewed as particularly wise, it does not make sense to limit
the focus to Madison or Stevens. Indeed, voters might prefer
constitutional provisions reflecting the wisdom not only of James
Madison, but also that of other respected figures-whether Mohammed, Sigmund Freud, or Martin Luther King. Madison might
have been wise, but perhaps not wise in all things; perhaps he
gave less attention to other heroes' wisdom than a voter views as
ideal; perhaps he could not have given adequate attention to the
wisdom of a voter's other heroes because they had not yet been
born.142
("[O]riginalist theory ... directs judges to use their best efforts to determine
what the intent of the drafters would be in a particular situation."); Powell, The
Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 ( 1985) (framers did
not intend for later generations to interpret Constitution based on original
intent).
141. Cf White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEX.
L. REV. 415, 418 (1982) (questioning how one chooses relevant framers).
142. This observation applies to issues not yet experienced, as well as to
heroes not yet born. Consider, for example, abortion. Madison and Stevens
simply did not focus their wisdom on abortion as a social issue. See W. NELSON,
supra note 23, at 6 (framers of fourteenth amendment never considered abortion
issue). Even if they had, because of changes in sexual mores and gender roles,
abortion could not have had the same significance in their social context as it has
in society today. Cf Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954)
("[W]e cannot tum the clock back to 1868 when the [Fourteenth] Amendment
was adopted .... We must consider public education in the light of its full
development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation."); A.
BICKEL, supra note 8, at 102-03 (seeking framers' intent as dispositive of present
constitutional controversies is "wrong question"); id. at 110 ("[O]ur own reasoned and revocable will, not some idealized ancestral compulsion, ... moves us
forward."); Brest, supra note 140, at 223 (originalism unworkable for resolving
modem constitutional conflicts); Chang, supra note 10, at 784-88 (relevant values for constitutional interpretation are those of people today); Sunstein, supra
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Third, Madison was not alone in 1787; Thaddeus Stevens
was not alone in 1868. Their views were compromised by competition with their political opponents. Thus, even if Madison or
Stevens were a voter's ideal, by choosing to apply the principles
of constitutional supremacy to aging provisions, and to the "original understanding" of those provisions, 143 the voter has delegated to Madison's and Stevens' opponents, and the political power
they happened to enjoy at the time, authority to determine the
extent to which his heroes' preferences are reflected in public
policy.
Thus, from the perspective of voters today, ancestor worship
is not a convincing reason for applying the principles of constitutional supremacy to aging constitutional texts. One must look
elsewhere to justify, or explain, an aging Constitution.

2. Laziness and Inertia: Deriving "Interpretive" Ideals of
Constitutional Representation for Voters Today
The laziness and inertia of private citizenship reflect concerns
that compete with a voter's desire to maximize the extent to
which his preferences are reflected in public policy. 144 An unwillnote 42, at 1563 (unclear why framers' values should matter to contemporary
constitutional controversies).
143. Analysis in the previous section should suggest the extent to which
any view of "original understanding" must depend upon other factors, e.g.,
whether those who created the provision held selfish or community-oriented
"interpretive" ideals, and upon choices that judges necessarily must make about
whose values to pursue and why. See supra notes 33, 4 7 & text accompanying
notes 69-70. The concern for ensuring judicial accountability suggests that
much of the meaning ultimately given to a newly created constitutional provision in application must be a function of continuing power relationships in practical politics. So viewed, any "original understanding" is far less significant than
is continuing competition, at any given moment, to resolve continuing issues in
one's own preferred way. See supra text accompanying notes 69-87.
144. Bruce Ackerman's treatment of the private citizen conflates two variables that should be viewed separately: first, the energy that one is willing to
commit to making public policy and second, the extent to which one pursues
"public regarding" concerns or "selfish" concerns when devoting energy to
public policy. Ackerman attributes three characteristics to the private citizenapathy, ignorance and selfishness. Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1034. Apathy and
ignorance are functions of the energy one is willing to commit to public policy;
selfishness relates to the extent to which one pursues "public regarding" concerns when devoting energy to public policy. Cf Michelman I, supra note 42, at
21-23 (republicanism and pluralism are distinguishable not by energy people
commit to public policy, but by quality of political debate); Sunstein, Naked Pref
erences and the Constitution, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1694 (1984) (interested political actors might exercise political power to serve both selfish and publiclyoriented ends). I attribute only apathy and ignorance to the private citizen, and
define him by the energy he is willing to commit to politics. The private citizen is
one who is willing to devote energy to the formation of public policy-including
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ingness to devote so much energy to politics, to sacrifice more
insular concerns, can explain why voters today do not create their
own constitutional provisions. 145 Yet such private citizenship does
not suggest that voters are uninterested in attaining the benefits
that constitutional supremacy can provide. Otherwise, it would
make no sense to place limits on congressional discretion with the
principles of constitutional supremacy. Thus, the laziness and inertia of private citizenship do not vitiate the ideal of having constitutional provisions reflecting one's own preferences to the
greatest extent possible.
This explanation for the infrequency of constitutional politics, despite a desire to attain the benefits of constitutional
supremacy, suggests that if constitutional politics were much less
bothersome, a majority among the national electorate would create their own constitutional provisions-toward perpetuating a
temporary political advantage, securing the benefits of political
self-constraint, or ensuring optimal governmental accountability.
This explanation further suggests that because constitutional
politics is too bothersome, voters hope that the Constitution can
provide some second-best substitute for the supreme provisions
that they would create if it were easier to do so.
Indeed, this explanation for aging constitutional provisions
suggests the "interpretive" ideal that voters today would like
choices to exploit the principles of constitutional supremacy. Furthermore, for
purposes of my analysis, the energies of citizenship might be directed in either
selfish or public-regarding ways. Limiting the focus in this way makes sense
given my rationale for using the private citizen idea-to explain why voters might
seek to limit congressional discretion by applying the principles of constitutional
supremacy to aging constitutional texts, rather than to create new ones of their
own. Thus, the private citizen might wish to exploit the principles of constitutional supremacy to perpetuate a temporary political advantage, secure the benefits of political self-constraint, or ensure optimal legislative accountability.
Indeed, one should avoid adjectives such as "selfish" or "public-regarding" as
question-begging. For example, are people who wish to achieve their preferences about abortion at the cost of denying their opponents' right to shape public policy acting in a "public-regarding" or a "selfish" way? On the one hand,
they are pursuing policies they view as morally correct; thus, their efforts, at least
from this perspective, have a "public-regarding" aura. On the other hand, they
are pursuing controversial policies at the expense of democracy-at the expense
of their opponents' desire to vote their own morality.
145. Unlike the antifederalists, most people do not seem to view publicspirited politics as among the worthiest of pursuits. See, e.g., G. Wooo, supra
note 42, at 500 (antifederalists of 1787 retained Republican ideology of 1776);
id. at 53 ("The sacrifice of individual interests to the greater good of the whole
formed the essence of republicanism and comprehended for Americans the idealistic goal of their [ 1776] Revolution."); Sunstein, supra note 54, at 35-38 (antifederalists valued unselfish, publicly-oriented participation in politics as route to
happiness); cf. supra note 144.
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Supreme Courtjustices to perform. But for the hard work, a majority among voters today would create their own constitutional
provisions. Previous analysis has suggested that voters who create constitutional provisions would articulate the "interpretive"
ideals characterized under the rubric of constitutional representation.146 Thus, voters today should articulate the very same "interpretive" ideals of constitutional representation for their aging,
second-best constitutional provisions 147-to identify choices they
would make if engaged in constitutional politics. If voters could
findjudges to fulfill this "interpretive" ideal, the electorate could
thereafter effortlessly serve their reasons for exploiting constitutional supremacy-whether perpetuating a temporary political
advantage, securing the benefits of political self-constraint, or ensuring optimal legislative accountability-as if they actually had
engaged in constitutional politics and created their own constitutional texts. 148

3. Constitutional Representation Versus Other Interpretive Theories:
The Living Electorates Perspective
a.

Originalism

Originalism would have the Court's interpretations of constitutional meaning remain static, despite a substantial evolution of
social values and institutions. Rather than an ideal of identifying
choices today's electorate would make if engaged in formal constitutional politics, the originalist would identify choices that past
electorates actually made in constitutional politics. 149 Signifi146. See supra text accompanying notes 62-66 (provisions intended to perpetuate extraordinary political advantage); supra text accompanying notes 88-94
(provisions intended to secure benefits of political self-constraint); supra text accompanying notes l 06-08 (provisions intended to ensure optimal legislative
accountability).
14 7. One might have a selfish, personal ideal, yet be unable to achieve it in
practice because one's opponents are pursuing their own selfish ideals. Together, such voters would generate a compromise, corporate ideal and select a
compromise judge. See supra notes 33, 45; infra text accompanying notes 175-91.
148. Cf Lee, supra note 10, at 1011 ("The [Supreme] Court does not sit as a
continuous constitutional convention. It is the Constitution itself-and not the
pronouncements of the justices-that is the supreme law of the land."). But why
is the Constitution the "supreme law of the land"? Surely not simply because it
says so. It is the supreme law of the land to the extent that the bulk of society
accepts or endorses the proposition. I have endeavored to consider why people
should accept or endorse that proposition. Why should people wish to exploit
the principles of constitutional supremacy by applying them to aging constitutional texts?
149. Raoul Berger has acknowledged that "[h]ad it fallen to me ... to decide some of the 'substantive due process' and 'equal protection' cases ab initio, I
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candy, however, the originalist does not deny the essence of constitutional representation as the ultimate benchmark for
generating constitutional meaning: the Constitution should reflect social changes and the present electorate's political values,
but only through formal amendment. 150
Yet it is only when a court's originalist decisions become intolerably removed from contemporary political reality that voters
could possibly be induced to overcome laziness and inertia and
overturn judicial doctrine by creating their own constitutional
provisions. So viewed, the costs of originalism are remarkable.
On the one hand, only through years of ever-increasing judicial
deviation from the choices voters today would make if engaged in
constitutional politics will the national electorate gain sufficient
incentive to overcome laziness and inertia, respond to the need
for more relevant uses of constitutional supremacy, and create its
own constitutional provisions. 151 On the other hand, it is precisely to avoid the hard work and high stakes of formal constitutional politics that voters apply the principles of constitutional
supremacy to aging texts, rather than create new ones of their
own. Thus, not only does originalism promise years of "interpretive" failure; 152 it promises, when its "interpretive" results beshould have felt constrained to hold that the relief sought lay outside the confines of the judicial power." R. BERGER, supra note 33, at 412 (footnote
omitted).
150. See id. at 353-54; R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 143 (1990).
151. An originalist might claim that the failure to amend past constitutional
choices implies public acceptance of those choices. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra
note 33, at 396 (departure from originalism undermines article V process for
amendment); Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 376
( 1981) ("Our legal griindnorm has been that the body politic can at a specific point
in time definitively order relationships, and that such an ordering is binding on
all organs of government until changed by amendment.") (emphasis in original).
This claim is weak for several reasons. First, the electorate is simply unaware of
the "original intention" underlying the Constitution's provisions. Second, given
this lack of awareness, failure to amend the Constitution at best reflects acquiescence to the Court's "interpretations" of the Constitution's meaning. Cf Amar,
supra note 42, at 1079 (failure to amend constitution suggests "basic (even if not
perfect) contentment" with "constitutional status quo"). This "constitutional
status quo" includes both text and judicial gloss. Thus, failure to amend supports Justice Brennan's decisions as well as Justice Rehnquist's. See Chang, supra
note l 0, at 789 n. l l l. Third, a discontinuity between original intent and contemporary values underlying constitutional amendment could develop only over
a period of time. Thus, as suggested in the text, if courts did enforce the original understanding, constitutional amendment would be evidence of a long period in which judicial review failed to reflect the choices the national electorate
would make if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics
today.
152. Thus, I disagree with Michael Perry that interpretive (i.e., originalist)
judicial review is easily justified as "legitimate," while the legitimacy ofnoninter-
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come so utterly deviant, to force voters to devote the
extraordinary effort to formal constitutional politics that they presumably hope to avoid.1ss
b.

Conventional Morality

Harry Wellington has suggested that in making constitutional
law, courts should "translate conventional morality into legal
pretive (i.e., nonoriginalist) judicial review is far more problematic. To serve the
framers' values (Perry's "interpretivism," see PERRY I, supra note 7, at 10-11), is
not necessarily to serve the constitutional values that voters would pursue today
if engaged in constitutional politics. See infra text accompanying notes 234-44;
infra note 237. Indeed, even Perry's own axiom of 1.egitimacy as el.ectorally accountabl.e policymaking raises serious questions about the legitimacy of interpretivism.
See PERRY I, supra note 7, at 125. Institutions that serve the values of past electorates do not necessarily serve the values of the present electorate, and "electoral accountability" implies concern for the present. Thus, Perry's professed
strongest justification for noninterpretive review-"[i]f in fact the framers had
authorized the judiciary to exercise (some sort of) noninterpretive review," id. at
24-is not strong at all. The question must instead be about the choices that the
present el.ectorate, if engaged in extraordinary constitutional politics, would make
about proper.judicial behavior.
Perry's search for a "functional justification for noninterpretive [judicial]
review," id. at 7, differs from my inquiry in at least two other important respects.
First, Perry does not define the perspective from which "function" is evaluated.
I explicitly take the perspective of political competitors who can endeavor to
affect public policy in different political forums. Second, by questioning all judicial review, rather than just noninterpretive review, I am led to seek "functional
justifications" not just for a method of judicial review, but for constitutional
supremacy itself. In short, my inquiry seeks "functional justifications" for institutional arrangements more fundamental than different versions of judicial review, and does so from the perspective of political competitors pressing their
own values.
153. Even accepting all of this, one might argue that originalism at least
best serves the "rule of law." See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 33, at 283-99. A
judge who speculates about the choices voters today would make if engaged in
constitutional politics arguably has more latitude than one who seeks to identify
the original meaning of constitutional provisions. By requiring judges to remain
bound by relatively clear "interpretive" rules, originalism at least predictably
limits judicial discretion. Id. at 283-99. But "there is a profound difference between the rule of law and submission to any particular institution's understanding of what that law requires, unless of course one adopts a catholic view oflaw,
which identifies it with the utterances of a specific institution." Levinson, Could
Meese Be Right This Timer, 61 TuL. L. REV. 1071, 1076 (1987). Indeed, a goal of
predictably limiting judicial discretion argues against originalism as well, becau.se the most predictably restrictive rule would be the elimination of judicial
review.
Judicial review makes sense only as a means to an end. If the end is constitutional representation, the pertinent question must be what provides the best
means: originalism with judicial supremacy; or originalism with congressional
supremacy; or speculative inquiry into contemporary values with judicial
supremacy (or congressional supremacy); or even the abandonment of judicial
review altogether.
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principle." 154 Justices Goldberg and Harlan pursued such an approach in Griswold v. Connecticut 155 by referring to dominant national traditions and practices in evaluating the constitutionality
of Connecticut's quirky law prohibiting the use of contraceptives.156 Similarly, Justice White examined national values as suggested by prevailing state legislation in concluding that laws
criminalizing homosexual sodomy are not unconstitutional. 157
Among three of the dominant modes of "interpretation"
positing a "living" Constitution whose meaning develops outside
of article V processes, 158 the notion of conventional morality is
most rooted in dominant political consensus. By referring strictly
to prevailing traditions and practices that people pursue in everyday living and prevailing policies that voters choose in everyday
politics, this approach loses sight of the special benefits voters
might wish to achieve by creating supreme constitutional textsreasons for making law by extraordinary constitutional politics
rather than by ordinary legislation. Thus, while conventional morality might keep judicially-declared constitutional law more in
step with the times than can originalism, it also transforms the
nation's constitutional law into national common law. 159
c.

"Living" Principle

Among those who advocate departure from the original understanding by focusing on the coherent development of moral
"principle" are Ronald Dworkin and Michael Perry. 160 Professor
Dworkin argues thatjudges should seek "integrity"-a consistent
adherence to principle-rather than "checkerboard solutions"
that accommodate conflicting principles or compromise principle
154. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE LJ. 221, 266-67 (1973).
155. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
156. Id. at 486-87, 493 (Goldberg,J., concurring); id. at 501-02 (Harlan,J.,
concurring); see Chang, supra note 10, at 819-25.
157. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193-94 (1986) (reviewing statute criminalizing sodomy only as applied to homosexual sodomy); see also Chang,
supra note 10, at 819-25.
158. The other two dominant modes of interpretation positing a "living"
Constitution are" 'living' principle" and "liberal republicanism." For a discussion of "living" principle, see infra notes 160-68 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of liberal republicanism, see infra notes 169-73 and accompanying
text.
159. See Chang, supra note 10, at 799-803 & 819-25.
160. For a discussion of Dworkin's theories, see infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Perry's theories, see infra notes 165-68 and
accompanying text.
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to "expediency." 161 He justifies this proposition with a quasimajoritarian argument:
[M]any of us, to different degrees in different situations,
would reject the checkerboard solution not only in general and in advance, but even in particular cases if it were
available as a possibility. We would prefer either of the
alternative [principled] solutions to the checkerboard
compromise. 162
Dworkin's view is vulnerable because it is demonstrably false
that people prefer coherent moral positions with which they entirely disagree to "checkerboard" solutions with which they partially agree. The original understanding of the fourteenth
amendment was a checkerboard. 168 Both pro-choice and pro-life
activists fight vigorously about every case that might marginally
weaken or strengthen Roe v. Wade. 164 To the extent that Dworkin
does care what "we" think, assuming that "we" means the citizenry-at-large, an insistent pursuit of moral coherence (beyond
choices "we" would make if engaged in extraordinary constitutional politics) is wrong.
Professor Perry argues for judicial development of constitutional principle without regard to majoritarian sentiment. While
he suggests that the American people are committed to moral development as a community, 165 Perry insists that "answers to
human rights questions are right (or not) independently of what a
majority of Americans happen to believe, either in the short-term
or in the long-term." 166 Thus, Perry suggests that ajudge should
not pursue "majoritarian beliefs as to what the relevant aspiration
requires," but "should rely on her own beliefs as to what the aspiration requires." 167
Perry's view is vulnerable because every provision of the
161. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 92, at 178-85.
162. Id. at 182.
163. See generally Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision,
69 HARV. L. REV. I (1955); Chang, supra note 10, at 828-38.
164. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
165. See PERRY I, supra note 7, at 98-102, 111.
166. Id. at 11 l.
167. PERRY II, supra note 7, at 149. Perry asks, "why should judicial review
be majoritarian? For the nonoriginalist no less than for the originalist, judicial
review is a deliberately countermajoritarian institution." Id.; cf. id. at 4 (constitutional adjudication should be "a species of deliberative, transformative politics"-"distinct from a politics that is merely manipulative and self-serving"); id.
at 121 (same); id. at 151-60 (same).
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Constitution was created by representatives of a majority of the
eligible electorate; every Supreme Court Justice was approved by
representatives of a majority of the eligible electorate. Perry bows
to this electoral perspective to some extent in suggesting that
Americans are committed to moral development as a community .168 But if Perry believes that the views of the American citizenry are significant for justifying his brand of constitutional
"interpretation," he must rely on Dworkin's vulnerable premise
that "we" prefer an entirely wrong position of coherent principle
to a partially right moral checkerboard. If Perry and Dworkin do
not truly believe that the Court's constitutional decisions should
(somehow) be rooted in majoritarian choice, then they have
strayed far from the political foundation of American
constitutionalism.
d.

Liberal Republicanism

Cass Sunstein articulates four principles of "liberal republicanism": political deliberation, equality of political actors, agreement as the basis for public policy, and participatory
citizenship. 169 Bruce Ackerman focuses on processes of formal
constitutional amendment as reflecting an ideal of engaged electoral policymaking.17° Both Sunstein and Ackerman seem to conceive liberal republicanism in terms similar to the notion of
political self-constraint presented in this article: policymaking
that is publicly-oriented in an extraordinary way and rooted in the
electorate-at-large .111
Liberal republicanism is less a theory of constitutional interpretation than an ideal conception of the processes by which public policy should be made. Sunstein does not prescribe guidelines
168. In his discussion of Roe, Perry seemed to shift to a perspective closer
to the one I advance here. Criticizing Roe, but advocating a narrower invalidation of the Texas anti-abortion statute, Perry argued that the Court should have
found a constitutional right to abort a fetus (i) to save the life of the mother,
(ii) when the pregnancy was caused by rape or incest and the fetus is not yet
viable and (iii) when the fetus is genetically defective and would live a "short and
painful" life. Id. at 175. He advocated this view "[b]ecause it is most unlikely
that abortion legislation failing to provide even for those relatively narrow exceptions would be enacted or maintained in contemporary American society."
Id. This is not an approach seeking the judge's personal view of moral aspiration; rather, this is an approach based on a realistic evaluation of the political
deliberation in which voters today would engage.
169. See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 1541.
170. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at l 053-56.
171. Cf Michelman I, supra note 42, at 74-77 (conceiving civic republicanism in elitist terms of nine Justices as relevant electorate).
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for vindicating an ideal of liberal republicanism through judicial review .172 Ackerman does so only with the notion of "structural
amendment," which is less a theory for interpreting old constitutional provisions than a prescription for making and interpreting
new constitutional prov1S1ons by non-article V political
processes. 173

•••

Originalism is deficient because it focuses on the wrong electorate and, in so doing, prescribes judicial failure until a new electorate is driven to create its own constitutional text and its own
original understanding. Conventional morality is deficient because it focuses on the wrong category of values and, in so doing,
transforms constitutional courts into common law courts. "Living" principle is deficient because it focuses on no electorate at all
and, in so doing, denies electoral rights and responsibilities for
making constitutional law. Liberal republicanism is deficient, de:spite prescribing an ideal attitude about public policy for today's
electorate, because it provides little guidance for interpreting aging constitutional provisions.
From the voters' perspective, the essential question for judicial enforcement of aging constitutional provisions must concern
a majority s aspirations-not their everyday preferences, but their
constitutional aspirations. This is the essence of constitutional representation. The task remains to determine how best to ensure
that judicial review does yield the decisions voters would make if
engaged in extraordinary constitutional politics. 174
172. Sunstein does tentatively prescribe various aspirations as consistent
with values of liberal republicanism. See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 1578 (increased sensitivity to concerns of federalism); id. at 1579 (more vigorous rationality review); id. at 1580 (more judicial challenges to conventional morality like
Roe); id. at 1585 (invigorating the voices of disadvantaged groups (blacks, women, handicapped, gays)). But he provides little guidance on how, when, and to
what extent courts should promote such values. Courts might still intrude
wrongly on legislative decisionmaking, thereby undermining the republican
value of self-determination by the citizenry, or wrongly fail to challenge legislative thoughtlessness, thus undermining the republican value of deliberation. See
id. at 1587.
173. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1053-56 (political activity in 1936 elections responded to Supreme Court by "structural amendment" of the Constitution); infra note 265 (evaluating Ackerman's "structural amendment").
174. Attaching the "interpretive" ideal of constitutional representation to
aging provisions fails to serve the republican valuation of political activity: that
politics enriches life and ennobles individuals. Cf Sunstein, supra note 54, at 37
("Jefferson proposed that the Constitution should be amended every generation, partly to promote general attention to public affairs."). Thus, even if
judges successfully achieved constitutional representation with aging provisions,
government will have become a public policy machine without the republicans'
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Why judicial Supremacy?

This section considers whether a regime of judicial
supremacy can achieve the "interpretive" ideals of constitutional
representation toward fulfilling each motive voters might have for
applying the principles of constitutional supremacy to aging constitutional texts: (i) perpetuating a temporary political advantage,
(ii) securing the benefits of political self-constraint, or
(iii) ensuring optimal legislative accountability.
1.

"Interpreting" Aging Constitutional Texts Toward Perpetuating a
Temporary Political Advantage

a.

Ideals of Constitutional Representation and the Case for
Judicial Supremacy

Like a majority among the Northern electorate in 1868, a
voter might have certain values that she views as more important
than her opponents' democratic right to shape public policy. 175
For example, one might care so much about a woman's right to
choose an abortion, a fetus's right to life, or affirmative action,
that she wishes to deny others the right to vote their contrary
preferences. Such a voter might wish for Supreme CourtJustices
who will "interpret" aging constitutional provisions by representing her personal preferences while ignoring those of her opponents. Voters who succeed in finding suchJustices might want to
give them the powers of judicial supremacy toward achieving national public policy unattainable in, and untouchable by,
Congress. 176
This psychology of trumping Congress describes a prevailing
attitude about constitutional "interpretation," judicial review,
and the selection of Supreme Court Justices. For example, President Reagan often argued that the Constitution, properly interpreted, not only permits laws restricting access to abortions, but
also itself prohibits abortion, because a fetus is a "person" for
purposes of the fourteenth amendment. 177 Diametrically opcherished human soul. Cf Michelman I, supra note 42, at 76-77 (republican politics best reflected within Supreme Court). I will suggest, however, that this deficiency would be mitigated ifjudicial review were supplemented by congressional
supremacy. See infra text accompanying notes 241-46, 346.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 23-35.
176. See, e.g., Seidman, supra note 22, at 1577 ("Vindication of the person's
own [political] preferences might appear more likely if at least some government
officials were shielded from pressures generated by the misguided majority.");
supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
177. President Reagan remarked: "I believe that until and unless someone
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posed, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has argued
that the Constitution, properly interpreted, prohibits laws that restrict access to abortions. 178 Another example: the Reagan Administration argued that the Constitution prohibits affirmative
action programs that have an "unfair" impact on "innocent"
whites. 179 Diametrically opposed, the ACLU has argued that the
Constitution, properly interpreted, not only permits laws using
racial classifications to compensate for the effects of past racial
discrimination, but also prohibits policies having an "unfair" discriminatory impact on blacks 180--essentially a position that acertain measure of affirmative action is constitutionally mandated. 181
Thus both President Reagan and the ACLU would like to establish national norms governing abortion and affirmative action
through judicial review and in the name of the Constitution, when
they lack the political clout to enact their preferred policies in
Congress. Their attitude is one of constitutional representation
toward denying their opponents' right to shape public policythe same ideal of constitutional representation held by Thaddeus
Stevens and the Northern electorate when they created the fourteenth amendment to perpetuate an extraordinary political advantage over their less enlightened political opponents. 182
can establish that the unborn child is not a living human being, then that child is
already protected by the Constitution, which guarantees life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness to all of us." Debate Between the President and Former
Vice President Walter F. Mondale in Louisville, Kentucky, 2 Pus. PAPERS 1441,
1451 (Oct. 7, 1984); see also id. at 1021, ll 15.
178. See w. DONAHUE, THE PoLmcs OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION IOI (1986).
179. See Shenon, Meese Sees Racism in Hiring Goals, N.Y. Times. Sept. 18,
1985, at Al6, col. 5 ("The idea that you can use discrimination in the form of
racially preferential quotas, goals and set-asides to remedy the lingering social
effects of past discrimination makes no sense in principle; in practice, it is nothing short of a legal, moral, and constitutional tragedy.") (quoting former Attorney General Meese). In Meese's view, affirmative action programs are
unconstitutional because the Civil War amendments were intended to make the
Constitution "officially colorblind." Id. Racial "classifications are wrong when
they are used by Government to bestow advantages on whites and men; they
have no greater claim of morality when the tables are turned." Id.
180. See W. DONAHUE, supra note 178, at 81.
181. See id. (South Carolina chapter argues bar examination unconstitutional because of discriminatory impact on blacks).
182. Cf Ackerman, supra note 6, at 1175 (Bork nomination "a desperate
effort by a lame-duck President to impose a constitutional program that had
otherwise failed to gain the support of Congress").
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The Improbabilities of Constitutional Representation and
the Case Against Judicial Supremacy

From 1861 through 1874, the Northern electorate that created the fourteenth amendment also could install Supreme Court
Justices without meaningful competition from the antebellum
white Southern electorate. 183 Despite this extraordinary political
advantage, however, Northern voters could not keep the Court
accountable to their values in the short term, let alone a generation hence. 184 Thus, previous analysis suggested that it might not
make sense even for those who do have an extraordinary political
advantage to seek to perpetuate that advantage by creating
supreme constitutional provisions.185
For several reasons, voters today must face even greater difficulty in denying their opponents' right to shape public policy by
selecting Supreme Court Justices to exercise the powers of judicial supremacy. First, unlike the Northern electorate of 1868, voters today lack an extraordinary political advantage to exploit. In
selecting Supreme Court Justices to "interpret" aging constitutional texts, Republicans must compete with Democrats, and the
John Birch Society must compete with the ACLU, just as they
must compete in enacting congressional legislation. This is not
to say that there are no momentary political advantages to be exploited. It is to suggest, however, that any such advantages reflect
the cycles of ordinary politics. The advantage that might enable
conservatives to put Judge Bork on the Court today is the sort of
advantage that liberals might enjoy four years hence-and with it,
the power to respond to Robert Bork with Laurence Tribe. Voters who are part of a contemporary majority-whether the ACLU
Democrats in the 1960s or Ronald Reagan Republicans in the
1980s-are, at best, in a position analogous to the Northern electorate after it lost its extraordinary political advantage over the
white Southern electorate .186
183. From 1861 through 1868, Southern states were not represented in
Congress at all. Although the Southern states regained their formal representation after the fourteenth amendment's ratification in 1868, Congress's efforts to
reconstruct the Southern electorate greatly weakened the antebellum power
structure. It was not until the election of 1874 that the Republicans' domination
began to weaken significantly. See supra note 81.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 69-87.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 79-87.
186. Richard Friedman attributes to Laurence Tribe the motive of trying to
fill the Court with like-minded Justices and argues its ineffectiveness.
Tribe's ... goal is to ensure that ... the Court is composed of Justices
who think the way he does .... If Tribe is in the minority, as I suspect,
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Second, because no portion of the electorate today is disenfranchised, unlike the Southern electorate of 1868, it is unlikely
that voters could install even one predictable idealogue (like Bork
or Tribe) on the Court to insulate policies supported by majorities today from future erosion. On the one hand, if a congressional majority with respect to a given issue is permanent and
unchallengeable, there would be no need for Justices to protect
relevant statutes from congressional erosion; the motive of perpetuating a temporary political advantage is inapplicable. On the
other hand, if a congressional majority is unstable and temporary,
it might include some people who are inexorably committed to
the policy, but also must include others who are only tentatively
committed. Those who are only tentatively committed would be
reluctant to bind their own discretion to change their minds. 187
Thus, a significant conclusion: For a majority among the national
electorate with respect to controversial issues at any given timethose temporarily in a minority and those temporarily in the majority who might change their minds-the goal of binding congressional discretion toward perpetuating a temporary political
advantage and, therefore, judicial supremacy as a means toward
attaining that goal, make little sense. 188
Third, even if a voter is part of a political minority who are
inexorably committed to some policy and who want to exploit a
temporary alliance with more casual dilettantes, it follows from
the foregoing that these minority ideologues must find a judicial
candidate who might perform their "interpretive" ideal of constitutional representation, but whose commitment to that ideal is
not so obvious as to frighten temporary allies. This would be a
then over the long run his standard would tend to work against the
implementation of his views more often than in favor of them ....
Friedman, supra note 64, at 1290. Lino Graglia sees a similar futility for conservatives in trying to perpetuate a temporary political advantage through selecting
Justices. See Graglia,judicial Activism: Even on the Right, It's Wrong, THE Pus. INTEREST, Spring 1989, at 57. For a discussion of Graglia's view, see infra note
190.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 117-22. This proposition does not
apply to the motive of political self-constraint for limiting congressional discretion. See supra text accompanying notes 36-43, 88-105, 123-29; infra text accompanying notes 193-99; see also Chang, supra note 10, at 774-82.
188. See Seidman, supra note 22, at 1577 (trumping legislature against majority's preferences "has no force at all with the majority that disagrees"). The
Bork nomination provides an example. Friends and foes viewed Robert Bork as
a judicial candidate with hard ideological contours. His prospective service on
the Court easily provoked intense passions. Anthony Kennedy's friends were
fewer and his foes were far less moved because he was so much more of an
enigma than Bork. Bork failed; Kennedy sits on the Court.
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risky enterprise, because such potentialJustices might be not only
less committed in appearance to the policy at issue, but also less
committed in fact.189
Fourth, even if a minority of the national electorate who are
inexorably committed to some policy (i) could hand-pick some
Justices and (ii) could predict how those Justices will vote, it is still
not clear that these voters will be served by constitutionalizing
their preferences and removing issues from congressional purview. Over the long run, their opponents, members of a minority
who are inexorably dedicated to other policies, might respond by
selecting Justices toward perpetuating their own cyclical political
advantages. By matching short-term "succe~ses," minority ideologues might do no better than simply trade issues, resolved in
the name of constitutional supremacy by a Supreme Court exercising the power of judicial supremacy. 190 Thus, even for a committed ideologue, endeavoring to perpetuate this sort of ordinary
political advantage makes sense only if he cares more about the
issues that his own Justices manage to constitutionalize than
about the issues that his opponents' Justices will manage to
constitutionalize.191
189. See Freund, Appointment ofjustices: Some Historical Perspectives, IO 1 HARV.
L. REV. 1146, 1156 (1988) (hazards in judicial selection as route to make public
policy include unforeseen issues, changes in nominee's views); Friedman, supra
note 64, at 1291-302 Uustice's performance over time difficult to predict). President Bush's nomination of the unknown, and largely unknowable, David Souter
reflected this strategy, to the dismay of those who wish to preserve Roe v. Wade.
See, e.g., Sullivan, Bush '.s Supreme Court Red Herring, N.Y. Times, July 29, 1990, § 4,
at 19, col. 1 ("There was a 'litmus test' ... on abortion: the President looked for
the candidate that would turn the litmus paper no visible color at all."); see also
Lauter & Ostrow, And Then There Were 2 and Finally I-Souter, L.A. Times, July 25,
1990, at Al, col. 3 (Souter's intellect was persuasive factor in President's selection of Souter over Judge Edith Jones, "[b]ut even more important was his lack
of a 'paper trail' on controversial issues.").
190. Lino Graglia argues that while "the Left" has been able to enact its
policies through judicial activism, "the Right can have no similar expectation,"
because of the purportedly liberal orientation of academia and the media. See
Graglia, supra note 186, at 73-74. Nevertheless, the Court's decisions limiting
local discretion to pursue affirmative action programs can well be characterized
as effective judicial activism from "the Right." See, e.g., City of Richmond v.J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (restricting local discretion to set aside percentage of public contracts for minority business enterprises); Wygant v.Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (restricting local discretion to pursue affirmative action goals in lay-off provision of collective bargaining agreement); see also
Chang, Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative Action, and Innocent Victims: judicial Conservatism or Conservative justices'!, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 790, 810-21 (1991).
19,l. The analysis must be refined a bit if one focuses on Ackerman's periods of "transformative appointments." See Ackerman, supra note 6. Suppose,
for example, that one political party has an opportunity to appoint a controlling
majority of the Supreme Court-such as the Roosevelt Democrats and the Rea-
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This analysis suggests that from the perspective of ordinary
voters, selecting Supreme Court Justices to "interpret" aging
constitutional texts toward perpetuating an ordinary political advantage makes little sense. For a majority at any given timethose opposed to the policies that committed ideologues wish to
mandate as constitutional law plus those temporarily in favor of
such policies who might change their minds-the motive is selfdefeating. For minorities of committed ideologues temporarily
empowered by an alliance with wavering moderates, the goal
makes good sense, but effective means are largely unattainable.

2.

"Interpreting" Aging Constitutional Texts Toward Securing the
Benefits of Political Self-Constraint

While no one today has enough power to create constitutional provisions toward perpetuating an extraordinary political
advantage, the electorate can engage in extraordinarily thoughtful politics toward securing the benefits of political self-constraint. Voters have not done so, however, because of laziness
and inertia. Thus, the electorate relies on aging constitutional
texts as a second-best source of evidence from which Justices
might identify the choices voters would make if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics today. 192
Previous analysis concluded that if voters actually did create
their own provisions for political self-constraint, they could serve
the "interpretive" ideal of constitutional representation better
with congressional supremacy than with judicial supremacy. 193
Given the possibility of judicial misbehavior in rejecting the ideal
of constitutional representation, or error even while endeavoring
to serve that ideal, the electorate needs some mechanism for
gan-Bush Republicans. In selecting Justices to perpetuate a temporary political
advantage, one faction would not trade issues and Justices piecemeal with its
primary opponents. Rather, the factions might be viewed as trading wholesale
control of different eras. Thus, the Roosevelt Court persisted beyond
Roosevelt; the Reagan Court outlasts Reagan. While Roosevelt and Reagan
themselves might support judicial supremacy toward controlling the future, the
significant question concerns whether future voters-voters among the national
electorate today-wish their discretion constrained by the ideology of the preceding era. It is implausible for a majority to be ancestor worshippers as a justification for governance by aging constitutional provisions. See supra text
accompanying notes 139-43. It would be equally implausible-at least for a majority of the electorate at any given time-for people to be Roosevelt or Reagan
worshippers as a basis for giving Roosevelt or Reagan Justices the powers of
judicial supremacy. See supra note 139, text accompanying notes 117-22.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 144-48.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 100-05.
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keeping judges accountable. 194 By supposing that voters would
retain meaningful memories of their extraordinary constitutional
politics-that a voter remains latently sensitive to her own concerns for political self-constraint-one could conclude that the
electorate would not choose through Congress to overturn a judicial "interpretation" that rings true as a better judgment made in
formal constitutional politics. Furthermore, with congressional
supremacy, voters could overturn a judicial "interpretation" that
deviated from their "interpretive" ideal of constitutional
representation. 195
This justification for congressional supremacy does not apply
to members of the national electorate today. Voters today have
no memories of choices for political self-constraint to recapture.
They have not engaged in formal constitutional politics about the
broad range of issues the Supreme Court faces. They have
neither seriously considered whether and why political self-constraint might be a good idea, nor identified specific values that
should be specially protected. Thus, without memories of choices
for political self-constraint to recapture, voters today seem to
have far less reason to trust themselves to keep judges accountable to the "interpretive" ideal of constitutional representation
than they would if they actually had engaged in their own extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics. 19 6
At the same time, however, aging constitutional texts provide
less effective evidence for justices to fulfill an "interpretive" ideal
of constitutional representation today than they provided for the
justices chosen by the voters who actually created those provi194. See supra text accompanying note 99.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 100-05.
196. Indeed, one can question the competence of Presidents and Senators
to evaluate judicial candidates and judicial philosophies. Yet as Professor Carter
has suggested, "This is no knock on Senators; it is, if anything, a knock on the
notion that something as obscure and subtle as 'judicial philosophy' is a sensible
measuring stick for use in the essentially political process of selecting judges."
Carter, supra note 116, at 1195. This point is also implicit in Professor Schauer's
view that for such divergent "interpretive" approaches as positivism, realism,
and Dworkinism, there is no determinate result for controversial legal questions.
"Instead," he notes, "the decision is likely to require, under any of a number of
now popular theories of adjudication, recourse to the political, economic, social,
cultural, and moral norms of the milieu in which the judge operates." Schauer,
supra note 22, at 1731; cf. PERRY I, supra note 7, at 100 ("Executive and especially
legislative officials tend to deal with fundamental political-moral problems, at
least highly controversial ones, by reflexive reference to the established moral
conventions of the greater part of their particular constituencies.") (emphasis in
original); Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 744 (l 982) (interpretation determined by expectations of "interpretive community").
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sions. Indeed, it is hardly clear why, and how, aging provisions
provide any basis for a judge to identify choices the electorate
today would make if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful politics.197 Beyond this, with each passing year, disputes about
proper methods of constitutional interpretation, and proper answers to specific constitutional issues, further undermine any
common understanding of what judicial review is, or should be.
Thus, a dilemma: Voters today have less reason than do people who create constitutional texts to trust both themselves and
their judges to vindicate the electorate's concerns for political
197. I have elsewhere posited that a past electorate's constitutional choices
can reflect the present electorate's constitutional values. See Chang, supra note
IO, at 792. While a premise of "constitutional continuity" is necessary for fulfilling ideals of constitutional representation by reference to aging constitutional
provisions, it is problematic as an "interpretive" device for several reasons.
First, it assumes that judges today can determine which constitutional provisions
were enacted with a motive for political self-constraint, which to perpetuate an
extraordinary political advantage, which to ensure optimal legislative accountability, and which as a result of some combination of the three. A mistake could
have far-reaching consequences. See id. at 830-70 (examining implications of
viewing fourteenth amendment as originally intended to secure benefits of political self-constraint); id. at 832 n.266 (implications of viewing fourteenth amendment as originally intended to perpetuate an extraordinary political advantage).
Second, even if one assumes that the tenth amendment's concern for federalism,
for example, was framed toward securing the benefits of political self-constraint,
but see infra note 262, one can recite a litany of changes from 1787 or 1868 to
1991-changes in attitudes, composition of the electorate, the nature of the
economy, technology, America's global role, among many others. One must
wonder whether these changes, given a premise of constitutional continuity, are
merely superficial or instead are deeply meaningful for fulfilling the "interpretive" ideal of constitutional representation. If meaningful, how and why? See
Chang, supra note IO, at 794-807 (unsatisfactory attempt to address these questions and to generate specific "interpretive" answers from a premise of constitutional continuity toward an ideal of constitutional representation). Third,
although the framers and ratifiers of aging constitutional provisions never focused on abortion and, therefore, never made extraordinarily thoughtful policy
about abortion, it hardly follows that voters today, if engaged in extraordinarily
thoughtful constitutional politics, would not make choices for political self-constraint about abortion. One can be extraordinarily thoughtful about any issue,
and if extraordinarily thoughtful, one's choices might be different from those
made carelessly in everyday politics. Whether the electorate's extraordinary
thoughtfulness about abortion would yield a pro-choice policy, a pro-life policy,
or a pro-federalism policy, however, seems an unanswerable question. See infra
text accompanying notes 293-303. Fourth, the foregoing has assumed that a
judge would choose to adopt the "interpretive" ideal of constitutional representation, and generated from the probabilities of good faith error a need for some
mechanism to keep judges accountable to that ideal. Yet judges might fail to
serve electoral concerns not only by error, but also by design. See supra text
accompanying notes 73-76 & 96-98. It hardly needs stating that there is intense
disagreement about what approaches for constitutional interpretation are bestoriginalism, conventional morality, "living" principle, liberal republicanism,
something in between or beyond. Even within each approach, there are disagreements about specific results in specific controversies.
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self-constraint. Toward mitigating this dilemma, one might consider other options by which these constitutional concerns might
be served. For example, voters could overcome laziness and inertia to create a new Constitution. In doing so, the electorate could
develop an essential self-awareness they now lack. Voters (and
their representatives) would have memories of their own better
politics, and thereby could replace judicial supremacy with congressional supremacy as a mechanism to ensure that their own
concerns for political self-constraint are effectively vindicated.
Yet this option requires a level of political activity that, apparently, most voters would rather avoid. 198
A second option would take aging texts as they are and determine whether judicial supremacy or congressional supremacy is
the less imperfect "interpretive" regime to serve concerns for
political self-constraint. I will argue that enforcing aging constitutional provisions through judicial review supplemented by congressional supremacy is the better option. 199
Before this, however, we must finish considering whether judicial supremacy can serve a voter's reasons for exploiting constitutional supremacy-for deviating from statutory supremacy-by
relying on aging constitutional texts. Thus, we turn to the third
motive for exploiting constitutional supremacy: ensuring optimal
legislative accountability.
3.

"Interpreting" Aging Constitutional Texts Toward Ensuring
Optimal Legislative Accountability

a.

Bright Lines and Predictable "Interpretations": Judicial
Supremacy as Irrelevant

Previous analysis of issues facing people who create their
own constitutional provisions to ensure optimal legislative accountability200 suggested that bright-line texts could be essen198. See supra text accompanying notes 144-45. In the controversy over
burning the flag, some have argued that one should not tamper with the Constitution. Cf infra text accompanying notes 320-21. If accepted by a majority, this
argument reflects fear that present political activity might not be undertaken
with sufficient care. Thus, recognition of one's own unwillingness to make sufficiently thoughtful political decisions, combined with concerns for political selfconstraint, can explain the aging Constitution.
199. See infra text accompanying notes 215-337.
200. A voter's concern for optimal legislative accountability encompasses
how much influence over public policy he (and his opponents) will have, as well as
what kind of influence over public policy he (and his opponents) will have. The first
criterion reflects a concern for conflict and political competition; the second criterion reflects a concern for political self-constraint. See supra text accompanying
notes 44-55.
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tially self-enforcing. 201 For voters today, those same bright-line
provisions, though now aging, are similarly self-enforcing. "Six
years" is probably as definite a statement today as in 1787. Judicial behavior in "interpreting" those provisions, and congressional behavior in complying with them, is also predictable.
Thus, not only would Bork and Tribe likely treat the "six years"
provision the same way on the Court; so too do Jesse Helms and
Edward Kennedy in Congress. To the extent that Justices and
members of Congress are fungible for issues governed by brightline provisions, judicial supremacy and congressional supremacy
are fungible. 202
b.

Fuzzy Lines, Core Values, and Predictable
"Interpretations": Judicial Supremacy as Unnecessary

Given consensus about the first amendment's core political
concerns, 203 one can confidently predict at least some "interpretations" that judges would make to ensure legislative accountability. For example, no matter who sits as a Supreme CourtJustice,
the first amendment will be "interpreted" as prohibiting the gov201. See supra text accompanying notes 114-16.
202. This is not to say that the predictable judicial behavior necessarily will
serve an "interpretive" ideal of constitutional representation. It is not necessarily true that voters today would choose a six-year term for Senators if they were
creating constitutional provisions to ensure optimal legislative accountability,
nor that voters would choose a bicameral legislature, a Senate representing
states equally, or, indeed, an amendment process with a strong states' rights
bias. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 42, at 1071. Thus, the only realistic way in which
voters today can improve the extent to which the system vindicates the brightline choices they would make if engaged in constitutional politics is actually to
overcome laziness and inertia, engage in constitutional politics, and create their
own bright-line provisions. Yet voters also must decide that doing so is worth
the effort. Cf supra notes 144- 48 and accompanying text (laziness and inertia
explain aging Constitution).
203. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976) (first amendment might be viewed as
"primarily an instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy");
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (speech protected "to the
end that government may be responsive to the will of the people") (quoting
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1932)); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (speech protected "to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people"); L. BOLLINGER, supra note 123, at 43-50 (core speech values concern democratic self-government); P. DIMOND, supra note 20, at 81 (first amendment
protects political expression "essential for self-government in a representative
democracy"); T. EMERSON, supra note 126, at 7 (free speech promotes consent of
governed); A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS
OF THE PEOPLE 16-17 ( 1960) (free speech necessary for popular control of government); Bork, supra note 50, at 20 (Constitution should be deemed concerned
only with explicitly political speech).
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erning party from silencing the opposition party, because this is a
relatively uncontested implication of a presumed concern for ensuring legislative accountability. 204
To the extent that there are uncontested implications of core
values underlying vaguely drawn provisions originally intended to
ensure optimal legislative accountability, judges will behave as if
they were "interpreting" a bright-line provision. Indeed, to the
extent that uncontestable "interpretations" reflect a present consensus, only the most extraordinary of circumstances could induce Congress to violate them in the first instance, 205 let alone
204. See supra text accompanying notes 117-22. There are so many Democrats, so many Republicans, and, perhaps more significantly, so many "independents" who are sometime-Democrats and sometime-Republicans that, at
any given time, a majority among the electorate would want to protect the opposition party's right to criticize the governing party. The opposition party, of
course, would want to protect its right to criticize the governing party, and the
"independent" sometime-governing party would want to protect the opposition
party's right to criticize the governing party, because these "independents"
know that they might want to change their minds and join the opposition party
in the future. Cf PERRY I, supra note 7, at 79 (though denying existence of consensus for issues that occupy judicial attention, recognizing that "if there were
anything approaching a consensus as to ... speech ... rights ... , the judiciary
would likely have a severely diminished role in defining ... such rights, because
the consensus ... would presumably be reflected in ... legislative and executive
action."). Perry does not, however, deny the existence ofa consensus about the
sort of issue addressed here. As he has observed:
[I]t is fanciful to suppose that incumbents would often protect their
incumbency by conspiring to deny to the electorate access to that basic
store of information and ideas essential to the evaluation of the main
features of public policy and performance. It is difficult to imagine
such a conspiracy in contemporary American political culture--and
among incumbents who have, after all, mutually antagonistic interests.
Id. at 81 (footnote omitted); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. l, 14 (1976)
("Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are
integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution."); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("[T]here is practically
universal agreement that a major purpose of ... [the First] Amendment was to
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs ... includ[ing] discussions of
candidates . . . .").
205. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (discussing Alien and Sedition Acts). Although an advocate of congressional supremacy for many issues of
constitutional interpretation, Professor Dimond would retain judicial supremacy
for "representation-reinforcing values." See P. DIMOND, supra note 20, at 79-88.
Dimond views accountable representation not only as unambiguously valuable,
but also as a value limiting only "the process of national lawmaking" rather than
"the substantive policies that Congress determines to enact into law." Id. at 87.
Dimond illustrates a case for judicial supremacy with a hypothetical situation in
which Congress prohibits disruptive demonstrations against presidential
speeches and authorizes the states to legislate similarly with respect to gubernatorial speeches. A case arises when the acts are applied to abortion protestors.
Id. at 97-100. Dimond's analysis is flawed because, as suggested in the text,
some issues of representation-reinforcement have relatively uncontroversial answers while others are complex and deeply contestable. For the former issues,
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choose to overturn a judicial determination that this congressional effort was unconstitutional. Although Jesse Helms might
try to silence Robert Mapplethorpe, not even he could think of
silencing Edward Kennedy. Joseph McCarthy's excesses were
roundly repudiated, and even he claimed to be concerned only
about enemies of consensus ideology. To the extent that there is
a consensus about core values, therefore, judicial supremacy and
congressional supremacy are, again, fungible.206
c.

Fuzzy Lines, Ambiguous Values, and Unpredictable
"Interpretations": Judicial Supremacy as Undesirable

Some issues of optimal legislative accountability go beyond
the uncontested meaning of bright-line provisions and the consensus implications of core values. Rulemaking by administrative
agencies, for example, neither clearly falls within the category of
"legislative powers" vested in the Congress by article I, nor
clearly violates consensus implications of core values underlying
the legislative process.2° 7 Similarly, because it lacks both brightline boundaries and underlying values with sufficiently expansive
implications, the first amendment's category of "speech" generates controversy among voters and judges about whether its protections extend to pornography, Klan propaganda, or flag
judicial supremacy is unnecessary; for the latter, it is undesirable. Dimond's
anti-protest hypothetical is designed to evoke a sense of horror at the possibility
that such a law could be re-enacted under congressional supremacy. Yet precisely because it can evoke such a sense of horror, the scenario is just as implausible as re-enactment of the Alien and Sedition laws. As applied to Klansmen
rather than abortion protesters, however, the hypothetical is more plausible, but
the "right" representation-reinforcing answer is far less dear. Thus, as the necessity of judicial choice in the absence of dear interpretive answers undermines
judicial supremacy in other contexts, as Dimond acknowledges, so it does for
contestable issues traditionally classified within the first amendment's rubric. Cf
id. at 18-20, 153-56.
206. As with predictable "interpretations" of the "six years" provision, predictable "interpretations" of the aging first amendment's protection of speech
must still be examined to determine whether, in fact, they will serve the electorate's ideal of constitutional representation. See supra note 202. The basis for
· uncontestable "interpretations" of the first amendment's protection of speech is
a postulated consensus about implications of a broadly based concern for ensuring
optimal legislative accountability. See supra notes 203-06 and accompanying text.
Here, unlike for a bright-line provision, there is a political foundation for judicial decisionmaking to better ensure that the goal of constitutional representation is fulfilled.
207. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951-59 (1983); Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414, 423-27 (1944); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495, 529-42 (1935); infra text accompanying notes 220-49.

1991]

A

CRITIQ.UE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY

353

burning. 208 Laws apparently intended to limit the influence of
pressure groups, 209 corporations, 210 and the wealthy 211 are also
ambiguously related to an ideal of optimal accountability. Previous analysis has suggested that such subtle questions concerning
optimal legislative accountability reflect concerns for political
self-constraint through, and with respect to, the legislative
structure. 212

•••

We are led back to the dilemma and the question with which
the previous section ended. The dilemma: Given the inevitability
of judicial error, concerns for political self-constraint are best vindicated by people who have created constitutional provisions of
their own and retained the powers of congressional supremacy.
By relying on aging provisions, however, voters today have both
less reason to trust a Justice's "interpretive" decisions, and less
reason to trust the electorate's own political judgment, than
would voters who have engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful
constitutional politics. The question: As a second-best alternative to creating new constitutional provisions to secure the benefits of political self-constraint, would it be better to retain judicial
supremacy in "interpreting" aging constitutional texts, or would
judicial review supplemented by congressional supremacy better
enable voters today to approach the ideal of identifying the
choices they would make if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful
constitutional politics?213
208. Consensus rationales for ensuring optimal accountability do not apply
well to extremist speech. See supra text accompanying notes 123-29.
209. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political
Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985) (invalidating federal law limiting expenditures of political action committees in federal campaigns).
210. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391
(1990) (upholding state statute prohibiting corporations from using treasury
funds for independent political expenditures); First Nat'! Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (invalidating state law prohibiting corporate expenditures to influence referenda).
211. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (invalidating federal law
restricting political expenditures by individuals, groups and candidates).
212. By self-constraint through the legislative structure, I mean to suggest
Madisonian arguments for longer rather than shorter legislative terms and for a
bicameral rather than unicameral legislative structure. See supra notes 51-55 and
accompanying text. By self-constraint with respect to the legislative structure, I
mean to suggest a rationale for framing the legislative structure as a constitutional mandate-in case the measure of self-constraint provided through the legislative structure is not enough to deter voters from choosing thoughtlessly to
change the legislative structure. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
213. Professor Seidman has argued that a judicial task of maintaining democracy cannot justify unaccountable judges. "[A]n independent judiciary in-
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Why Congressional Supremacy?

[I]f the policy of the Government upon vital questions
affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by
decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are
made in ordinary litigation between parties in personal
actions, the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal. 214
1.

The Essential Qp,estion: Would judicial Supremacy or Congressional
Supremacy Better Serve Goals of Political Self-Constraint?

Based on the foregoing analysis, one can simplify matters by
reducing from three to one the relevant motives for exploiting the
principles of constitutional supremacy. The motive of denying
political opponents the right to shape public policy in Congress
by perpetuating a temporary political advantage can be put aside
as senseless for a majority among the national electorate, 215 and
as a dangerous gamble for a minority of ideologues.2 16 Furthermore, in choosing between judicial supremacy and congressional
supremacy, voters can view concerns for optimal legislative accountability essentially as concerns for political self-constraint.
The meaning of bright-line provisions and the implications of
core values are likely to be largely uncontested-viewed similarly
whether by Robert Bork, Laurence Tribe, Jesse Helms, or Edward
Kennedy. When meaning is contestable and, therefore, the identity of the decisionmaker affects the content of decisions, the underlying concern is likely to be for optimal legislative
accountability-that is, for political self-constraint with respect to
the legislative process. 211
Thus, the following analysis will consider the relative merits
of judicial supremacy and congressional supremacy against a
tent on pursuing 'representation reenforcement' could not avoid choosing a
theory of democracy that was itself controversial. But without some democratic
check, we would have no assurance that the judiciary's theory of majoritarianism
was itself supported by a majority." Seidman, supra note 22, at 1586; cf. supra
note 205 (discussing Professor Dimond's view).
214. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, Mar. 4, 1861, reprinted in G.
GUNTHER, supra note 60, at 24.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 183-88.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 189-91. This is not to say that no
one would choose to take this gamble. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying
text.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58, 123-29.
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benchmark of constitutional representation for concerns of political self
constraint-from the perspective of voters who choose not to create their own constitutional provisions, but instead to rely on aging texts created by others long since dead. Would judicial
review supplemented by congressional supremacy identify
choices the electorate would make if engaged in extraordinarily
thoughtful constitutional politics better than judicial review insulated by judicial supremacy? After addressing this question
through a series of case studies, I will consider the relative merits
of judicial supremacy and congressional supremacy against a
benchmark of other theories for constitutional interpretationoriginalism, conventional morality, "living" principle, and liberal
republicanism. Would judicial supremacy or congressional
supremacy better ensure that each of these "interpretive" ideals
is fulfilled?

2.

The Benchmark: Constitutional Representation and Case Studies

Constitutional politics toward securing the benefits of political self-constraint differs from ordinary politics in three significant ways: first, extraordinary vigilance-the electorate is focused on
issues that otherwise might be ignored; second, extraordinary
thoughtfulness-the electorate considers issues more broadly,
deeply, and systemically than the manner in which they address
issues in everyday politics; and third, extraordinary electoral rootsmore of the electorate is more involved in making public policy
than in everyday politics. 218 Voters make choices for political
self-constraint because they expect that the decisions they reach
in extraordinarily vigilant, thoughtful, and electorally rooted politics will be better than the decisions they reach in everyday
politics.
When the Court reviews policies made by Congress or its
proxies, the national electorate's representatives have been sufficiently vigilant to notice an issue and respond with policy. When
the Court reviews policies made by states and localities, the national electorate's representatives have made no relevant policy.
Congress might have chosen not to make policy in the relevant
context. More likely, however, Congress simply has not been sufficiently vigilant about relevant issues to determine whether national policy should govern and, if so, what that policy should be.
Whether examining a national law, or a state law that governs
218. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43, 107-08.
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in a vacuum of national choice, the Court might strike down policies as "unconstitutional"-which, from the perspective of constitutional representation, means that the policy is not that which
the electorate would choose if engaged in extraordinarily
thoughtful constitutional politics---or the Court might defer to
the primary decisionmaker. These two potential outcomes suggest that judicial review might deviate from constitutional representation for concerns of political self-constraint in two ways:
(i) an erroneous invalidation of a policy that voters would decide to
leave intact, if they engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics, and (ii) an erroneous refusal to invalidate a policy
that voters would decide to supersede, if they engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics. I next consider
whether judicial review under congressional supremacy or judicial supremacy can better avoid, and compensate for, the possibilities for each type of "interpretive" error in the context of
specific constitutional cases.
a.

A Preliminary Note: Congressional Supremacy Does Not
Preclude Congressional Deference to the Court

Despite judicial supremacy, the Court generally defers to
Congress and state legislatures in determining the constitutionality of challenged policies. 219 Similarly, congressional supremacy
need not mean that members of Congress should, or will, feel
free to enact statutes modifying or overturning the Court's constitutional decisions. Indeed, the same notions that underlie present conceptions of judicial supremacy-for example, the Court's
special capacity to make constitutional decisions--can induce
congressional caution in responding with legislation. Although I
argue that prevailing ideas about such a special judicial capacity
are overdrawn, I also will suggest that under congressional
supremacy, judicial decisionmaking would play an essential role
in constitutional representation warranting a good measure of
deference from Congress. Thus, as judicial deference to legislatures under judicial supremacy reflects concerns about erroneously overturning a valid majoritarian choice, congressional
deference to the Court under congressional supremacy would reflect concerns about erroneously violating values the electorate
would respect if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics.
219. I will later suggest that the Court follows this course because of judicial
supremacy. See infra text accompanying notes 250-53.
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Evaluating the Constitutionality of National Policies
Addressing the Possibility of an Erroneous Invalidation

Responding to a perceived need for more pervasive and intricate national standards and following an ideology of government
by experts, 22° Congress began to delegate rulemaking authority
to executive agencies during the first quarter of the twentieth century. 221 Although many believed that executive rulemaking undermined the constitutionally designed separation of powers,222
the New Deal Court eventually settled on a posture of deference
to these congressional choices. 223 Nevertheless, even today,
"[t]he wisdom and constitutionality of these broad delegations
are matters that still have not been put to rest. " 224 Indeed, Congress itself was apparently uncomfortable with executive rulemaking, for it devised the "legislative veto," which empowers one or
both Houses to veto a specific rule promulgated by the executive
branch under broadly delegated rulemaking authority.
In INS v. Chadha, 225 a divided Supreme Court determined
that legislative vetoes are unconstitutional. ChiefJustice Burger's
majority opinion found that the Constitution specifies certain
procedures for enacting measures having a "legislative character
220. See, e.g.' G. McCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
43-48 (1966) (early twentieth century Progressive movement laid foundation for
delegation with its "confidence in impersonal expertise" and "scientific" regulation by administrative commissions).
221. See, e.g.' T. Low1, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE
CRISIS OF PuBLIC AUTHORITY 93-97 ( 1969) (sketching development of administrative rulemaking).
222. See, e.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542
(1935) (invalidating authority delegated to administrative agencies to prescribe
and enforce codes governing industry).
223. See infra text accompanying notes 255-60.
224. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985 (1983) (White,]., dissenting); see also
Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism and Administrative Power, 36
AM. U.L. REv. 295, 299-309 (1987) (arguing that delegation of legislative power
to executive "deranges" constitutional design of limited government); Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1223, 1249-74 (1985) [hereinafter Schoenbrod I] (developing test for improper
delegation); Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers and the Powers that Be: The Constitutional Purposes of the Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U.L. REv. 355, 387-89 (1987)
[hereinafter Schoenbrod II] (arguing that delegation doctrine serves constitutional policies); cf. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 323, 32529 (l 987) (courts cannot effectively limit delegation of legislative power); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 169397 (1975) (same).
225. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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and effect," 226 and that the legislative veto is not among them. 227
The Chiefjustice adopted an originalist approach, basing his conclusion on the framers' reasons for requiring the House of Representatives and the Senate and the President to participate in
enacting legislation. 22s
Justice White's dissent reflected far more an attitude of constitutional representation than did the majority opinion. 229 He
focused on changes in national lawmaking since the time of the
framers' decisions-for example, the pervasive delegation of
rulemaking authority to the executive. While Justice White consequently was more sanguine than the Chief Justice about the
constitutionality of such legislative vetoes, 230 he was also more
unsure that any "interpretive" answer could be deemed correct:
If the legislative veto were as plainly unconstitutional as the Court strives to suggest, its broad ruling
today would be more comprehensible. But, the constitutionality of the legislative veto is anything but clear-cut.
The issue divides scholars, courts, Attorneys General,
and two other branches of the National Government.

... That disagreement stems from the silence of the
Constitution on the precise question.2 31
Thus, he counseled deference to Congress's choices in the face of
such "interpretive" doubt. 232
226. Id. at 952 (quoting S. REP. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1897)).
227. Id. at 958-59. The veto device challenged in Chadha empowered one
House of Congress to overturn a prior executive determination that individual
aliens, otherwise deportable under the Immigration and Naturalization Act,
qualified under statutory criteria for a "suspension" of deportation proceedings
and continued residence in the United States. Id. at 925.
228. Id. at 944-51. Mark Tushnet sees Burger's opinion as reflecting a
"plain meaning" approach. See Tushnet, supra note 22, at 1689-90. I quarrel
with this characterization of the opinion, as the ChiefJustice resorted not just to
"plain meaning," but to the framers' policies underlying the text they employed.
See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946-51.
229. Justice White's analysis was, in fact, inapplicable to Chadha because
§ 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act was not a broad and
vague delegation of rulemaking authority to the executive, but a provision containing relatively narrow and clear criteria for the executive to apply. See Chadha,
462 U.S. at 967 (Powell, J., concurring).
230. Justice White observed: "If Congress may delegate lawmaking power
to independent and Executive agencies, it is most difficult to understand
Art[icle] I as prohibiting Congress from also reserving a check on legislative
power for itself." Id. at 986 (White, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 976-77 (White, J., dissenting).
232. See id. at 974 (White, J., dissenting) ("The Court has frequently called
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No one who frames the "interpretive" issue in terms of constitutional representation could be confident of reaching a "correct'' decision, precisely because the electorate has not engaged
in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics to determine
the desirability of either the veto mechanism or the underlying
broad delegations of rulemaking authority to the executive. Extrapolating from the decisions made by the framers to determine
the constitutional decisions voters today would make is an exercise in indeterminate speculation.2 33
Yet from the perspective of voters today, Chief Justice Burger's originalism is even more problematic. Asking whether legislative vetoes fit the framers' choices ignores that the original
constitutional design has been substantially changed, if not distorted, by precisely those broad delegations of rulemaking authority to which many legislative vetoes were responses. Indeed,
in general, the originalist would have constitutional meaning remain static, despite otherwise significant social changes.234 From
the perspective of constitutional representation, therefore,
originalism must posit not only that voters today would adopt the
same constitutional rules as did those who actually created those
provisions in quite different circumstances, but also that in choosing such rules under different circumstances, voters would make
quite different constitutional decisions-different value judgments-than did the framers. Thus, rather than a premise of constitutional continuity, originalism reqmres a premise of
discontinuity. 235
Despite these specific problems with Chief Justice Burger's
originalism, and despite the general problem of "interpretive" indeterminacy, 236 judicial supremacy requires that Chief Justice
attention to the 'great gravity and delicacy' of its function in passing upon the
validity of an act of Congress ... .'" (quoting Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345 (1936) (Brandeis,]., concurring)); id. at 984 (White,J.,
dissenting) (Congress may rely on its experience and reason "to accommodate
its legislation to circumstances") (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat) 316, 415-16 (1819)).
233. Justice Brennan has acknowledged as much. In a speech at Georgetown University, he said: "It is arrogant to pretend that from our vantage
point we can gauge accurately the intent of the Framers on application of principle to specific, contemporary questions.'' Johnson, Restoring Balance to the Seal.es
ofjustice, Wash. Post, Oct. 20, 1985, at A3, col. 3.
234. See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
235. See Chang, supra note 10, at 857-61.
236. Professor Schauer has suggested that for most, if not all, controversial
issues that survive from filing a complaint to pressing an appeal, "both sides can
make more or less equivalent legally plausible arguments from the positive law.''
See Schauer, supra note 22, at 1726-27. Professor Dimond also has constructed
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Burger's Chadha opinion circumscribes national policy regarding
legislative vetoes. Despite its vulnerability as "interpretation"
and its controversial status as policy, it is law governing Congress. 237 The issue must be largely closed. 23s
If judicial review were supplemented by congressional
supremacy, however, judicial invalidation of legislative vetoes essentially would issue a challenge to Congress: Accept the ruling
and abandon legislative vetoes, or reverse the Court's "interpretation." Congress might pass legislation responding to the
Court's decision by amending or reversing the Court's declaration of governing constitutional principles.2 39 Such a statute
would supersede the Court's opinion as the "precedent" upon
his argument for "provisional judicial review" (congressional supremacy) in
large part on the premise that "people ... [should] be skeptical of claims that the
Constitution provides a single, simple answer for every question." P. DIMOND,
supra note 20, at 20 (emphasis in original).
237. Professor Conkle implies that because it is an originalist decision,
Chief Justice Burger's opinion should be protected with judicial finality. See
Conlde, supra note 22, at 14-15. At the same time, Conkle suggests that judicial
finality is problematic, and should be abandoned, with respect to nonoriginalist
review-at least for "individual rights" issues. Id. at 11. However, because
originalist interpretations often conflict with nonoriginalist interpretations, a
prior question must be when, if ever, originalism is good interpretation. See
supra text accompanying notes 149-53. Whether and when originalism is appropriate is itself a question of "interpretation," and as such can be resolved either
in an originalist way or a nonoriginalist way. See Chang, supra note 10, at 784-96
(nonoriginalist way); Powell, supra note 140 (originalist way); supra text accompanying notes 144-48. The nationalization of moral policy may be a primary benefit emerging from nonoriginalist review of individual rights cases. See Conkle,
supra note 21, at 26-30. But this benefit conflicts with an originalist view of federalism. Thus, the proposal of judicial finality for originalist decisions and congressional supremacy for nonoriginalist decisions is untenable.
238. In fact, Congress has continued to employ legislative vetoes despite
Chadha. See Tolchin, The Legislative Veto, An Accommodation That Goes On and On,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1989, at All, col. l. This practice challenges judicial
supremacy and raises questions about the extent to which Congress does accept
the principle. I do not doubt that judicial supremacy might be vulnerable in
practice. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 309-13 (Biden flag statute challenges judicial supremacy). But this possibility does not undermine the importance of determining the desirability of judicial supremacy versus an ethic of
congressional authority to contradict Supreme Court "interpretations" of the
Constitution. Such an analysis will suggest either that Congress should feel
more free to contradict Supreme Court opinions or should refrain from doing
so. For a suggestion that any legislative response under congressional
supremacy must explicitly address relevant judicial precedent, see infra notes
241 & 244.
239. Congressional supremacy could require developing new congressional
institutions and procedures-for example, "a special committee in each house
developing traditions of deliberative, dispassionate, and (relatively) nonpartisan
consideration of constitutional issues." Brest, supra note 10, at 1092; see also D.
MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY IN RESPONSIBILITY 351-57
(1966).
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which future relevant cases would be decided. Alternatively, Congress might pass no responsive legislation at all. 240 If so, the
Court's opinion would continue to govern.2 41
Under judicial review supplemented by congressional
supremacy, the best decisionmaking attributes of both the Court
and Congress can be joined to simulate the three special characteristics that distinguish constitutional politics toward political
self-constraint from everyday legislative politics: extraordinary
vigilance, extraordinary thoughtfulness, and extraordinary electoral roots.
The nature of litigation helps provide extraordinary vigilance. Issues of public policy that otherwise might be overlooked
are easily raised by litigants and, therefore, brought to the attention of authoritative policymakers. For example, to the extent
that Congress enacted the Immigration and Naturalization Act
240. As the Court now has rules for deference to Congress, see infra notes
255-60 and accompanying text, congressional supremacy suggests that Congress
should develop rules for deference to the Court. Cf Seidman, supra note 22, at
1587 (people can and do defer to experts even while not giving them final authority to decide). An example of such a rule of deference might be to give more
weight to a unanimous judicial decision than to a 5- 4 decision.
241. Thus, congressional supremacy would require that governmental institutions reflect, respect, and respond to two new ethics. First, Congress should
actively consider enacting direct responses to Supreme Court opinions. See
Brest, supra note 10, at 98 (Congress lacks strong tradition of constitutional decisionmaking). Second, the Supreme Court should defer to such legislative responses. See id. at 76. Whether the Court should defer to all relevant responses,
only to explicit congressional responses, only to explicit and thoughtful (defined
procedurally) responses, only to explicit and thoughtful (defined substantively)
responses, etc., should also be analyzed from the perspective of constitutional
representation. Dean Brest suggests that if Congress sought to respond to the
Court's constitutional decisions, then the Court should defer only if "Congress
develops systematic and trustworthy procedures of constitutional decisionmaking"-by which he means not so much an extraordinarily thoughtful consideration of the merits of competing policies, but more traditional and pseudojudicial approaches to constitutional "interpretation." See id. at 103. Because I
question the viability of traditional notions of "interpretation," by courts let
alone by Congress, I would reject Brest's particular standard, if not the principle
that Congress's responsive legislation satisfy some procedural standard of extraordinary thoughtfulness. Cf P. DIMOND, supra note 20, at 85 (Court has applied dear statement rule when Congress compromises constitutional
concerns); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 316-17 (2d ed. 1988)
(Court has applied clear statement rule when federal statute reaches to outer
limit of commerce power and would conflict with state institutional interests);
Farber & Frickey, supra note 51, at 917-19 (existing doctrines requiring legislative deliberation); Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976)
(advocating judicial doctrine to improve legislative processes); Sandalow, supra
note 20, at 1189 (courts should defer to political decisions reflecting deliberate
judgment by representative institutions). For further discussion of Dean Brest's
view of congressional competence to engage in constitutional "interpretation,"
see infra note 244.
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without considering whether legislative vetoes compromise values underlying the separation of powers doctrine, Mr. Chadha's
lawyers helped focus public attention on potentially important issues that otherwise would have been ignored.
The nature of judicial decisionmaking helps provide extraordinary thoughtfulness. Judges can shape an understanding
of issues as they relate to putative constitutional values. Relatively insulated from the pressures of give-and-take legislative
politics, and constrained to write opinions that satisfy standards
of reason, judges can help ensure that such constitutional values
are not forgotten. Thus, ChiefJustice Burger's opinion in Chadha
helps frame the merits of legislative vetoes from the perspective
of traditional concerns for separated powers. Justice White's dissent frames the issues from a more contemporary perspective, but
one still guided by similar concerns for separated powers.
Finally, the nature of responsive congressional decisionmaking could help provide extraordinary electoral roots. Congress's
second look would be closer to the ideal of extraordinarily
thoughtful constitutional politics than was the Court's review of
the initial congressional choice, for Congress's "interpretive" decision would be political. Far more than the Court's, Congress's
decision would be constitutional representation. 242 To the extent
242. Some might object to equating Congress with voters, or with "the
People." See T. Low1, supra note 221, at 68-72 (President and Congress identify
with, and vote for, different interest groups rather than broadly conceived majorities); G. McCONNELL, supra note 220, at 339 ("[A] substantial part of government in the United States has come under the influence or control of narrowly
based and largely autonomous elites."); Amar, supra note 42, at 1079-85 (arguing that Congress is inadequately majoritarian). Bruce Ackerman argues that
"we must systematically reject the idea that when Congress (or the President or
the Court) speaks during periods of normal politics, we can hear the genuine
[constitutional] voice of the American people." Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1027
(emphasis in original). However valid these observations might be, they are
hardly arguments against congressional supremacy. To question Congress's
representativeness should not lead one toward less representative judicial
supremacy, but toward more representative options for constitutional policymaking. See supra notes 48-58 and accompanying text; cf Farber & Frickey,
supra note 51, at 911-13 (advocating political process reform rather than heightened judicial review to cure perceived defects in legislative representation).
Significantly, Ackerman acknowledges that the Court, as well as Congress, is
a poor proxy for true constitutional politics. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at
1027. But true constitutional politics must be episodic. See id. at 1040, 1050
(noting that after intense political activity achieves its goal (e.g., an amendment),
"most private citizens ... inevitably will [find] that they have better things to do
with their time than continue the political struggle at fever pitch"). Any "interpretive" regime must therefore be imperfectly representative and imperfectly
deliberative. The challenge for voters today is to identify an interpretive regime
that best approximates the decisions the electorate would make if engaged in
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that Chief Justice Burger's opinion successfully identifies values
the electorate would pursue in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics, it should ring true, and influence Congress's second look. 243 To the extent that the Court has sought to protect
concerns that voters would not favor in extraordinarily thoughtful
constitutional politics-if, for example, Justice White's observations ring true-congressional supremacy would allow the electorate's representatives to correct the Court's mistake. 244
extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics. See supra text accompanying
notes 144-48.
243. This is not inconsistent with a focus on interest groups underlying
economic theories of legislation and public choice theory. "Interest group theory treats statutes as commodities that are purchased by particular interest
groups or coalitions of interest groups that outbid and outmaneuver competing
interest groups." Macey, supra note 48, at 227. "Payment takes the form of campaign contributions, votes, implicit promises of future favors, and sometimes
outright bribes." Landes & Posner, supra note 35, at 877. Thus, public choice
theory raises questions about the representativeness and the quality of legislative
decisionmaking. See supra note 51. While such theories of legislation find political capital in resources other than the vote, they do not necessarily deny that
interest groups might spend their resources to support legislation serving "legitimate, public-regarding, noneconomic goals." Macey, supra note 48, at 228.
The recognition that the "publicly articulated purpose [of a statute] will almost
invariably be a public-regarding purpose" suggests that electoral accountability
remains a significant influence on legislative behavior, because clearly articulated factional purposes could induce the otherwise quiet members of the public
to mobilize in opposition. See id. at 250-53. Nevertheless, such public choice
theory suggests that the bulk of interest group activity seeks wealth transfers at
the expense of other groups and, therefore, "that politicians can advance their
own private interests by ... helping enact legislation that transfers wealth from
groups with high information and transaction costs to groups with low information and transaction costs." Id. at 229-30. Viewing "public-regarding" policies
as superior to interest group policies, Macey advocates methods of statutory interpretation that temper the latter by, for example, enforcing the general language of a statute rather than by examining a legislative history which might
indicate specific targets and beneficiaries of the legislation. See id. at 236-40
(criticizing view that judges should consider the "deals . . . struck in
cloakrooms" in seeking proper enforcement of statutes). Macey's analysis of judicial and legislative interaction in the statutory context to encourage "publicregarding" policies might be applied to a judicial and legislative interaction for
constitutional "interpretation"-which, as I have suggested, should seek a representative determination of the extraordinarily thoughtful choices the electorate would make if engaged in constitutional politics today. See supra text
accompanying notes 144- 48.
244. Dean Brest suggests that if Congress may "subvert judicial doctrine,"
it may do so only if, "after engaging in independent constitutional interpretation, Congress determines that the doctrine is legally incorrect." Brest, supra
note 10, at 59. "Congress must engage in independent constitutional interpretation." Id. at 80. By suggesting that such "interpretation" requires not only
facility with constitutional text, history, structure, and precedents, but also "disinterested" decisionmaking, Dean Brest concludes that Congress is, at least for
now, institutionally incapable of validly overturning a judicial finding of unconstitutionality. See id. at 82, 103; see also PERRY I, supra note 7, at 16, 19 (Congress
lacks impartiality necessary to interpret Constitution); Mikva, How Well Does Con-
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Thus, while the Court's opinions can provide Congress's second look with some of the extraordinary vigilance and thoughtfulness that voters anticipate in true constitutional politics, 245 the
choices ultimately emerging from the processes of congressional
supremacy 246 are more the voters' own, as they would be in the
extraordinarily thoughtful politics through which constitutional
provisions for political self-constraint ideally are created. To the
extent that legislators are cautious about exercising the powers of
congressional supremacy, and sensitive to the Court's role in providing extraordinary thoughtfulness, the goal of constitutional
gress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C.L. REV. 587, 610 (1983) (Congress cannot effectively interpret Constitution).
Dean Brest's analysis is problematic for several reasons. First, he seems to
rely on a surprisingly technical notion of "legal" correctness and "interpretation." Yet the notion of constitutional representation is more political than
technical and, indeed, even speculative. It is questionable whether courts can
,effectively pursue that "interpretive" ideal. Even without resort to any notion of
constitutional representation as an ideal, it is hardly novel to question protestations of technically correct "interpretive" results. See Schauer, supra note 22, at
1731-32 (appellate review does not involve technical legal skills so much as require "recourse to the political, economic, social, cultural, and moral norms" of
society). Thus, contrary to Dean Brest's view, the judicial point of departure is
not sacrosanct. Second, Dean Brest's observation that Congress is not sufficiently
"disinterested" to overturn judicial determinations of unconstitutionality attributes to courts a virtue they do not necessarily possess, and transforms into a vice
a characteristic of congressional decisionmaking that is, in fact, a virtue. As
judges are hardly "disinterested" in the controversial issues they resolve in the
name of constitutional law, Dean Brest again paints a rosier picture of the judicial point of departure than it deserves. More importantly, although congressional decisionmaking is expressly political and interested, so are the politics of
constitutional ratification and, therefore, the choices voters today would make if
engaged in constitutional politics. Indeed, Congress itself has drafted many of
the constitutional provisions so revered by proponents of judicial review. Cf
Fisher, supra note 103, at 718 ("Constitutional law often turns on factfinding and
the balancing of conflicting values. Members of Congress can make important
contributions in both areas."); id. at 732 (Congress's constitutional judgments
"compare favorably to those announced by the courts"). Third, courts might
develop rules for reviewing congressional review, perhaps requiring certain indicia that Congress has, in fact, engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful decisionmaking, before the Court would need to defer to Congress's "interpretive"
statute. See supra notes 240-41.
245. This function of the Court would provide good justification for maintaining judicial life-tenure under a regime of congressional supremacy. See infra
note 359. The new system might also encourage even greater judicial activism,
to mitigate Congress' errors of omission, because the Court's errors of commission could more easily be remedied. See infra text accompanying notes 268-72,
283-86.
246. Some might fear that constitutional law under congressional
supremacy would be less coherent than under judicial supremacy. But not only
is the value of coherence debatable; it is by no means certain that congressional
supremacy would, in fact, generate a constitutional law significantly less coherent than that heretofore developed by the Court. See supra note 104.
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representation-simulating extraordinarily vigilant and thoughtful politics-can indeed be approached.
Given the indeterminate meaning of aging constitutional
texts, it is, perhaps, only by the processes of "interpretive" decisionmaking that voters today can hope to attain the choices the
electorate would make if engaged in true constitutional politics. 247
Some might doubt, however, whether congressional response can
achieve this ideal of constitutional representation. 248 Indeed, one
might question the extent to which congressional decisionmaking
can be either truly representative or truly thoughtful. 249 But the
issue is not whether judicial review supplemented by congressional supremacy replicates true, formal constitutional politics.
My suggestion is more modest: that congressional supremacy is
the less imperfect of two options.
11.

Addressing the Possibility of an Erroneous Refusal to
Invalidate

Constitutional representation can be as badly compromised
by erroneous refusals to invalidate congressional choices as by erroneous invalidations. 250 Yet since the New Deal struggle over
24 7. As Professor Sandalow has suggested, "The central problems in devising a satisfactory theory of judicial review is ... to define and justify the process
by which societal norms should be constructed for the purpose of giving content
to constitutional law." Sandalow, supra note 20, at 1185.
248. Even enacting a constitutional amendment~r failing to do so-under article V procedures might not necessarily yield the decisions voters today
would make if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics, for
the most extraordinary thoughtfulness would have the electorate consider its
own rules for constitutional ratification, i.e., article V itself. Cf Amar, supra note
42, at 1099 ("[A]ny political process that weights some Americans ... more than
others . . .-as does Article V . . .-is legitimate only if that process itself is
approved by, and is subordinate to, a process which weights all Americans
equally.").
249. See supra notes 102, 242. Professors Farber and Frickey reach a contrary conclusion even after carefully· considering public choice theory conceptions of problematic congressional behavior:
Congress is not merely the reflection of private political power. Faith
in deliberative congressional resolution of sensitive issues is not entirely misplaced, particularly when courts assist the deliberative process
through structural and procedural review. To be sure, judicial invalidation under this approach constitutes only a suspensive veto. Yet even
that shifts the burden of inertia to those seeking to reimpose the invalidated decision, highlights the perceived unfairness of the decision, and,
because of the passage of time, often presents the issue to a legislature
constituted somewhat differently from the one that made the original
decision. Considering the ease of killing legislation and the difficulty of
passing it, these consequences of a suspensive veto are significant.
Farber & Frickey, supra note 51, at 923 (footnote omitted).
250. But see R. NAGEL, supra note 21, at 22-26 (judicial deference gives to
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delegation and federalism, 251 the Supreme Court has taken an especially deferential posture when reviewing the constitutionality
of congressional acts. 252 One can trace this deference to judicial
supremacy. From fear of erroneously invalidating a congressional choice, the Supreme Court risks erroneously upholding a
congressional choice. 253
During this century, the Supreme Court has taken three approaches to constitutional federalism. First, through the early
New Deal, the Court struck down many congressional statutes in
the name of federalism. 254 The Depression notwithstanding, and
against the judgments of the President and Congress about how
other institutions responsibility for making constitutional law). Nagel's position
ignores that other institutions, at least without interaction with judicial decisionmaking, generally are incapable of the extraordinary thoughtfulness and vigilance that constitutionalism toward political self-constraint seeks to promote.
251. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v.Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Carterv. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238
(1936); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
252. Even when using racial classifications, otherwise subject to close (if
somewhat ill-defined) judicial scrutiny, Congress has enjoyed the Court's deference. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3008 (1990)
("It is of overriding significance in these cases that the FCC's minority ownership programs have been specifically approved-indeed, mandated-by Congress."); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980) (racial classification
must be examined "with appropriate deference to Congress"). The Court has
looked far more critically at affirmative action programs designed by states and
localities. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498-506
( 1989) (restricting local discretion to set aside percentage of public contracts for
minority business enterprises); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
282-84 ( 1986) (restricting local discretion to adopt affirmative action program in
lay off provision of collective bargaining agreement); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307-10 (1978) (restricting state discretion to adopt affirmative action program in university admissions policies); see also Chang, supra note
190.
253. James Bradley Thayer made the point: "The courts are revising the
work of a co-ordinate department, and must not, even negatively, undertake to
legislate. And, again, they must not act unless the case is so very clear, because
the consequences of setting aside legislation may be so serious." Thayer, supra
note 60, at 150; see also J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 41 ( 1980) ("If a principled approach to judicial enforcement of ... the Constitution's open-ended provisions cannot be developed, one that is not hopelessly inconsistent with our
nation's commitment to representative democracy, responsible commentators
must consider seriously the possibility that courts simply should stay away from
them."); L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1-30 (1958) (questionable foundation for
judicial review demands cautious exercise of presumed judicial power to invalidate legislation); Conkle, supra note 20, at 34-36 (finality of constitutional decisions induces cautious judicial inaction).
254. See, e.g., Carter, 298 U.S. at 293-97 (national wage and hour standards
applied to mining industries); Schechter, 295 U.S. at 549-51 (national wage and
hour standards applied to poultry industry); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S.
251, 273-77 (1918) (national fair labor standards governing employment of
children).
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to invigorate national economic health, the Court denied the national electorate its congressionally-expressed preferences. Second, perhaps in response to the political turmoil generated by this
restrictive view of Congress's authority, the Court broadened its
definition of Congress's discretion. The process culminated in
United States v. Darby, 2 55 where a unanimous Court determined
that Congress could, under the commerce clause, enact statutes
regulating "commerce"-defined essentially as the "shipment interstate of goods" or "activities intrastate which ... affect interstate commerce"25 6-"[w]hatever their motive and purpose." 257
Although the possibility of judicial intervention for the sake of
federalism remained, it was widely perceived as insignificant. 258
Third, by its decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 259 the Court today has deemed federalism to be essentially a political question, wholly within Congress's discretion,
based on the view that "[s]tate sovereign interests ... are more
properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the
structure of the federal system than by judicially created limita255. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
256. Id. at 115, 118.
257. Id. at 115 (emphasis added). National discretion is far greater under a
commerce clause understood as permitting regulation for any purpose, rather
than one understood as permitting regulation for limited purposes-for example,
only for purposes of promoting economic health and development.
A restrictive, purpose-oriented approach for defining the scope of Congress's discretion against claims of federalism-based limits is suggested in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Chief Justice Marshall
announced: "should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass
laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it would
become the painful duty of this tribunal ... to say that such an act was not the
law of the land." Id. at 423 (emphasis added). In a pre-Darby case, the Court
had articulated a purpose-oriented principle defining the scope of Congress's
discretion under the commerce clause: "[T]he power to regulate commerce is
the power to enact 'all appropriate legislation' for 'its protection and advancement'; to adopt measures 'to promote its growth and insure its safety'; 'to foster,
protect, control and restrain.'" NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1, 36-37 (1937) (citations omitted). Though this principle could be distorted
toward Darby's endorsement of congressional regulations, "[w]hatever their motive and purpose," it was articulated in a context limited to commercial purposes.
Hence it was far more a principle respecting local discretion than that. which
evolved in Darby and that which signaled the death of constraint altogether in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
258. For example, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy stated during Senate hearings on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, "I think that there is an injustice
that needs to be remedied. We have to find the tools with which to remedy that
injustice. . . . The commerce clause will obtain a remedy and there won't be a
problem about the [constitutionality]." G. GUNTHER, supra note 60, at 159.
259. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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tions on federal power." 260 Thus, Congress is now the exclusive
guardian of this putative constitutional concern; federalism is not
an issue for judicial review.
What decisions about federalism would the national electorate make if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional
politics today? Perhaps, like the framers, voters would conclude
that local decisionmaking is a value that weighs against establishing national standards-that governmental diversity serves freedom; heterodoxy creates options; options forestall unhappy
citizens' perceptions of tyranny-and, therefore, that one should
think twice about these benefits of local decisionmaking before
establishing national standards. 261 Voters alternately might conclude that local decisionmaking serves no value that should weigh
against establishing national standards. 262 What is right is right,
260. Id. at 552.
261. Indeed, major antifederalist currents against the Constitution were
notions of community, participation and autonomy within a small and local
realm. See THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
DEBATES 275-77 (R. Ketcham ed. 1986) (Brutus's first essay). Concern for one's
neighbors was essential for good public decisionmaking, but possible only on a
small scale, in relatively homogeneous circumstances, like a family. Cf Sunstein,
supra note 42, at 1556 ("[R]epublican belief in deliberation about the common
good is most easily sustained when there is homogeneity and agreement about
foundations."). These values would be compromised by a national government-through expanding the community beyond recognition; through bringing together (though not unifying) diverse interests and perspectives; through
creating more incentive for conflict and more chance lo lose. See G. Woon, supra
note 42, at 499-502. Thus, one might suppose that responding to these ideas,
the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution acted with a motive of political selfconstraint in choosing to protect concerns of federalism with the principles of
constitutional supremacy. Because the benefits of local government-the costs
to local values imposed by national government-could be overlooked in the
pressures and passions of everyday congressional decisionmaking, the Congress
was to be vested with only certain enumerated powers. But see infra note 262
(suggesting federalism might have reflected desire by recalcitrant minority to
perpetuate an extraordinary political advantage). Furthermore, federalism involves issues of when it is right for one group (the nation) to impose its will on
another (a state). This, it seems to me, involves not only questions of raw
power, but also subtle questions of political morality. But see J. CHOPER, supra
note 10, at 201-03 (federalism issues concern practicality rather than principle).
262. Yet the tenth amendment, as well as the Senate's structure, originally
might have reflected a desire by minority states to perpetuate an extraordinary
political advantage, e.g., by exploiting the desire of majority states to win the
minority's participation. Cf Amar, supra note 42, at 1069-71 (provision requiring state's consent before loss of equal suffrage in Senate may be overridden by
non-article V amendment procedures devised by "We the People"). If so, then
the "interpretive" implications would be even more complex-requiring a determination of what past choices by a minority to perpetuate a temporary political advantage imply about the choices a majority of voters today would make if
engaged in extraordinary constitutional politics about federalism. See supra note
197.
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and should govern New York as well as Georgia,2 63 Georgia as
well as New York. 264 Here, as elsewhere, "interpretive" indeterminacy reigns. 265
The Darby and Garcia approaches to constitutional federalism
raise the potential "interpretive" error of failing to strike down
national policie~ that the national electorate, if engaged in ex263. See, e.g., GA. CooE ANN.§ 16-6-2 (1988) (prohibiting consensual "sodomy"); cf Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91, 196 (1986) (upholding this
statute as applied to homosexuals).
264. New York courts have struck down sodomy statutes as violating the
New York Constitution. See, e.g., People v. Onofre, 72 A.D.2d 268, 272-73, 424
N.Y.S.2d 566, 569, ajf'd on other grounds, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434
N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
265. Bruce Ackerman would have the Court interpret the national political
activity that culminated in the elections of 1936, i.e., debate about the New Deal
provisions, as comprising a "structural amendment" of the Constitution, establishing a new, unrestrictive policy on federalism. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at
1053-56. His "structural amendment" is an effort to link constitutional interpretation with contemporary politics, while maintaining a distinction between ordinary national politics and extraordinary constitutional politics. See id. at 102731. Although my own enterprise in this article might be similarly characterized,
one should recognize a critical distinction between my suggestion of congressional supremacy as a route to constitutional representation and Ackerman's
modified processes for constitutional amendment as a means of linking judicial
behavior with contemporary politics. Ackerman focuses on reforming the
processes offormal constitutional amendment, while I focus on the processes of
interpreting formally intact and progressively aging constitutional provisions.
This line is blurred for Ackerman's 1936 "structural amendment"-as that
"amendment" was "ratified" without a formal text. See Amar, supra note 42, at
1091; Chang, supra note 10, at 824 n.233. Nonetheless, Ackerman is rather insistent that he views 1936 as true amendment rather than simply as a basis for new
interpretation. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1056. In a later effort, however,
he was unambiguously concerned with formal constitutional amendment. See
Ackerman, supra note 6, at 1182 (proposing modified processes for formal constitutional amendment).
Whether the "structural amendment" is viewed as a true, formal amendment or as a method for interpreting intact and aging texts, Ackerman's linkage
of interpretation to contemporary electoral politics is far more limited than the
linkage would be under congressional supremacy. Ackerman would have the
Court find a "structural amendment" only after political struggle of a sort so
extraordinary that he finds only one example in United States history. He also
characterizes the fourteenth amendment as a "structural amendment," despite
its ratification by formal article V processes. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at 106369. For discussion of the different issues involved in the fourteenth amendment
and the 1936 elections as "structural amendments," see Chang, supra note 10, at
824 n.233, 830 n.255. It seems to me that the "structural amendment" is no
solution to the problematic disjunction between judicial interpretation and constitutional politics--or, at least, a solution so rarely available that the pervasive
problems of judicial interpretation remain largely undisturbed. Whether viewed
as an interpretive method or as a new species of constitutional amendment, the
"structural amendment" is at least as rare as article V amendment has been. As
the existence of the article V option provides inadequate assurance that judicial
decisions will satisfy an ideal of constitutional representation, so, it seems to me,
does Ackerman's "structural amendment."
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traordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics, would decide do
not justify undermining the benefits of local decisionmaking. 266
Such deference essentially destroys the benefits of judicial review,
for the Court not only fails to measure challenged policies against
putative constitutional concerns; it fails even to articulate relevant
constitutional values by which legislators should feel themselves
constrained. With such deference, the extraordinary vigilance
and thoughtfulness that the Court otherwise could provide toward simulating true constitutional politics are lost altogether. 267
Under congressional supremacy, however, there would have
been less incentive for this sort of deference. The Court could
have retained federalism as a meaningful constitutional value, as
part ofjudicial doctrine. 268 Thus, the potential concern for federalism could be less lost than under judicial supremacy; the ideal
of constitutional representation would be better approached as
judicial review (more than meaningless deference) helps simulate
266. When the Court took a hostile posture to congressional legislation,
striking down much of the early New Deal response to the Depression, it risked
the potential "interpretive" error of striking down national statutes that the national electorate, if then engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional
politics, would have decided were sufficiently important to justify intruding on
the benefits of local decisionmaking. For an analysis of how congressional
supremacy can mitigate this error, see supra text accompanying notes 239-49.
267. See infra text accompanying notes 288-92.
268. A judicially articulated doctrine of constitutional federalism, even if
deferentially enforced, could guide legislative decisionmaking far more than the
view that federalism is merely a political question. For example, in debates
about the Civil Rights Act of 1964, members of Congress explicitly considered
whether they would violate constitutional federalism by voting for the legislation
under the commerce clause. In answering this question, they referred to
Supreme Court doctrine. Given Darby, members of Congress were advised that
they would act permissibly under the commerce clause, so long as the subject was
commerce, no matter what the object (purpose) of their regulation might be. See
G. GUNTHER, supra note 60, at 159-62 (testimony of Attorney General Robert F.
Kennedy during Senate Hearings on Civil Rights Act of 1964). But ifthe Court
had retained the commerce clause doctrine devised injones & La.ugh/in, members
of Congress would have been advised that the act would be permissible only if
their major object was economic. Unless a putative constitutional principle is judicially articulated, legislators are unlikely to consider respecting it. The Garcia
abandonment of constitutional federalism as a political question not only eliminates the possibility of judicially invalidating a statute on tenth amendment
grounds, but also diminishes the chances that members of Congress themselves
can give the issue due deliberation. On the other hand, the Jones & La.ugh/in
approach articulates principles limiting congressional discretion while applying
those principles deferentially. It minimizes the possibility that a court will invalidate a statute on tenth amendment grounds, but provides an articulated putative
constitutional principle of federalism that Congress can choose to respect on its
own. This difference is significant to the extent that one views the essence of
constitutional decisionmaking as extraordinarily thoughtful politics. See supra
text accompanying notes 36-43, 192-99 & 215-18.
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the vigilance and thoughtfulness of constitutional politics, while
the opportunity for congressional evaluation and response helps
simulate the electoral roots of constitutional politics.
This is not to suggest that unbridled judicial activism would
be proper under congressional supremacy.269 While the costs of
"erroneous" judicial declarations of national policy in the name
of the Constitution would be mitigated, they cannot be eliminated. 270 Neither is it to suggest, however, that Congress should
be eager to overturn the Court's decisions under congressional
supremacy. Rather, members of both the Court and Congress
should evaluate the other's decisions according to the strengths
and weaknesses each institution can bring to the task of constitutional representation. Thus, toward serving the ideal of political
self-constraint in a context of congressional supremacy, judges
would need to develop new guidelines for deference in their initial review of national policies. 271 Members of Congress would
need to debate principles of deference to the Court's declarations
of constitutional principle. Such mutual consideration of underlying institutional capacities can enhance decisionmaking about
specific substantive policies and thereby promote the extraordinarily thoughtful decisionmaking that is the goal of political selfconstraint. 272
269. Even given congressional supremacy, the Court must develop principles suggesting when deference is appropriate and when it is not. See supra notes
240-41; infra text accompanying note 270; see also infra note 285.
270. It is a matter of no small consequence that Congress must rouse itself
from the inertia that seems to have been part of its original design if it is to
exercise the prerogatives of congressional supremacy. It is a matter of no small
consequence that voters, in evaluating their representatives' "interpretive" decisions, must devote more attention to public policy than under judicial
supremacy. "Erroneous" judicial declarations of national policy in the name of
the Constitution might well not be corrected by a Congress that sees little political capital in acting. See J. CHOPER, supra note 10, at 16-24 (structure of Congress inhibits action); Amar, supra note 42, at 1078-79 (arguing that presentment
and bicameralism are countermajoritarian).
271. To the extent that this greater judicial activism would mitigate the erroneous failure to invalidate congressional choices, it also would increase the
chances for erroneous invalidations of congressional choices. See infra text accompanying notes 281-83 (same point for judicial review of local policies). "Interpretive" indeterminacy suggests, however, that results cannot be the basis for
choosing among different institutions of judicial review or different people to
serve in those institutions. To the extent this is true, one must evaluate the
processes by which those results are reached. See infra text accompanying notes
283-86 (same point for judicial review of local policies).
272. Similar problems with judicial deference arise when the Court examines national policies implicating individual rights. For example, a sharply divided Court held that an Orthodox Jewish rabbi was not denied his first
amendment rights by an Air Force regulation that prohibited him from wearing
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c.

Evaluating the Constitutionality of State Policies

1.

Striking an Optimal Balance Between the Erroneous
Invalidation and the Erroneous Refusal to Invalidate

In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court invalidated a Connecticut
statute that prohibited people from using, or counselling the use
of, contraceptives. 27!1 Justice Douglas's majority opinion recognized a constitutional right of privacy that includes a married
couple's interest in using contraceptives. 274 Justices Black and
Stewart each wrote dissenting opinions acknowledging, respectively, that the Connecticut law was "offensive" and "unwise," but
emphasizing the lack of constitutional foundation on which to invalidate the statute.2 75
Would a majority among the national electorate today, if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics, choose
to establish a national standard protecting a right to use contraceptives? On the one hand, as even the dissenters implied, Cona yarmulke. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). The regulation
had been promulgated pursuant to a congressional grant of rulemaking authority. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion could hardly have been more deferential: "UJudicial deference ... is at its apogee when legislative action under the
congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules and regulations for their governance is challenged." Id. at 508 (quoting Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981)). With such deference to military policies,
Justice Rehnquist gave no consideration to competing putative constitutional interests. Because the costs of an "erroneous" judicial invalidation would be less
under congressional supremacy, the Court might justifiably forgo the extreme
deference rooted in fears of the "erroneous" invalidation toward avoiding the
"erroneous" failure to invalidate, when it appears that constitutional values were
inadequately considered--or not considered at all-by Congress or its
subordinate decisionmakers. Thus, the extraordinary vigilance and thoughtfulness of constitutional politics is simulated. Congress's authority to respond provides ultimate electoral resolution. Ironically, the Court's decision in this case
spurred Congress to enact responsive legislation. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 774 (West
Supp. 1991).
273. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
274. Id. at 485. Justice Douglas found the right of privacy in the "penumbras" emanating from the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 484. Justice
Goldberg joined the majority opinion, but wrote a separate concurring opinion,
joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan, that derived a right of privacy from the "traditions and [collective] conscience of our people." Id. at 493
(Goldberg, J., concurring). Justices White and Harlan each concurred in the
judgment in separate opinions. For an analysis of the relationship between Griswold and Hardwick, see Chang, supra note 10, at 808-25.
275. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 507-10 (Black,]., dissenting); id. at 527, 530-31
(Stewart, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinions were originalist in scoperooted in, and limited by, history. See id. at 509 (Black, J., dissenting) (courts
should "stick to the simple language of the First Amendment in construing it");
id. at 529-30 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (discussing original intent of ninth amendment). For an analysis of originalism's inadequacies for purposes of constitutional representation, see supra text accompanying notes 149-53.
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necticut's law might well deeply offend a national majority.
Perhaps voters would establish a national norm if they were vigilant about public policy-as they would be if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics. 276 On the other hand,
if voters also accounted for concerns of federalism in an extraordinarily thoughtful way, they inight choose not to impose their
views as a national standard. Again, "interpretive" indeterminacy
prevails. Thus, Griswold potentially represents the erroneous establishment of national policies preempting local discretion.
In 0 'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 277 the Court considered whether
New Jersey prison officials violated the free exercise clause by requiring Muslim inmates to adhere to a work schedule that prevented them from attendingJumu'ah, a.weekly Muslim service. 278
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion adopted a standard of
review deferential to state prison officials and held that the free
exercise clause was not violated. 279 Justice Brennan, for four dissenters, argued that the majority had ignored the Constitution's
purpose "to provide a bulwark against infringements that might
otherwise be justified as necessary expedients of governing." 280
Justice Brennan concluded that "[o]ur objective in selecting a
standard of review is therefore not, as the Court declares, '[t]o
ensure that courts afford appropriate deference to prison offi276. The Senate judiciary Committee focused on this matter during the
Bork confirmation hearings. One might infer from exchanges between the Senators and the nominee that most believed that states should not be free to prohibit the use of contraceptives. See, e.g., Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate
justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on
the judiciary, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 114-21, 149-51, 240-43, 182-84 (1987)
(questioning by Senators Biden, Kennedy, Hatch and Simpson). If so, Griswold
has served the national electorate's values. See Chang, supra note 10, at 819.
Without it, Congress probably would never have addressed the issue, and Connecticut might well have retained its offensive law. Thus, judicial review provided a vigilance, about public policy that congressional government alone would
lack. While the Senate had occasion to review, evaluate, and potentially control
the Supreme Court's disposition of the issue through such rare and inefficient
mechanisms as the Bork confirmation hearings, congressional supremacy would
provide a method for a more engaged electoral review of the Court's disposition
of issues that otherwise would escape national attention. See supra text accompanying notes 239-42; infra note 291.
277. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
278. Id. at 345.
279. Id. at 349, 353. Chiefjustice Rehnquist stated, "when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Id. at 349 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). In form and in substance, this inquiry
amounts to the extreme deference employed in most cases applying mere rationality review under the equal protection clause.
280. Id. at 356 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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cials,' " but "to determine how best to protect" the constitutional
rights of prisoners. 281 Thus, he employed a non-deferential balancing approach that, in form and substance, amounted to the
"strict scrutiny" applied in many fundamental rights cases. 282
It is conceivable that voters today, if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics, would consider prisoners'
interests in free religious exercise unimportant and, therefore,
would have no impulse to displace New Jersey's policy. It is also
conceivable that voters might sympathize with the religious claims
of prisoners, yet, on balance, respect values of local autonomy.
Finally, it is conceivable that voters would decide that religious
free exercise is a particularly important component of sound
prison policy, warranting national standards preempting local discretion. Here, as with most constitutional questions that survive
from complaint to Supreme Court review, the merits are controversial and the correct "interpretive" results are indeterminate.
Thus, Shabazz potentially represents the erroneous refusal to establish national policies preempting local discretion.

•••

As judicial review of congressional choices might become less
deferential under congressional supremacy than it tends to be
under judicial supremacy, 283 so judicial review of state policies
could be similarly affected. If so, congressional supremacy can
redress the error of which Shabazz is a possible example: the erroneous refusal to establish national policy. Yet by encouraging
greater judicial intrusiveness, congressional supremacy could exacerbate the error of which Griswold is a possible example: the
erroneous intrusion on values of federalism. Furthermore, despite congressional supremacy, natural legislative inertia might
preclude congressional responses restoring the level of state discretion that voters today would choose to respect if engaged in
281. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion) (emphasis in
original).
282. See id. at 358-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (degree of scrutiny should
depend on nature of right, type of activity being restricted, and extent of restriction) (citing Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015, 1033 (2d Cir. 1985) (Kaufman, j.)). Judicial supremacy is especially problematic when the basis for
judicial decisionmaking is a "balancing" of competing values. Balancing begs
such questions as whose values to balance and how to calibrate a scale for balancing. See Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE LJ. 943,
972-83 (1987) (highlighting analytic and operational problems balancing
presents). But see PERRY II, supra note 7, at 149 (judge should enforce personal
notion of community's proper moral aspiration). For a criticism of Perry's view,
see supra text accompanying notes 165-68.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 266-68.
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extraordinarily thoughtful (and vigilant) constitutional politics. 284
Thus, although congressional supremacy could redress the potential Griswold error once committed better than judicial supremacy,
it also could encourage more potential Griswold errors, some of
which would be left unremedied. 28 5
This suggests a trade-off. Judicial supremacy poses a greater
risk of erroneously refusing to establish national standards that
voters would choose if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics. Congressional supremacy poses a greater risk
of erroneously intruding on local discretion that voters would
choose to respect if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics. Identifying the error that voters would rather
avoid (if they confronted the question in an extraordinarily
thoughtful way) is itself an issue of constitutional representation
and, therefore, a matter of indeterminate speculation. In this
sense, judicial supremacy and congressional supremacy cannot be
evaluated according to the substance of the policies each would
generate. 286
284. The structure of Congress, after all, was originally intended to protect
concerns of federalism by inhibiting congressional action. See J. CnoPER, supra
note IO, at 26 (commenting that either house of Congress may defeat a bill, and
senators representing only 15% of population can block federal action). Such
structures-and legislative inertia in general-could similarly operate to inhibit
congressional responses toward restoring state discretion, thus preventing decisions which favor federalism. Dean Calabresi has analyzed problems of legislative inertia in responding to judicial efforts to serve contemporary community
values by invalidating or "updating" legislation in a common law, rather than
constitutional, capacity. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 72, at 72-80, 120-45.
285. It is not necessarily true that justices will become less deferential in evaluating state policies under congressional supremacy. If judicial behavior remains the same, then congressional supremacy can mitigate the erroneous
establishment of national standards, see supra text accompanying notes 236- 46,
273-76, and the establishment of erroneous national standards, see supra text accompanying notes 293-303, while leaving the erroneous failure to establish national standards unaddressed. In the end, whether Justices become less
deferential, how much less deferential, and under what circumstances less deferential, will depend on their judgments about the continuing constitutional significance of federalism. With the goal of constitutional representation, this
should be a matter of determining whether voters today, if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics, would more often decide to establish national standards or to leave matters to local discretion.
286. During debates preceding the Constitution's framing, some proposed
a congressional power to invalidate offensive state legislation. This was rejected
as being too nationalistic. See G. Wooo, supra note 42, at 525-26. It is reasonable to suggest, however, that federalism is far less important today than it was
to the framers and ratifiers of 1787-or even those of 1868. More today than in
1787, the national community is viewed as primary; issues are viewed as national; culture and perspective are formed as national. See J. CHO PER, supra note
IO, at 191-93 (regional heterodoxy more perceived than real); Ackerman, supra
note 6, at 1180 (national perspective developed through Civil War; accelerated

376

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36: p. 281

Yet results are not the only basis by which to evaluate the
rival "interpretive" regimes. Congressional supremacy still
promises three process-oriented benefits discussed in other contexts. First, with more active judicial review both encouraged and
tempered by congressional supremacy, the Court could confront
the inevitable competition between concerns for federalism and
concerns for the best governing national policy. This contrasts
favorably with both congressional silence, born of the national inertia in which judicial review of state policies necessarily occurs, 287 and the know-nothing deference of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's Shabazz opinion, induced by the high stakes of judicial supremacy. Thus, more active judicial review encouraged by
congressional supremacy could help to simulate the extraordinary
vigilance of constitutional politics. Issues otherwise ignored would
be confronted.288
Second, the judicial focus on constitutional norms historically acknowledged as fundamentally important helps these
processes of constitutional policymaking to simulate the extraordinary thoughtfulness of constitutional politics. While Justice
Brennan in Shabazz could have focused national political attention
on values of religious free exercise, for example, Chief Justice
Rehnquist might have focused attention on values of federalism.
Because of the judicial deference induced by the high stakes of
judicial supremacy, however, the competition between concerns
of federalism and concerns of religious free exercise in this context was left entirely unexamined by any accountable representative of the national polity, let alone examined m an
extraordinarily thoughtful way.
Finally, the nature of congressional resolution under congressional supremacy helps to simulate the electoral roots of constitutional politics. Although legislative inertia would inhibit
through New Deal); Brest, supra note IO, at 75 n.54 (prevalent notion that values
of federalism are less important today). How much less significant concerns for
federalism are, however, remains the indeterminate issue of constitutional representation. Cf supra text accompanying notes 261-65 (discussing possible positions that national electorate could take on issues of federalism).
287. See Mikva, supra note 244, at 609-10 ("Congress is a reactive body unable to enact legislation until the problem at hand reaches crisis proportions.")
(footnote omitted). This observation cuts two ways: in favor of greater judicial
activism, because Congress cannot (or will not) address issues that voters would
wish to consider if engaged in extraordinarily vigilant and thoughtful politics;
and against greater judicial activism, because Congress cannot easily correct judicial errors.
288. Cf PERRY I, supra note 7, at 152-54 (litigation of institutional reform
cases can bring to public attention issues otherwise ignored).
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statutory responses that, ideally, should be enacted, any debate is
intrinsically valuable. 289 The mere acknowledgment of congressional authority to overturn the Court's "interpretations," even
. when that authority is not exercised, could have both symbolic
and practical value in lending majoritarian legitimacy to the
Court's decisions. Furthermore, when Congress overcomes its
inertia and enacts responsive legislation, constitutional issues will
have been resolved by accountable representatives of the national
electorate, just as constitutional provisions themselves are framed
and ratified .by accountable representatives of the national
electorate. 290
Thus, while Chief justice Rehnquist's approach would protect federalism (and risk the erroneous refusal to establish national standards) through congressional inertia and judicial deference,
greater judicial act1v1sm supplemented by congressional
supremacy would reduce erroneous refusals to establish national
standards (and risk undermining federalism) by promoting conscious choice-the Court's choice or Congress's choice. As either
choice is surely more thoughtful than inertial know-nothingness,
and ultimately subject to Congress's nationally accountable judgment, the processes by which constitutional policy are made could
better approximate extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics. 291 In the end, because successful constitutional representa289. The intrinsic worth of public discourse is a central proposition in the
recent prominence of republicanism in constitutional scholarship. See, e.g., B.
ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 8-19 (1980) (proposing conversational paradigm for generating ideas of justice); Ackerman, supra note 8, at
1022 (describing higher-track politics characterized by appeals to public good
evaluated by mobilized citizenry); Michelman II, supra note 42, at 1495 (republicanism emphasizes deliberative functions of politics); Sunstein, supra note 42, at
1589 (noting importance of disagreement and dialogue in republican theories);
Sunstein, supra note 48, at 1691 (republican model is "town meeting, where decisions are made during a process of collective self-determination"); cf.
Michelman I, supra note 42, at 76-77 (judicial plurality "is for dialogue, in support of judicial practical reason, as an aspect of judicial self-government, in the
interest of our freedom"). Michelman's republicanism here is more elitist, focused on dialogue among Supreme Court Justices rather than within the electorate. See also PERRY I, supra note 7, at 152-56 (deliberative politics valuable as
means to gain knowledge of self and others).
290. Under article V, constitutional provisions are proposed by representatives, whether Congress or a convention, and are ratified by representatives,
whether state legislatures or special state conventions. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
291. The Court's "dormant" commerce clause jurisprudence provides an
example. Justice Stone suggested that when the Court invalidates a state policy
as excessively burdensome on interstate commerce, it may be pursuing "the presumed intention of Congress" rather than a constitutional mandate. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767-69 (1945). One might question why
the Court should act as Congress's quasi-legislative front; indeed, one might
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tion must be defined in terms of process-making the decisions
that voters today would make if engaged in extraordinarily
thoughtful constitutional politics-it is perhaps only by better approaching the processes of constitutional politics that voters can
hope to approach their ideal results. 292
u.

Redressing the Establishment of Erroneous National
Policies

A court might commit a third possible "interpretive" error
within the spectrum between the erroneous establishment of national policies and the erroneous refusal to invalidate offensive
local policies. It might correctly invalidate a local policy that voters would decide to displace if engaged in extraordinarily
thoughtful constitutional politics, yet create the wrong national
policy.
Consider Roe v. Wade as a potential example of this "interpretive" error. 293 Justice Blackmun, for a majority of seven, held that
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment protects a
right of privacy which "is broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." 294 After
finding this right, he invoked the familiar judicial balance called
"strict scrutiny." Weighing the woman's privacy interest against
state interests in protecting health and "potential life," Justice
argue that the "dormant" commerce clause involves an unconstitutional delegation (or arrogation) of legislative power to (or by) the Court. Cf Schoenbrod I,
supra note 224, at 1224-48, 1283-90 (arguing against delegation of legislative
power to executive). But several arguments support this relationship between
Court and Congress that parallel my rationale for judicial review tempered by
congressional supremacy. First, Congress is not sufficiently vigi.lant to notice
state and local policies that might unduly burden interstate commerce. Litigation provides an easier mechanism by which government may notice potential
issues of public policy than does the legislative process. Second, the Court can
devise a reasoned, coherent theory for resolving an issue of public policy. Third,
Congress's power to correct the Court's "common law" commerce clause policy
provides ultimate electoral control. While legislative inertia might make congressional response difficult, it is probably easier for Congress to notice and
respond to an offensive judge-made commercial policy than to notice and respond to the entire range of state and local policies that might unduly compromise national commercial concerns.
292. Based on the proposition that the results of "interpretation" are indeterminately creative, Professor Sandalow has posited that the essence of constitutional decisionmaking is the deliberative processes from which constitutional
law emerges, rather than the substance of those decisions. See Sandalow, supra
note 20, at 1184-85.
293. Roe might also be an example of the erroneous establishment of national policies that compromise values of federalism.
294. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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Blackmun determined that the state may not regulate abortion
during the first trimester of pregnancy; may regulate abortion for
the sake of maternal health during the second trimester; and may
prohibit abortion altogether for the sake of the fetus during the
third trimester.295
If voters today engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics to establish some national standard governing
abortion, would they choose the policies imposed by Justice
Blackmun in Roe? Few would deny that if any issue of constitutional representation is indeterminate, this one is. 296 Given such
indeterminacy, judicial supremacy is problematic, for it protects
as governing constitutional law a judgment that has no firm basis
as sound "interpretation. "297
In contrast, rather than having to wait nearly two decades for
the Court to hand the abortion issue back to the political process-a development suggested by Webster 298-voters would have
had authority to strike their own balance far sooner under a regime of congressional supremacy. 299 Given a healthy measure of
295. Id. at 164-65. Recently, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices
White and Kennedy, indicated an inclination to strike a different balance among
these competing considerations. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492
U.S. 490, 517-21 (1989) (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, CJ.).
296. See supra text accompanying note 164; see al.so Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE LJ. 920 (1973). While Ely allows that
"[w]ere I a legislator I would vote for a statute very much like the one the Court
ends up drafting," he believes that "Roe lacks even colorable support in the constitutional text, history, or any other appropriate source of constitutional doctrine." Id. at 926, 943.
297. Justice Blackmun's methodology, relying in part on century-old common law, "logic," and biology, was hardly well-suited to satisfying the ideal of
constitutional representation. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 132-36, 163. Lo'gic is meaningless except as a means toward effectuating values. Biology might be a matter
of fact, but the facts of biology can relate differently to the values of different
people. Furthermore, there is little reason to believe that century-old common
law reflects values of the national electorate today-whether their ordinary legislative values or their extraordinary constitutional values. The dissenters' answer
was based on a methodology similarly ill-suited to constitutional representation.
Justice Rehnquist limited his opinion to original intent. See id. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (majority "eschew[ ed] the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment"). Justice White's dissent in a companion case was also mired in
originalism. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221-22 (1973) (White,]., dissenting) ("nothing in the language or history of the Constitution" to support Court's
view that Constitution encompasses special solicitude for liberty to choose abortion). For an argument that originalism poorly serves the "interpretive" ideal of
constitutional representation, see supra text accompanying notes 149-53.
298. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 521 (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, CJ.)
("[T]he goal of constitutional adjudication is surely not to remove ... [controversial] issues from the ambit of the legislative process, whereby the people
through their elected representatives deal with matters of concern to them.").
299. Professor Bickel noted that with judicial supremacy, "the ultimate, fi-
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congressional deference to the Court, 300 the political judgment
made by Congress responding to Roe, regardless of its substance,301 more likely could have better reflected the choices that
voters in 1973 would have made if engaged in extraordinarily
thoughtful politics than did Blackmun's opinion, or White's, or
Rehnquist's. 302 As the years passed, voters might have remained
satisfied with their "interpretive" response; they might not have.
With congressional supremacy, Congress could have passed new
naljudgment of the Court is quite frequently ajudgment ultimate and final for a
generation or two. That, however, is quite long enough to worry about, and the
really interesting question, therefore, is what happens within the generation or
two." A. BICKEL, supra note 8, at 244-45 (footnote omitted).
300. See supra text accompanying notes 219, 271-72.
301. Congressional response could be radically different from Justice
Blackmun's opinion-for example, establishing a national norm prohibiting abortion based on viewing the fetus as an entity worthy of protection. If Congress
did make this choice in exercising its powers of congressional supremacy, it
would be difficult to argue that the Court's opinion, rather than Congress's "interpretive" statute, more likely reflects the choices voters today would make if
engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics. Congress's decision, after all, would be not only a national political decision, but also an extraordinarily thoughtful one-compared with ordinary congressional politicslike constitutional politics itself. This view is consistent with Sunstein's version
of "liberal republicanism." See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 1574-76. While a republican perspective (more than one of pluralism or of hopelessly victimized
minorities) might suggest that some views "are better than others," the proof of
the better view comes "through discussion with those initially skeptical." Id. at
1574. Thus, a process of public discussion and resolution, more than one of
judicial imposition, satisfies republican notions ofreflective self-government. Id.
at 1579-80 (republican rights emerge from deliberative politics rather than from
pre-political natural law). Michelman has a more outcome-specific view of republicanism and, therefore, is satisfied with the "traces" of popular republicanism found among a dialogic (and liberal-activist) Supreme Court. See Michelman
I, supra note 42, at 73-77.
302. Reasons supporting this proposition should, by now, be familiar. First,
in presenting an issue for Congress's consideration, the Court's decision, better
than Congress's erstwhile inaction, helps national policymaking to simulate the
extraordinary vigilance of constitutional politics. Second, Justice Blackmun's opinion, as well as the dissents, provides a relatively comprehensive, if not coherent,
point of departure on the merits of the abortion issue. Any congressional response can simulate the extraordinary thoughtfulness of constitutional politics better than did the failure of consideration reflected in the absence of any national
policy at all. Finally, Congress's response can be closer to constitutional politics
than was the Court's initial determination because Congress's resolution is political in an electorally accountable way-as is constitutional ratification itself. This
is particularly significant given Justice Blackmun's self-acknowledged "interpretive" method of balancing competing concerns. Congressional response under
a system of congressional supremacy seems far more likely to satisfy the "interpretive" ideal of constitutional representation than does Justice Blackmun's gut
reaction. Cf Aleinikoff, supra note 282, at 982 (criticizing prevalent judicial balancing where the "weights" of competing interests "are asserted, not argued
for"); id. at 1004 (judicial balancing turns constitutional law into decisionmaking no better than that in ordinary politics).

1991]

A CRITIQ.UE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY

381

legislation, reflecting experience gained and lessons learned, to
supersede its first "interpretive" statute. Indeed, even if Congress did not act again, congressional supremacy need not have
precluded the Court from striking down Congress's first "interpretive" response after a decade or so, posing the constitutional
issue to the national electorate once again, based on a judgment
that voters then would have created a different abortion policy if
engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics.30 3

•••

The foregoing analysis suggests that toward serving concerns
of political self-constraint, judicial review can better serve ideals
of constitutional representation under congressional supremacy
than under judicial supremacy-not only for people who create
constitutional provisions of their own, 304 but also for people who
rely on aging constitutional texts. The "interpretive" ideal of
constitutional representation seeks to replicate decisions that voters would make if engaged in constitutional politics. Constitutional politics toward political self-constraint embodies three
essential elements-electoral roots, extraordinary vigilance, and
extraordinary thoughtfulness. 305
Better than judicial review insulated by judicial supremacy,
judicial review supplemented by congressional supremacy could
simulate all three elements. Ultimate congressional resolution of
constitutional questions would provide electoral roots. The judicial opinions to which Congress would respond-with a likely
measure of healthy deference to the Court-challenge established
policy and would help provide extraordinary thoughtfulness. A
reduction in the paralytic judicial deference inspired by judicial
supremacy would improve the extent to which otherwise unexamined policies become subject to extraordinarily thoughtful scrutiny and, therefore, would provide extraordinary political
vigilance.
The point is obscured when there is no clear notion of what
"interpretation" should be. Yet by framing ideal "interpretation"
303. Cf G. CALABRESI, supra note 72, at 2, 7 (common law courts should
supersede statutes believed no longer to reflect community values). On an issue
such as abortion, ferment seems inevitable; strife and change likely. In the end,
the transition from Roe to Webster suggests that judicial supremacy might delay
change, but not prevent it. Judicial supremacy might simply have delayed the
day when voters learn practical lessons about the abortion controversy that must
be learned.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 88-105.
305. See supra text accompanying notes 241-42.
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as a replication of constitutional politics-identifying choices the
electorate would make if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful
constitutional politics-and by viewing judicial supremacy and
congressional supremacy as alternative mechanisms for ensuring
accountability to this ideal of constitutional representation, congressional supremacy seems to emerge as the better option.
d.
1.

Special Cases
The Flag: Congressional Supremacy and the Preservation of
Exhortatory Constitutional Texts

The recent controversy about flag burning provides a unique
context in which to consider the relative merits of judicial
supremacy and congressional supremacy. In Texas v. johnson, 806
the Supreme Court decided that a state may not criminalize expressive flag burning if the state's purpose is to "preserv[e] the
flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity." 807 President
Bush pressed for a constitutional amendment to supersede the
Court's judgment. 8 0 8 Congress, led by Senator Biden, pursued
legislation to protect the flag. 309
The President openly acknowledged that his concerns were
content-motivated and, therefore, inconsistent with the Court's
opinion in Johnson. 810 Thus, by seeking a constitutional amendment, he acted in a manner consistent with judicial supremacy.
Although Senator Biden professed a content-neutral concern
with the flag as a physical entity, his argument for legislation was
indistinguishable from President Bush's content-motivated argument for a constitutional amendment: The flag is a special and
revered symbol that must be protected. 811 To the extent that
306. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
307. Id. at 410-20.
308. See Remarks by the President Announcing the Proposed Constitutional Amendment on Desecration of the Flag, l Pus. PAPERS 831-33 Uune 30,
1989) [hereinafter Remarks] (the proposed text: "The Congress and the States
shall have power to prohibit the physical desecration of the Hag of the United
States.").
309. S. 1338, lOlst Cong., lst Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 15,067 (1989) ("Whoever knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns, maintains on the
floor or ground, or tramples upon any Hag of the United States shall be fined not
more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year.").
310. See Remarks, supra note 308, at 832-33 (The Hag is "one of our most
powerful ideas. And like all powerful ideas, if it is not defended, it is
defamed.").
31 l. See Statutory and Constitutional Responses to the Supreme Court Decision in
Texas v. Johnson: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civ. and Const. Rights of the House
Comm. on thejudiciary, lOlst Cong., lst Sess. 12, 15 (1989) ("What we've done
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Senator Biden claimed to have acted consistently with the Johnson
opinion, his approach also remained within the bounds of judicial
supremacy. By acting with the very motive that the Court declared unconstitutional, 312 however, Senator Biden sought to exercise powers Congress would possess only under a regime of
congressional supremacy. Senator Biden's legislation passed,
while President Bush's amendment died.
Under congressional supremacy, there would have been no
need for Senator Biden's disingenuous denial that his bill directly
contradicted the Court's op1mon. Indeed, congressional
supremacy would encourage open and direct legislative responses
to judicial decisions as legitimate. Furthermore, under congressional supremacy, congressional legislation that, unlike the Biden
statute, openly and directly responded to Johnson would have been
spared the fate of the Biden statute-invalidated by the Court in
United States v. Eichman.3 13
Thus, one might argue that the flag burning controversy sug... is draft a bill that is 'content neutral.' ") (statement of Sen. Biden). In introducing this legislation, however, he explained, "The flag is truly the nation's
most revered and profound symbol, representing what this country stands for
. . . . That is why ... just two days after the Supreme Court handed down its flag
decision, I stood on this floor and offered a bill to amend the federal flag burning law .... " Id. at 12-14.
312. In reaching his decision for thejohnson Court, Justice Brennan rested
on the "bedrock principle" that "the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414. Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, reaching his
conclusion without significant reference to constitutional text, the framers' intent, or judicial precedent. See id. at 421-35 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
Rather, he looked outside the usual confines of his (self-proclaimed) originalism
and sought to measure the deeply felt values of the national electorate today.
He noted:
[M]illions of Americans regard [the flag] with an almost mystical reverence regardless of what sort of social, political, or philosophical beliefs
they may have. I cannot agree that the First Amendment invalidates the
Act of Congress, and the laws of 48 of the 50 States, which make criminal the public burning of the flag.
Id. at 429 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
313. 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990). In a 5-4 decision, Justice Brennan found that
"[a]lthough the Flag Protection Act contains no explicit content-based limitation
on the scope of prohibited conduct, it is nevertheless clear that the Government's asserted interest is 'related to the suppression of free expression.' " Id. at
2408 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2547 (1989)).
A requirement that congressional response to Supreme Court opinions be
open and direct to carry the authority of congressional supremacy would encourage Congress to deliberate more seriously about the issue at hand-toward
simulating the concern for general principle that is more prominent in extraordinarily thoughtful politics. See supra notes 239-41, 244. Thus, a statute that did
openly and directly contradict the Court might not have been so easy to enact as
was Senator Biden's duplicitous measure.
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gests at least one context in which judicial supremacy is better
than congressional supremacy as a route to constitutional representation: Because judicial supremacy required the national electorate to pursue the Bush route of constitutional amendment to
override the Court's flag policy-a proposed amendment that did
not even approach ratification-voters were less likely than they
would be under congressional supremacy to create an ill-considered policy. Actual constitutional politics is, by definition, a better route to extraordinarily thoughtful decisions than Congress's
pseudo-constitutional politics would be.3 14
Although congressional supremacy would indeed encourage
the inferior electoral route (responsive congressional legislation)
to overturning unpopular constitutional decisions by the Court, it
is important to remember that under judicial supremacy, the better electoral route (ratification of constitutional amendments) has
been successfully completed only four times in the nation's history.315 For those infrequent circumstances when voters actually
would respond to a Supreme Court decision by formal constitutional amendment, the electorate might well construct a policy
more likely to reflect extraordinarily thoughtful choices than if it
acted simply with responsive congressional legislation.
Yet when the electorate's representatives consider, but fail to
ratify, formal constitutional amendment in response to a judicial
314. See supra text accompanying notes 241-47. It should be emphasized
that the Biden statute was not an example of the open and direct response to
judicial review envisioned by the pseudo-constitutional politics of congressional
supremacy. See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
One might object that neither President Bush's politics of constitutional
amendment nor Senator Biden's politics of congressional legislation were extraordinarily thoughtful at all-that both epitomized the reflexive and demagogic politics about which Alexander Hamilton warned when justifying judicial
review. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469-70 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed.
1961); supra note 43. Most lawyers have been indoctrinated injustice Brennan's
perspective. Upon reflection, one might conclude that there is more to Chief
Justice Rehnquist's position than the lawyer's traditional view allows-at least
from the perspective of constitutional representation. In this case, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's afrProach was better suited to constitutional representation than justice Brennan's. In an ironic role reversal, it was the Chief Justice, not Justice
Brennan, who sought the actual values of "millions and millions of Americans,"
rather than referring acontextually to the framers, constitutional text, or precedent. See supra text accompanying notes 123-29 & 208 (discussing extremist
speech from perspective of constitutional representation).
315. See L. FISHER, supra note 60, at 201-05; cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI
(ratified to supersede Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)); U.S. CONST.
amend. XVI (ratified to supersede Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157
U.S. 429 (1895)); U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (ratified to supersede Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)); U.S. CONST. amend. XI (ratified to supersede Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793)).
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decision-as in the flag controversy-the Court's decision remains vulnerable against a benchmark of constitutional representation. That the electorate's representatives began, but failed to
complete, the article V process cannot be taken to validate the
Court's judgment as having successfully identified a choice the
electorate would make in constitutional politics. Indeed, if the
dissenting Justices in Johnson and Eichman had prevailed, there
might well have been talk of an article V response to restore the
integrity of the first amendment that would have fared no better
than did President Bush's failed proposal. Thus, failure to complete article V processes can mean no electoral decision at all, or,
perhaps, a general reluctance to change constitutional text, rather
than endorsement of specific decisions the Court might have
made.
More common are circumstances in which the electorate
would not consider, let alone create, a responsive constitutional
amendment under judicial supremacy, but might consider openly
and directly responsive legislation under congressional
supremacy. Such electoral inertia under article V presents the issue this article confronts: Can the Court's decisionmaking under
judicial supremacy or Congress's openly and directly responsive
decisionmaking under congressional supremacy-neither of which
is article V decisionmaking-better approximate the electorate's
ideal of an extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional deliberation
that does overcome inertia and does yield decision. Previous
analysis has suggested that congressional response under congressional supremacy would more likely yield the choices voters
would make if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics than is the ill-guided "interpretive" decisionmaking
of unaccountable Justices. 316 Thus, in general and over timewhen the electorate is entirely inert under article V and even
when it begins, but fails to complete, decisionmaking under article V-congressional supremacy can yield the better approximation of constitutional representation.
Is it more important to better approximate constitutional
representation for that vast body of issues that do not generate the
sort of intense consensus required to satisfy article V's amendment procedures, or for that small set of exceptional issues that
might generate such political energy as to overcome the article V
316. See supra text accompanying notes 239-49. Again, the Biden statute
was not openly and directly responsive. See supra note 313 and accompanying
text.
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barrier to formal constitutional amendment? For me, answering
this question is relatively easy. Unless there is something special
about the issues that would generate responsive constitutional
amendment-so special that having actual constitutional deliberation rather than responsive congressional deliberation is critically
important-judicial supremacy and congressional supremacy
should be evaluated for the general rule rather than for the rare
exception. At least three of the four situations in which the national electorate has overturned the Court by amending the Constitution-sovereign immunity, federal income taxation, and the
minimum voting age-would hardly seem to qualify as exceptions
so special as to supersede the significance of all other constitutional cases combined. And the fourth; slavery, was resolved not
by extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics, but with the
force of war. Indeed, for this issue, from today's perspective, a
route toward overturning Scott v. Sandford 'fH 7 easier than either
war or constitutional amendment probably would seem a better
option. 318
Some commentators, including Professors Ackerman and
Amar, have recently addressed the problems of "interpreting"
the aging Constitution by focusing on the processes for constitutional amendment. Amar wrote: "In considering modes of updating our fundamental law, our choice need not be limited to the
Article V amendment process versus freewheeling judicial review,
... for there is a third ... possibility: constitutional amendment
by direct appeal to, and ratification by, We the People of the
United States." 319 This possibility suggests that formal constitutional deliberation need not be as rare as it has been under article
317. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
318. The analysis tracks my reasons for suggesting that originalism is a bad
route to constitutional representation. While originalism, more than other theories of interpretation, would likely create greater incentive for formal constitutional amendment, it would do so only because the Court's anachronistic
"interpretations" would increasingly deviate from the choices voters today would
make if engaged in constitutional politics. See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text. In general, the better the system approaches constitutional representation, the less voters need to consider formal constitutional amendment;
with successful constitutional representation, the choices voters would make if
engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics are being made
through other means.
319. Amar, supra note 42, at 1044. Akhil Amar has suggested several alternatives to article V procedures, including (i) ratification of a congressionally proposed national referendum by a mere majority of the national electorate and
(ii) proposal and ratification by majorities of national conventions. See id. at
1044-45 & 1066. Bruce Ackerman also has suggested a modified process for
formal constitutional amendment. See Ackerman, supra note 6, at 1182.
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V. If so, then I have proposed a false tension between congressional supremacy versus judicial supremacy as the general rule,
and formal constitutional amendment as the rare exception.
Yet to provide for electoral rejection of unpopular Supreme
Court decisions by facilitating the amendment of constitutional
text could produce a Constitution that looks more like a
hodgepodge of conflicting principles and policies than a declaration of aspirations for political self-constraint. Indeed, many were
concerned that President Bush's flag amendment would dilute the
symbolic function of the first amendment: at risk was the power
of simple and general commands, issued in an authoritative voice,
to induce popular consideration of, and respect for, principle.
Ironically, with an increase in formal constitu.tional politics that
tinkers with constitutional text toward overturning the Court's
decisions, the Constitution could become less a device of political
self-constraint to influence popular consideration of contemporary issues, and more a diary of momentary political debates.
Thus, in evaluating congressional supremacy versus easier constitutional amendment as a popular check on judicial review, voters
must determine whether the goals of political self-constraint are
better served by relegating the resolution of specific issues to judicial opinions and responsive congressional statutes, 320 or by
elevating the resolution of so many more specific controversies to
the status of constitutional text itself. 321
11.

Brown v. Board of Education 3 2 2

Brown presents the ultimate challenge to any theory of constitutionalism and judicial review. Indeed, my arguments suggesting the superiority of congressional supremacy for a majority
among the national electorate today beg questions about
320. Cf R. NAGEL, supra note 21, at 128-31 (doctrinal formulae employed
by courts to resolve constitutional cases obscure relevant values and lack intuitive appeal).
321. Choosing the best route toward constitutional amendment depends in
large part on confronting this article's fundamental question: Why constitutional supremacy rather than statutory supremacy? See supra text accompanying
notes 23-59 & 137-48. Why have a two-track process for lawmaking? Only by
answering this question can one determine how each track should work. (This
choice also depends significantly on factors that determine a pre-formal, ad hoc
rule of recognition. See supra note 45.) Furthermore, as I have su·ggested
throughout this article, whether voters leave the aging Constitution intact, create new provisions pursuant to article V, or create new provisions by other procedures, they still must decide on the best available interpretive regime-judicial
supremacy, congressional supremacy, or some other alternative.
322. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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whether, and hbw, issues of racial segregation might have been
differently resolved if the Supreme Court had not enjoyed the
powers of judicial supremacy.
From the perspective of voters today, Brown would most undermine congressional supremacy if each of the following three
propositions is true. First, Congress (and the President), representing the will of the national electorate in 1954, would have reversed the Court's decision by statute. Second, a majority among
the national electorate in 1991 oppose racial segregation and support Brown. Third, Brown, as enforced through judicial
supremacy, was necessary for this evolution in national attitudes
about racial discrimination.
If each of these conditions is true, Brown challenges more
than congressional supremacy as a route to constitutional representation; it challenges the notion of constitutional representation itself. If each condition is true, it may be that the Court's
constitutional "interpretations" should reflect policies that a majority of the contemporary electorate would reject even in extraordinarily thoughtful politics (the first condition), but that a
future generation would embrace (the second and third
conditions).
Deriving from Brown this modified "interpretive" ideal, and a
concomitant support for judicial supremacy, 323 is problematic for
several reasons. First, racial segregation in public education
might still have been successfully invalidated under a regime of
323. This "interpretive" ideal could not be vindicated under congressional
supremacy. It is threatened even by the specter of Supreme Court decisions
being overturned by article V constitutional politics. Alexander Bickel seemed
attracted to this ideal of "interpretation." Referring to Brown, he said, "the
Court's principles are required to gain assent, not necessarily to have it." A.
BICKEL, supra note 8, at 251 (emphasis added). John Ely has criticized this notion on several grounds. First, the Supreme Court is not particularly qualified to
predict "progress." See J. ELY, supra note 253, at 69-70. Second, to govern the
present by the values of the future is as undemocratic as governing the present
by the values of the past. See id. at 70. Ely's second criticism, however, does not
give Bickel his due. The matter as I have stated it and, I believe, as Bickel conceived it, is not simply one of "predicting" progress, but of making progress,
where progress is defined from the future's perspective. The present must decide not whether it wishes to suffer in being governed by values that will prevail
in the future, but whether it wishes to suffer in creating a society for which the
future will be thankful. Nevertheless, Ely's first criticism is applicable to this
"interpretive" ideal of making progress: The Court seems not particularly wellsuited to identify those issues and choices that a future generation would embrace, but that would be rejected by the present generation even in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics.
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congressional supremacy. 324 The Court might have waited for a
President who could be relied upon to veto any resolution 325
Congress might have enacted restoring state discretion to segregate. 326 Indeed, Brown itself might have survived under congressional supremacy. Congress might not have passed a resolution
overturning the Court's decision; even if Congress did act, President Eisenhower might have exercised his veto authority. 327
Second, political activity between 1954 and 1964 yielded
profound changes in the national electorate's attitudes about
race. By 1964, Congress not only was an ally of Brown; it had
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which some feared the Court
would invalidate for going too far in prohibiting racist policies and
practices. 3 28 While it is possible that such political change would
not have occurred but for Brown and judicial supremacy, the radi324. See, e.g., R. NAGEL, ;upra note 21, at 5 (Brown reflected dominant national culture).
325. It is perhaps significant that John F. Kennedy was elected President
while expressing sympathy with Brown's principle of desegregation during the
campaign of 1960. See A. BICKEL, supra note 8, at 268.
326. If so, Brown would have been delayed at least seven years. While the
delay would have been problematic, actual desegregation had to await real
changes in attitudes. Cf Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 191-200 (1973)
(Denver district maintained segregated schools 19 years after Brown); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 5-13 (1971) (North Carolina
school board had not desegregated schools 17 years after Brown); Green v.
County School Bd., 391U.S.430, 432-38 (1968) (Virginia county had not desegregated schools 14 years after Brown).
327. The Eisenhower administration did file an amicus brief advocating
that the "separate but equal" doctrine be overruled and systems of segregated
public schools be invalidated. See L. FISHER, supra note 60, at 18. There were
strong reasons other than racial morality for dismantling America's racial
apartheid. "America could not fight world communism and appeal to darkskinned peoples in foreign lands if it maintained racial segregation in its own
school system. The executive branch made the Court mindful of these realities." Id. ; see also Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV.
61, 117-19 ( 1988) (Truman and Eisenhower administrations used desegregation
issue in Cold War competition with Soviet Union for Third World influence).
Eisenhower was far less enthusiastic about Brown when speaking to domestic
audiences. See A. BICKEL, supra note 8, at 265. His justification for supporting
the Court's subsequent affirmations of Brown rested more on judicial supremacy
than on his agreement with the decision. See id. at 266; cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1, 18-19 (1958) (unanimously affirming Brown and stressing duty of state
officials to uphold interpretation of fourteenth amendment). Nevertheless, judicial supremacy allowed Eisenhower to have his cake and eat it too. If he had to
choose between one or the other under congressional supremacy, he might well
have exercised statesmanlike leadership. Cf Amar, supra note 42, at 1101 (irresponsibility results when responsibility is not imposed); Thayer, supra note 60, at
155-56 (given more responsibility, institutions can act more responsibly).
328. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, supra note 60, at 159 (Attorney General Kennedy
expressing fear that Court would invalidate antidiscrimination legislation passed
under § 5 of fourteenth amendment).
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cal change in political orthodoxy during just one decade suggests
that forces of social change were already present and could not
long have been forestalled. 329 Brown was as much a product of
these forces as it was a catalyst. While judicial supremacy might
have stifled some resistance, pro-Brown political activity would
have continued even if Congress had exercised the powers of "interpretive" supremacy to overturn Brown. Protracted politics, at
least as much as the Court's injunctions, changed attitudes so
considerably in the decade after 1954. 330
Finally, even if all three conditions of this Brown scenario are
true, voters today should not necessarily adopt the modified "interpretive" ideal. Perhaps there are no Brown-like issues 331 left in
American politics. 332 Even if voters think there might be such issues, 333 a majority might not be willing to sacrifice the discretion
329. Under congressional supremacy, the Brown scenario might have
played out like this: By 1964 Congress could have enacted legislation repealing
its repudiation of Brown, or broadened the Civil Rights Act with provisions governing school desegregation. Alternatively, the Court might have decided another case like Brown, presenting the constitutional challenge to Congress once
again. For a similar analysis of Roe, see supra notes 298-303 and accompanying
text.
330. While the Court's opinion would no longer have been an authoritative
basis for injunctive force, its moral force would have remained as political capital, perhaps inspiration, for those opposed to segregation. They could then
have struggled against segregation with equal, and perhaps greater, force. Cf
Chang, supra note IO, at 880-85 (Supreme Court opinions are force for political
influence).
331. By this I mean judicial determinations that a majority among the national electorate would reject in constitutional politics today, but that a future
generation would embrace. See supra text preceding note 323.
332. Abortion might be such an issue, but one wonders whether the Brownlike disposition would conform to Roe or instead create national policy to protect
a fetus from abortion. See supra note 30 I.
333. There is at least one sense in which Brown was the last issue of its type.
If overturned under congressional supremacy, Brown would have fallen to a coalition of Southern Democrats and Northern conservatives-precisely the coalition that the Radical Republicans feared in endeavoring to perpetuate their
extraordinary political advantage through the fourteenth amendment. So
viewed, Brown is the last great episode of the Civil War. In this context, constitutional supremacy and judicial supremacy are employed not to promote concerns
for political self-constraint, but to deny one's opponents a right to shape public
policy. If judicial supremacy was necessary for the fall of Southern segregation,
Brown suggests that the Northern electorate's majority was able to perpetuate a
temporary political advantage on this issue. Does this suggest the desirability of
judicial supremacy for those who wish to perpetuate a temporary political advantage? The answer is still unambiguously "no" from the perspective of the national electorate's majority. See supra text accompanying notes 183-91. From the
perspective of the Northern electorate's majority, the answer depends on two propositions. First, Brown's resolution could not have been attained without judicial
supremacy. Second, benefits gained from Brown's resolution through judicial
supremacy are worth more than losses incurred when opponents manage to
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to pursue present concerns-such as, ironically, affirmative action
programs 334-in order to give future generations the satisfaction
of a moral development for issues that might have Brown's status.335 If so, the modified version of constitutional representation
should be rejected, and, with it, judicial supremacy as well.
Brown remains troubling. 336 But it is only from Brown, and
the possibility of future cases like it, that a majority among voters
today should find a significant challenge to an "interpretive" ideal
of constitutional representation and its implementation through
benefit from judicial supremacy. The first proposition is questionable. See supra
text accompanying notes 322-30. The second must be viewed in the light of
each individual's value scheme. Nevertheless, in making that judgment, it might
be helpful for Brown's proponents to consider the present Court's decisions severely restricting local discretion to pursue affirmative action programs. See, e.g.,
City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498-506 (1989) (restricting
local discretion to set aside percentage of public contracts for minority business
enterprises); Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 282-84 (1986) (restricting local discretion to adopt affirmative action program in lay off provision
of collective bargaining agreement); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 307-10 ( 1978) (restricting state discretion to adopt affirmative action program in university admissions policies).
334. See supra note 333. For a critical examination of the Court's recent
conservative judicial activism in restricting legislative discretion to adopt affirmative action programs, see generally Chang, supra note 190.
335. As Professor Seidman has suggested with respect to Brown itself, "It is
not obvious to everyone that Brown ... was worth the cost of Lochner, Korematsu,
and Plessy." Seidman, supra note 22, at 1577 (footnotes omitted). This point is
more powerful as applied to issues that might have Brown's status.
336. The busing remedy might have been more vulnerable under congressional supremacy than Brown itself. Busing was widely unpopular and affected
both Northern and Southern communities. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v.
Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 452-54 (1979) (Ohio); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (North Carolina). Congress might well have
acted to prohibit busing as a remedy for judicially-determined violations. Once
Brown and the evil of purposeful segregation are accepted, however, it easily
follows that some remedy for past transgression is required. Whether a remedy is
required, and for what, presents the moral concern. Whether busing is the best
remedy is not so much a moral issue as a practical one. Remedies other than
busing are available and are arguably superior. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433
U.S. 267, 280-88 (1977) (upholding order for remedial educational programs
and funding); cf. Chang, The Bus Stops Here: Defining the Constitutional Right of
Equal Educational opportunity and an Appropriate Remedial Process, 63 B. U. L. REV. 1,
38-45 (1983) (advocating educational programs tailored to needs of students to
supplement or replace busing). Indeed, there is a growing movement within the
black community advocating schools designed expressly for black males to redress a pattern of disproportionate failure and underachievement. See Kantrowitz & Springen, Milwaukee Plans Two Schools/or Blacks, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 15, 1990,
at 67. Given the continuing debate about how best to cure the effects of purposeful racial segregation, a continuing dialogue between the Court and Congress under congressional supremacy could have been more productive than the
judicially crafted approach that may become extinct as more courts find that past
violations have been "cured." See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Okla. City v. Dowell,
111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
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congressional supremacy. I am inclined to view Brown as unique.
The issue of racial equality has not only a special moral status in
American society, but also the unique history of having spawned a
civil war. At any rate, however troublesome one case is for any
given theory of constitutionalism, it is, perhaps, more troublesome to construct a theory of constitutionalism around one
case. 337 For now, one might simply conclude that even if congressional supremacy is not the best approach for the extreme
exception, it seems best tailored for the general rule.
3.

The Benchmark: Other Theories of Constitutional Interpretation

The foregoing has suggested that congressional supremacy
better serves the "interpretive" ideal of constitutional representation than does judicial supremacy. Because many concerned with
judicial review might reject the notion of constitutional representation-that constitutional law should reflect decisions the electorate today would make if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful
consitutional politics-this section will examine the implications
of congressional supremacy for traditionally prominent theories
of constitutional interpretation.
a.

Originalism

At first glance one might suppose that judicial supremacy
would better achieve originalist interpretation, because judges
are arguably better suited than legislators for identifying and acting upon the original understandings of constitutional provisions. 338 But the Court's performance over two centuries reveals
that judicial supremacy cannot ensure originalist interpretation, if
only because so few judges have embraced originalism as their
benchmark. 339 Furthermore, as I have previously suggested,
originalism is properly rejected, at least from the electorate's perspective today. 340 Thus, however better judicial supremacy might
be toward achieving originalist review should be irrelevant in determining whether judicial supremacy or congressional
supremacy is the better "interpretive" regime from the perspective of voters today.
337. See R. NAGEL, supra note 21, at 4.
338. See PERRY I, supra note 7, at 16-17; Brest, supra note 10, al 82, 103.
339. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 33, at 411-18 (acknowledging that most
constitutional decisions are nonoriginalist); R. BORK, supra note 150, at 155-59
(same); Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional A<ijudication, 88 CoLUM. L. REV.
723, 727 (1988) (same).
340. See supra text accompanying notes 149-53.
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Conventional Morality

Conventional morality envisions judicial review more as the
creation of national common law than as an interpretation of constitutional law. 341 Congressional supremacy can serve an "interpretive" ideal of conventional morality better than judicial
supremacy for two reasons. First, to the extent that congressional
supremacy mitigates the pressures for judicial deference, procedures for making public policy can more vigilantly ensure that local policies are not out of step with national values and that old
policies are not out of step with contemporary values.3 42 Second,
under congressional supremacy, when the Court erroneously
strikes down state or national policies based on putative norms
that offend the national electorate's morality, Congress could respond with legislation that does reflect national consensus.
Under judicial supremacy, a court decision out of step with conventional morality is insulated from revision. Thus, as a legislature's statute supersedes a common law court's precedent,
congressional supremacy makes sense for a theory of "constitutional" interpretation that seeks conventional morality. 343
c.

"Living" Principle

"Living" principle seeks a coherent vindication of moral
principles arguably rooted in constitutional history. 344 As with
originalism, one might suppose that judicial supremacy can serve
"living" principle better than can congressional supremacy. Congressional supremacy empowers the electorate's representatives
to compromise principle by "correcting" judicial decisions that
have pursued the coherent implications of certain values farther
than voters can tolerate.
Yet, for several reasons, constitutional moralists can conclude that congressional supremacy need not substantially undermine the extent to which judicial review serves their ends, or even
that congressional supremacy might promote their ends. First,
"living" principle is controversial as a method of constitutional
interpretation and, therefore, is imperfectly served even under ju34 l. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
342. For an examination of such questions framed as issues of common law,
rather than constitutional law, see generally G. CALABRESI, supra note 72.
343. For the suggestion that conventional morality is deficient as a theory
of constitutional interpretation, precisely because it would transform the nation's constitutional law into a national common law, see supra text accompanying note 159.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 160-68.
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dicial supremacy. While Ronald Dworkin and Michael Perry have
their own preferred principles, Richard Posner and Richard Epstein have theirs. 345 Thurgood Marshall must compete with William Rehnquist.
Second, while "principle" can be compromised by active and
affirmative policymaking-such as the statutes that Congress
might enact in response to Supreme Court decisions that stray
too far from the national electorate's perspective-it also can be
compromised by legislative inertia and inattention. To the extent
that congressional supremacy mitigates the incentives for judicial
deference, the characteristics of courts that enable them to promote principle-their greater vigilance and more coherent reasoning-can promote judicial review as "living" principle. Thus,
under congressional supremacy, Roe might have been changed by
Congress, but Hardwick might have been decided differently by
the Court.
Third, principle "lives" less meaningfully if it grows without
electoral impetus and acceptance. Under congressional
supremacy, policies that some voters dislike, but that survive Congress's opportunity to review and reverse, can be more effectively
vindicated because they would be more clearly rooted in
majoritarian values and choices than they would be under judicial
supremacy. Indeed, one might question the benefit of public policy that reflects the philosopher's preferred "principle" when the
majority resents this "morality" as illegitimately imposed from
without. 346
d.

Liberal Republicanism

Congressional supremacy can serve liberal republicanism
better than can judicial supremacy. Under congressional
345. See Graglia, supra note 186, at 67. Professor Graglia notes:
Dworkin and Epstein are equally enthusiastic about judicial intervention in the political process; they differ only in that Dworkin would have
the Supreme Court enact Rawls' egalitarian program because it is required by natural law and therefore the Constitution, whereas Epstein
would have the Court enact Robert Nozick's libertarian program on a
similar basis.
Id.

346. See Michelman II, supra note 42, at 1504 ("(T]he distinctive promise of
political freedom remains the possibility of genuine collective action, an entire
community consciously and jointly shaping its policy, its way of life.") (quoting
Pitkin.justice: On Relating Private and Public, 9 PoL. THEORY 327, 344-45 (1981));
Sunstein, supra note 42, at 1548 (republican conception of individual autonomy
involves "selection rather than implementation of ends"); id. at 154 7-48 (republican conception of political freedom values "collective self-determination").
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supremacy, judicial Teview would help to simulate the extraordinary vigilance and thoughtfulness of constitutional politics, and
would stimulate the electorate-at-large, as represented in Congress, to deliberate authoritatively about issues otherwise left neglected. Referring to Cass Sunstein's four characteristics of
liberal republicanism, 347 one can conclude that congressional
supremacy could promote (i) more political deliberation among
(ii) more equal political actors, (iii) leading to more agreement
underlying public policy, (iv) all in a stronger atmosphere of participatory citizenship. In contrast, judicial supremacy promotes a
sense of alienation from public policy and undermines electoral
responsibility for making constitutional law. 348
While constitutional representation-choices the electorate
would make if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful politicsseems an ideal description of the substantive policies that would
emerge from true liberal republicanism, 349 congressional
supremacy seems an ideal mechanism (or, at least, one better
than judicial supremacy) for achieving the processes of liberal republican policymaking. This should hardly be surprising, as there
is much of liberal republicanism in the idea of political self-constraint. 350 To the extent that constitutional representation serves
the electorate's ideals of political self-constraint better than other
"interpretive" theories, and to the extent that congressional
supremacy serves constitutional representation better than judicial supremacy, advocates of liberal republicanism should find
their concerns better served by congressional supremacy as well.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This article has questioned the merits of judicial supremacy
347. See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 1547-58 (discussing republican conceptions of politics in terms of these four characteristics); supra text accompanying
notes 169-73.
348. The ideal of constitutional representation toward concerns for political self-constraint seriously undermines Professor Nagel's effort to reestablish
electoral responsibility for constitutional law through more pervasive judicial
deference. See generally R. NAGEL, supra note 21. While deference might make
governing law more electorally rooted, it does nothing to make it more thoughtful. In contrast, congressional supremacy retains the distinction between extraordinary constitutional decisionmaking and ordinary policymaking by
recognizing an essential role for judicial review while giving the electorate ultimate responsibility for evaluating and making constitutional law. See supra text
accompanying notes 266-67 & 287-88 (judicial deference can thwart electoral
vigilance).
349. See supra text accompanying notes 169-73.
350. See supra text accompanying notes 36-43.
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from the perspective of the American voter. From this perspective, the article examined whether the political processes that the
electorate must satisfy to supersede an interpretation of constitutional text by the Supreme Court should be the same processes
that the electorate must satisfy to create constitutional text. By
examining why voters might wish to make policy by creating
supreme constitutional texts rather than by enacting ordinary
congressional legislation, the article sought to develop ideal views
of how such constitutional provisions should be "interpreted,"
and to determine how welljudicial supremacy serves these "interpretive" ideals.
The common denominator of all motives for creating
supreme constitutional texts (other than to overturn a Supreme
Court decision) is a relationship to public decisionmaking in constitutional politics better than one's relationship to public decisionmaking in everyday politics-better through extraordinary
power, 351 extraordinary thoughtfulness, 352 or extraordinary vigilance.353 Voters who have created supreme constitutional texts
hope to perpetuate the extraordinary aspect of their constitutional politics after having returned to everyday politics; they
hope that policy will continue to reflect choices they would make if
still engaged in constitutional politics. Similarly, voters who rely
on aging constitutional texts hope to attain the extraordinary aspect of public decisionmaking they would enjoy if they created
supreme constitutional provisions of their own. 354 In short, voters seek constitutional representation.
For a majority among voters today, only the goal of extraordinary thoughfulness through political self-constraint is relevant in choosing between judicial supremacy and congressional
35 l. People who create constitutional provisions to deny their opponents'
ability to shape public policy in Congress seek to exploit extraordinary but temporary political power-a competitive advantage that they will not enjoy tomorrow. See supra text accompanying notes 23-35.
352. People who create constitutional provisions to secure the benefits of
political self-constraint seek to exploit extraordinary but temporary thoughtfulness and devotion to public policy-a public-oriented thoughtfulness that will be
overwhelmed by their more pressing private concerns tomorrow. See supra text
accompanying notes 36-43.
353. People who create constitutional provisions to ensure optimal legislative accountability seek to exploit an extraordinary but temporary level of direct
control over public policy-a vigilance that will be relinquished to representative
functionaries who will make day-to-day governmental decisions while enjoying
opportunities to serve their own ends rather than those of their employers. See
supra text accompanying notes 44-55.
354. See supra text accompanying notes 144-48.
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supremacy as a route to constitutional representation. 355 For
these voters, judicial supremacy is the less productive device. Judicial supremacy protects judicial decisionmaking no more likely
to reach correct "interpretive" results than a coin toss, and it promotes a measure of paralytic deference that leaves the products of
everyday politics unchallenged in too many contexts. Judicial review supplemented by congressional supremacy, on the other
hand, could encourage decisionmaking processes more thoughtful than everyday politics, 356 more vigilant than everyday politics,357 and more accountable than naked judicial review. 358
These processes, better than policymaking under judicial
supremacy, simulate the extraordinarily thoughtful politics that
constitutionalism seeks to perpetuate.
Yet judicial supremacy and congressional supremacy are not
the only options. Voters might consider, for example,
(i) retaining judicial supremacy and abandoning life-tenure; 359
355. See supra text accompanying notes 215-17.
356. See supra text accompanying notes 245-47, 268-72 & 288-89.
357. See supra text preceding note 245; text accompanying notes 247, 26872 & 286-88.
358. See supra text accompanying notes 242-44, 268-72 & 289-92.
359. Defining an "interpretive" ideal for a Justice's performance can be employed toward defining the judicial term of office: "during good Behaviour."
See U.S. CONST. art. III. That the term so often is called "life-tenure" suggests
an absence of criteria by which to evaluate judicial performance successfully. See
sources cited supra note 22. James Madison suggested that there is, indeed, a
relationship between electoral accountability and good behavior: "[A republican] government ... derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great
body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during
pleasure for a limited period, or during good behavior." THE FEDERALIST No.
39, at 241 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). It should not seem too odd to
link a definition of "good behavior"-of ideal "interpretive" behavior-to the
electorate. Constitutional representation maintains the essence of popular sovereignty and constitutionalism by asking for the choices the national electorate
would make if engaged in constitutional politics.
Life-tenure has been a point of focus for those concerned about judicial
accountability. See supra note 22. My analysis of congressional supremacy suggests, however, that life-tenure, and the personal security for a judge that goes
along with it, can be a constructive force toward constitutional representation.
See supra note 245 and accompanying text. To the extent that the choices voters
would make in constitutional politics are different from the choices made in everyday politics, voters would want some part of the "interpretive" process to be
capable of making decisions different from those made by elected representatives. Independent judicial review provides an element of extraordinary
thoughtfulness that legislative politics often lacks. To subject judges to the pressures of re-election would undermine the possibilities for the dialogic tension
(between court and legislature) from which congressional supremacy can approximate choices the electorate would make if engaged in extraordinarily
thoughtful constitutional politics. See Grodin, supra note 22, at 1980 (former
California justice admitting that concern for retention election might have affected his decisions on bench); Seidman, supra note 22, at 1585-87, 1599-1600
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(ii) adopting congressional supremacy while requiring a supermajority within Congress to override a Court decision; 360
(iii) adopting congressional supremacy while requiring Congress
to wait one year (or two, or more) before it can enact responsive
legislation; 361 (iv) determining whether Congress's structure truly
does provide optimal legislative accountability; 362 (v) exercising
Congress's authority to curtail federal court jurisdiction; 363 or
(judges will behave differently depending on whether appointed for life-tenure,
appointed but subject to removal, or elected); cf. Landes & Posner, supra note
35, at 883 (noting that independent judiciary may use statutory interpretation to
enforce "contracts" between legislators and interest groups).
360. Cf Amar, supra note 42, at 1079-85 (ordinary congressional processes
inadequately majoritarian).
361. This option would discourage a heated rush to judgment and create
an opportunity for extended reflection and debate-as in constitutional politics
itself. At the same time, however, it would extend the period during which a
possibly erroneous judicial decision retains its status as governing law.
362. See supra note 284.
363. Michael Perry has justified a relatively creative, "noninterpretive" judicial review as consistent with electorally accountable policymaking, based on
Congress' power to make exceptions to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. See PERRY I, supra note 7, at 128. This solution is problematic for several
reasons. First, if Congress does restrict the Court's appellate jurisdiction in response to unpopular judicial decisions, it will have eliminated judicial review
altogether in future political disputes about relevant issues. While Perry's democratic safety-valve would silence the Court's voice in certain contexts, congressional supremacy retains judicial review-and with it, the Court's constructive
role in promoting the extraordinary vigilance and extraordinary thoughtfulness
to which voters would aspire in making constitutional choices for political selfconstraint. Cf id. at 157-59 (valuing Court's ability in prison reform litigation to
raise otherwise ignored issues for public scrutiny, while advocating congressional power to "enact legislation withdrawing [such cases] from the federal
courts['] jurisdiction"). Second, given these high stakes of eliminating judicial
review altogether for certain issues, it is hardly clear that Congress would readily
choose to exercise its exceptions clause power. Thus, the Court's judgments
would remain intact, even when unpopular, and even when Congress might
choose to reverse specific decisions given a regime of congressional supremacy.
Thus, Perry must explain why this particular balance of popular control over
judicial intervention is the optimal route toward his ideal of the national community's moral development. Why is article V, or other formal procedures for constitutional amendment, an inadequate popular control to legitimize
noninterpretive review, while congressional supremacy promotes excessive popular control, and the article III exceptions power is just right? See id. at 127, 13335. Third, Perry still embraces originalist review as plainly valid, and not subject
to the control of Congress under its article III power. Id. at 133. Aside from the
problems of identifying originalist limits on "noninterpretive" review, see supra
notes 152 & 237, there remain the basic problems that (i) the framers' preferences are not necessarily those that voters today would choose if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional politics; and (ii) courts are not infallible
in identifying what those preferences are. Perry later retreated from his commitment to electorally accountable policymaking and more unambivalently embraced noninterpretive review. See PERRY II, supra note 7, at 164 (premise that
accountable policymaking is a value prior to all others was mistaken). It seems
to me that Perry has moved in the wrong direction. At least for questions about
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(vi) determining whether article V provides the best procedures
for constitutional amendment. 364
A search for the best "interpretive" regime, rather than the
less imperfect of just two options, would be an inquiry well worth
pursuing. 365 Any other option, I suggest, should be evaluated by
subjecting it to the same analysis this article has applied to judicial supremacy and congressional supremacy. Those concerned
about the proper relationships among constitutionalism, majoritarianism, and judicial review should consider how well any "interpretative" regime can approach an ideal of constitutional
representation: identifying the decisions that voters today would
make if engaged in extraordinarily thoughtful constitutional
politics.366
the nature of the governmental system, choices must (somehow) be attributable
to the electorate-at-large. Such is my task in taking the perspective of voters
comprising the national electorate today.
364. As previously noted, Bruce Ackerman and Akhil Amar have questioned the merits of article V procedures for constitutional amendment. See
supra note 319 and accompanying text.
365. For example, when Pennsylvania's electorate was creating a constitution after the Declaration of Independence, some proposed "that at the expiration of every seven ... years a Provincial Jury shall be elected, to inquire if any
inroads have been made in the Constitution, and to have power to remove
them." See G. Wooo, supra note 42, at 232 (emphasis in original) (quoting pamphlets circulated at that time). Pennsylvania was one of the more radically egalitarian and majoritarian states during the revolutionary period. Id. at 226-37.
This proposal eventually was adopted. Id. at 339.
366. If one remains uncomfortable with constitutional representation and
congressional supremacy, it could be that one is uncomfortable with the idea of
constitutional democracy. See Michelman II, supra note 42, at 1508-IO. Ifa majority of the electorate would reject constitutional representation and congressional
supremacy, however, then the premise with which this article began-that justifications for judicial supremacy depend on justifications for constitutional
supremacy-must be reexamined. See supra text accompanying notes 322-35
(discussion of Brown). If, from the perspective of a national majority, justifications for constitutional supremacy depend on justifications for judicial
supremacy, rather than the other way around, then the processes of judicial decisionmaking must be viewed as the primary good and the processes by which
constitutional provisions are created are at best merely an imperfect way to provide judges with the vaguest sort of guidance; at worst, they are a withering
governmental appendage. Such a version of constitutionalism not only would
suggest that the electorate distrusts itself so much that it seeks Platonic guardians, but also that through two centuries of practice, the practical and normative
relationships between constitutional texts and judicial review have been
reversed.

